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Regulating Sex Work: Assimilationism, Erotic Exceptionalism and Beyond
Adrienne D. Davis 1
Most commentators on sex markets focus on the debate between abolitionists and
those who defend and support professional sex work. This paper, instead, looks at
debates within the pro-sex work camp, uncovering some unattended tensions and
contradictions. It shows that, within this camp, some stress the labor aspect, urging that
sex markets perpetuate a “vulnerable population” of workers, similar to others who
perform highly risky and/or exploited labor, and should be regulated accordingly. In this
view, sex work would be assimilated into other labor. Others, though, take a more antiregulatory stance. They exceptionalize this form of labor, arguing that because it is
sexual it should be exempt from state scrutiny and interference, claims which can quickly
sound libertarian. In sum, while both camps agree that professional sex work should be
decriminalized, when one turns from the criminal to the regulatory perspective, the paper
shows how erotic exceptionalists and assimilationists could not be more opposed. The
paper contends that neither of these views is satisfactory. Sex work could very well be
legalized and regulated—if we have the political and moral will to do so. The paper
explores a regulatory structure that might govern sex markets. Doing so requires a break
with both assimilationism and erotic exceptionalism.
This paper attempts two interventions into the sex work debate. The first move is
a conceptual one, shifting the focus from disputes between abolitionists and sex work
advocates to uncovering contradictions and ambivalences within the pro-sex work camp.
It gives significant attention to these latent tensions, as I anticipate some readers steeped
in feminist theory may dispute this as an issue. The second is a governance move,
comparing sex work to other types of work to consider to what extent various risks and
injuries of sex work, physical and otherwise, could be ameliorated by legalization—that
is by appropriate state regulation. It pairs two regulatory claims. One contends that risk
reduction is best served by correlating regulation to institutional form, or what I call
sexual geography, which I do not anticipate will be that controversial. Another, which
tackles discrimination from the demand side, that is, through the erotic preferences that
comprise sex markets, should be provocative to many. In the end, my goal is to launch a
conversation about whether the sex workplace really is like the factory floor.
Underlying all of this is an effort to break the feminist pro-sex work position out
of an impasse. While increasing global attention to sex trafficking has resulted in the
1
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anti-sex work position becoming more and more refined, evolving into contemporary
abolitionism, the pro-sex work camp appears to remain stuck in a set of first generation
claims. 2 I do not mean to be dismissive or critical; after all, we would not understand
sexual harassment as sex discrimination, marital rape as rape, or domestic violence as
criminal assault without feminism. Yet, in the arena of sex work, the feminist regulatory
imagination remains stuck, unable to recognize the latent tension between
assimilationism and erotic exceptionalism, let alone move beyond it. I call for a quick
and purposeful move into second generation issues beginning with the recognition of the
sheer complexity of the issue. As the paper shows, there is no one free market for sex
work, which is perhaps unintentionally envisioned by assimilationists. Rather, the
question is which free market and which of 1,000 switches to throw. Nor is this debate
only of interest to feminists. Rather, it sheds light on workplace law, anti-discrimination
law, and regulatory effects more broadly, including questions of substitution effects and
endowments.
The Article proceeds in four parts. The first part explores the discourse and
debate over professional sex, teasing out latent, unexplored tensions among advocates of
professional sex as labor. It summarizes, briefly, the abolitionist position, often identified
as the dominant feminist position. It then turns its attention to sex work advocates,
exploring the discourse in detail to reveal a contradiction between those who emphasize
the sexual part of sex work to exempt it from state regulation versus those who
emphasize the labor part of sex work and see this as a way to demand greater state
regulation of sexual commerce. While both camps view “work” as a legitimizing lens,
they ultimately envision starkly different, even contradictory, relationships between
sexual commerce and the state. In the end, while both may urge decriminalization, what I
call assimilationists and erotic exceptionalists are quite opposed.
The second Section shows how assimilationist rhetoric of sex as “just” labor can
be overly simplistic and terribly misleading. From a policy perspective, insisting that
commercial sex merely be assimilated into legal work invokes a single, idealized
workplace that ignores the starkly different manifestations of work and its regulation in
post-industrial global economies. This Section explores how employment, labor, and
discrimination law regulate the various hazards, risks, conflicts, and disputes that arise in
the modern workplace. In the process, it exposes the complete diversity of work and its
regulation. Although assimilationists’ claims rest on a monolithic vision of how “work”
is regulated, their claim to a universal workplace or regulatory structure is a miscue from
how labor law actually functions. Workplace regulation today is varied, differential,
instrumental, and under immense contest.
The second half of the paper then turns its attention to whether sex work could be
effectively regulated, once we break from both assimilationism and exceptionalism.
Section III completes the break and tackles the regulatory question in three moves. It
first stresses the extent to which sex workplaces are not like most workplaces. Most
workplaces are not characterized by the particularities of sex work, the culture of alcohol
and drinking and drugs; the homosocial “mob” context; the blurred line between renegotiations and assaults; a similarly blurred line between on-site/off-site (that is onduty/off-duty) identities; and employer expectations of “free” services that can combine
to make commercial sex more dangerous for workers than most other forms of labor.
2
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Crucially, the danger is coming largely from customers and patrons (and managers and
owners) rather than from machines or mine collapse. Assimilationism misses these key,
distinct characteristics of sex work and the corollary hazards they pose.
There is a corollary to this point: the assimilationist “sex work is just work”
mantra misses the ways that sexual services differ from each other, posing what the paper
shows to be radically different regulatory challenges. The Article rejects schema that
categorize professional sex according to either a criminal/legal binary or along a
continuum of proximity to intercourse, ranging from phone sex to prostitution with
lapdancing and sexual massage in the middle. 3 The paper suggests a different
framework, predicated on institutional form, or sexual geography. It differentiates the
variable hazards posed by phone sex, incall and outcall work, and work in commercial
establishments such as brothels and clubs, proposing to categorize and regulate sex work
according to the risk different institutional geographies pose to worker health and safety.
It shows that the degree of risk correlates not with the type of activity but with the
proximity and isolation of the interaction. In sum, the sexual geography model replaces
the criminal and bodily penetration schema with an analysis rooted in risk reduction.
Other aspects of sex work, though, might be tougher to regulate. Sexual commerce is
highly racially stratified, with workers allocated to different market sectors and
employment prospects based on race and other legally protected characteristics. Many
assimilationists find the idea of dance club or brothel owners or other sex employers
empowering patrons’ racial or other bodily preferences offensive and urge that it
constitutes impermissible discrimination. They likewise condemn customers who
discriminate on their own accounts. The paper demonstrates that while the sexual
geography approach can rather straightforwardly regulate for sex workers’ health and
safety, and even against sexual harassment, disparate treatment discrimination presents a
far more vexed case. This paper questions whether different sorts of discrimination can
be defensibly disaggregated, that is whether racial discrimination can be distinguished
from gender and other forms of discrimination in sex markets. I pursue this inquiry to
show that assimilationists’ embrace of anti-discrimination laws may actually reveal a
latent ambivalence towards sex markets and the erotic preferences that comprise them. I
contend this results from an exclusive focus on labor and an analytical neglect of the
demand side of erotic markets.
The paper concludes by considering the political feasibility of not only
decriminalizing but dedicating administrative and regulatory resources to sex work. It
contrasts sexual commerce with two industries at opposite ends of the regulatory
spectrum, pornography and mining, to consider questions of administrability, political
will, endowments, externalities, and substitution effects. It considers how all of these
will figure into the calculus as to whether sex work can be effectively regulated.
A quick note about language. Because the paper is exploring the discourse and
feasibility of sex as labor, it uses the terms professional sex, sexual commerce,
transactional sex, commercial sex, and sex markets interchangeably. In particular,
professional sex can be contrasted with the “amateur” sex in which most of us engage,
involuntary sex trafficking, and, at a mid-point between the two, “survival sex” in which
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I contend conservatives, liberals, and radicals all are susceptible to this logic. See infra notes [sections I
and III] and accompanying text.
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sex is transacted, typically without meaningful capacity and often directly for drugs. 4 I
avoid the term commodified sex as a nod to the argument that much sex, and intimacy, is
commodified, sometimes in ways that are far more mercenary than in formal sex
markets. 5 On the demand side, I call consumers of paid sexual services customers,
patrons, and clients, self-consciously adopting the “customer” language to confront and
show how a full embrace of market logic and norms can be unsettling. The denomination
“customer” suggests the possible legitimacy of their preferences for different kinds of
sexual services, which I take up in Section IIII as putting purposeful pressure on those
who advocate for legalizing sex markets to contemplate the logical end of sex markets.

I. DISCOURSES OF LABOR: ASSIMILATIONISM & EXCEPTIONALISM
The commodification of activities conventionally associated with women—care, sex,
and reproduction—has long generated debate and controversy, 6 especially among those
whose first principles are feminist, 7 i.e., to sex equality, gender and sex as axes of

4

Survival sex can be traded for any basic subsistence needs, including housing, food, and money. The key
distinction is the immediacy of the trade versus the labor generating a source of income, however regular or
irregular. See, e.g., Jody M. Greene et al, Prevalence and Correlates of Survival Sex Among Runaway and
Homeless Youth, 89 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1406, 1406 (1999) (“’Survival sex’ refers to the selling of sex to
meet subsistence needs. It includes the exchange of sex for shelter, food, drugs, or money.”); UNAIDS
Inter-Agency Task Team on Gender & HIV/AIDS, Fact Sheet: HIV/AIDS, Gender and Sex Work 1 (2008),
available at www.unfpa.org/hiv/docs/factsheet_genderwork.pdf (“Women and men who have occasional
commercial sexual transactions or where sex is exchanged for food, shelter or protection (survival sex)
would not consider themselves to be linked with formal sex work. Occasional sex work takes place where
sex is exchanged for basic, short-term economic needs and this is less likely to be a formal, full-time
occupation.”). Many professional sex workers distinguish their labor from survivalists. See, e.g.,
ELIZABETH BERNSTEIN, TEMPORARILY YOURS: INTIMACY, AUTHENTICITY, AND THE COMMERCE OF SEX
(2007) [hereinafter, BERNSTEIN, TEMPORARILY YOURS] (add pincite and quote).
5
See infra notes [x] and accompanying text. Of course, one can argue that sex between intimates outside
of markets is transactional, etc. These would be species of what Viviana Zelizer calls “nothing but”
arguments, that deny any meaningful distinction between sex work and non-market intimacy. See infra
notes [x] and accompanying text. Because I do think sex performed in markets is different, and in need of
different regulation, than sex outside of markets, I resist this effort to collapse the two and employ different
language. On the other side, abolitionists, of course, will reject my language of voluntary markets. See,
e.g., SHEILA JEFFREYS, THE INDUSTRIAL VAGINA: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE GLOBAL SEX TRADE 89, 15-37 (2009) (arguing feminist embrace of language of labor and voluntarism to characterize sex work
normalizes injuries of prostitution and capitulates to “economic ideology of neo-liberalism”).
6
As Viviana Zelizer observes, “Intimate care sentimentalizes easily, for it calls up all the familiar images
of altruism, community, and unstinting noncommercial commitment. From there it is only a step to a
notion of separate spheres of sentiment and rationality, thence to the hostile worlds supposition that contact
between the personal and economic spheres corrupts both of them.” VIVIANA A. ZELIZER, THE PURCHASE
OF INTIMACY 207 (2005). See also KIMBERLY KRAWIEC, SHOW ME THE MONEY: MAKING MARKETS IN
FORBIDDEN EXCHANGES (2009) (characterizing these as “forbidden markets”).
7
Elizabeth Bernstein observes:
What Arlie Hochschild has termed “women’s uneasy love affair with capitalism” is made all the
more acute when we consider that many of the flourishing sectors of the late-capitalist service
economy—such as child care, domestic labor, and sex work—are commercialized refinements of
services that women have historically provided for free.
BERNSTEIN, TEMPORARILY YOURS, supra note [x], at 176 (footnote omitted).
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distributive justice, and destabilizing the sex/gender system. 8 While subject to much
critique, care activities have long been heavily commodified; much of this activity is
unregulated, or, more precisely, occurs in what Elizabeth Emens has called a “litigationfree zone.” 9 Reproduction is currently in a gray area of commodification and regulation,
with increased technological capacities generating much debate over the legitimacy of
such markets and their regulation. 10 The last of the troika, commodified sex, and more
specifically, markets for sex, is the subject of this paper and has been particularly
contentious. Although commodification pervades sexual intimacy, 11 social
condemnation of sexual labor has a long history. 12 Sex markets are diverse, and so is
8

There are, of course, many, contested definitions of feminism. I adopt Gayle Rubin’s classic formulation
that feminism is dedicated to destabilizing the sex/gender system and supplement it. Gayle Rubin,
Thinking Sex: Notes for a Radical Theory of the Politics of Sexuality, in PLEASURE AND DANGER:
EXPLORING FEMALE SEXUALITY (Carole S. Vance ed., 1984) (discussing sexuality as a political force
similar to gender that is used to create and maintain hierarchies of power and oppression of
nonconformists).
9
“Intimate discrimination should remain a litigation-free zone. But this does not mean it should be, or
could be, a law-free zone. On the contrary, law should take account of its role in intimate discrimination at
a structural level and work to eliminate burdens and biases that currently shape who has access to intimate
relationships and on what terms.” Elizabeth F. Emens, Intimate Discrimination: The State's Role in the
Accidents of Sex and Love, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1307, 1311 (2009).
10
For example, contrast Michigan, where statutes prohibit enforcement of surrogacy contracts and
parenthood defaults to the birth mother with California where both the judiciary and legislature provide
mechanisms to enforce such agreements. Compare Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. 722.857 (West 2004)
(penalties of up to five years in prison for participants in a gestational surrogacy arrangement involving
compensation) with Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993) (enforcing the surrogacy contract and
holding that the couple that initiated the creation of the child are the intended and legal parents); Cal Fam
Code § 7961 (2011) (regulating “surrogacy facilitators” and payment/escrow procedures). For discussion
of the legitimacy of surrogacy agreements, see for example Marjorie M. Shultz, Reproductive Technology
and Intent-Based Parenthood: An Opportunity for Gender Equality, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 297 (1990); Karen
Busby & Delaney Vun, Revisiting The Handmaid’s Tale: Feminist Theory Meets Empirical Research on
Surrogate Mothers, 26 CAN. J. FAM. L. 13 (2010) (presenting empirical data to challenge claims about the
vulnerability and exploitation of women who agree to gestate pregnancies for others); Seema Mohapatra,
Achieving Reproductive Justice in the International Surrogacy Market, 21 ANNALS HEALTH L. 191 (2012)
(responding to rise of reproductive tourism); Elizabeth S. Scott, Surrogates and the Politics of
Commodification, 72 LAW & COMTEMP. PROBS. 109 (2009) (noting how the “moral panic” about
commodification sparked by Baby M has dissipated over time). Elizabeth Bartholet condemns reproductive
technology in different terms, as devaluing children in need of adoption.
11
See generally ZELIZER, supra note [x]; RETHINKING COMMODIFICATION: CASES AND READINGS IN LAW
AND CULTURE (Martha M. Ertman & Joan C. Williams eds., 2005).
12
As noted, commodification pervades sexual intimacy and the question of when commodification tilts sex
into a “professional,” market transaction is deeply contested. See, e.g., ZELIZER, supra note [x], at 94-157
(discussing legal cases on the borderline of prostitution and non-commercial interactions). Moreover,
Zelizer notes that race and class norms and rituals often differentiate prostitution from dating as money
changes hands. Id. at 114-18. Recent cultural phenomena, including the Girlfriend Experience and Sugar
Babies, both demonstrate how seamless the line can be, as the former explicitly “sells” non-market ideals in
markets for sex and the latter explicitly brings market ideals into nominally non-marketized sex. Id. at 83,
97, 111.
In explaining the widespread repugnance of commodified intimacy, including sex work, Zelizer
notes, it is rarely the actual commodification of intimacy that troubles us, as economics plays a large role in
intimacy, but the “payment systems” that are employed. In the case of professional sex, or cash for sex,
abolitionists condemn the mixing as what Zelizer calls “hostile worlds.” This hostile worlds approach,
“which frequently involves questions of social justice” rests on and reinforces the idea of “intimacy as a
fragile flower that withers on contact with money and economic self-interest.” Opposition to sex work
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their treatment by the state. Almost everywhere in the U.S. purchase of actual sex is
currently criminalized, 13 but filming and distribution of sex acts, i.e., pornography, erotic
performances which may include sexual acts performed on customers, (e.g., lapdances),
erotic massages, and sexual interactions that do not involve touching (e.g., internet and
phone sex) are all legal. While sex markets and their regulation are diverse, the stigma
associated with them is not. Neither commodified reproduction nor commodified care
entail the social and moral reprobation commodified sex does. 14
A. The Debate over Professional Sex: A Primer
Interestingly, many self-identified feminists join conservatives in opposing legal
markets for sex. However, while conservatives typically target both the sale and
purchase of sex, many feminists urge criminalizing only its sale. 15 In addition, while
often rests on the belief that “intimacy corrupts the economy and the economy corrupts intimacy.”
Sometimes it is intimacy that corrupts the “commercial,” e.g., insider trading and sexual harassment and
sometimes it is economics that corrupts intimacy. Prostitution is a classic example is of the latter.
Ironically, she contends the contamination hypothesis draws on nineteenth century ideologies of
domesticity and separate spheres, which have been much criticized by feminists. ZELIZER, supra note [x],
at 40, 1, 5, 297, 24, 24.
13
The United States leaves the status of prostitution to the individual states, but it is criminalized
everywhere except for eleven rural counties in Nevada, with populations of less than 700,000. N.R.S.
244.345.8. Between 1980 and 2009, “indoor” prostitution was legal in Rhode Island because of an
unintentional legislative loophole. The state enacted new legislation criminalizing all prostitution in
November 2009. Rhode Island: 2009 R.I. Pub. Laws 185-186 “Prostitution and Lewdness.” Some
jurisdictions have contemplated decriminalization or non-enforcement of state laws at the local level. See,
e.g., Proposition K, City of San Francisco: Changing the Enforcement of Laws Related to Prostitution and
Sex Workers (2008, defeated), text available at http://www.smartvoter.org/2008/11/04/ca/sf/prop/K/; see
also Sylvia A. Law, Commercial Sex: Beyond Decriminalization, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 523, 583-585 (2000)
(discussing New Jersey, Rhode Island, and San Francisco); Leigh, supra note [x] (discussing San Francisco
Task Force recommendations to suspend enforcement of state laws against prostitution and redirecting
resources to services for sex workers and enforcing nuisance laws).
Although prostitution is itself is illegal, Viviana Zelizer notes that “in practice courts and judges
have not maintained a simple dichotomy of legitimate, nonmonetary sexual relations versus illegal,
monetized prostitution.” Instead, they carefully parse how and when commodified relations are permitted
within intimate connections. ZELIZER, supra note [x], at 148-51.
14
While people debate the ethics of commodified care work, critics do not generally condemn care
providers as immoral, unethical , criminal people. Similarly, most tend to see reproductive surrogates as
themselves victims of reproductive markets and the wealthy. Sex workers, however, are often viewed as
immoral, bad people. See, e.g., Bernstein, supra note [x], at 7 (“prostitution has . . . been the paradigmatic
example of the moral difficulties that ensue when bodily attributes are commodified for a wage.”); see also
Martha C. Nussbaum, “Whether from Reason or Prejudice”: Taking Money for Bodily Services, 27 J.
LEGAL STUD. 693 (1998) (using other forms of labor to question extreme opposition to prostitution.).
15
See, e.g., Michelle Madden Dempsey, Sex Trafficking and Criminalization: In Defense of Feminist
Abolitionism, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1729, 1776-77 (2010) (“Meanwhile, whether because they are victims of
male patriarchy or because they are victims of social deviance, women prostitutes should not be penalized
themselves but instead should be the target of rescue and rehabilitation efforts.”); Chuan, supra note [x], at
1669. This is the model adopted by Sweden. See infra notes [x] and accompanying text.
Complicating this argument, though, Levitt and Dubner observe that “most governments prefer to
punish the people who are supplying the goods and services rather than the people who are consuming
them” even though the resulting scarcity inevitably raises prices, which “entices more suppliers to enter the
market.” They speculate that a more effective mechanism would be to target demand in a different way: if
“men convicted of hiring a prostitute were sentenced to castration, the market would contract in a hurry.”
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conservatives typically condemn professional sex in moral terms, feminists do so in a
different register. For instance many feminists characterize commercial sex as abusive of
women 16 and a human rights violation 17—it is an inherently “degraded exchange.” 18
They reject it as a legitimate form of labor, instead seeking its prohibition and
eradication. According to philosopher Carol Pateman, “When women’s bodies are on
sale as commodities in the capitalist market, the terms of the original contract cannot be
forgotten; the law of male sex-right is publicly affirmed, and men gain public
acknowledgment as women’s sexual masters – that is what is wrong with prostitution.” 19
Catharine MacKinnon has a similar formulation, “Women are prostituted precisely in
order to be degraded and subjected to cruel and brutal treatment without human limits; it
is the opportunity to do this that is exchanged when women are bought and sold for
sex.” 20 Kathleen Barry puts it perhaps most strongly: “The sex men buy in prostitution is
the same sex that they take in rape—sex that is disembodied, enacted on the bodies of
STEVEN D. LEVITT & STEPHEN J. DUBNER, SUPERFREAKONOMICS: GLOBAL COOLING, PATRIOTIC
PROSTITUTES, AND WHY SUICIDE BOMBERS SHOULD BUY LIFE INSURANCE 25 (2009).
16
One of the most famous opponents, Kathleen Barry, explains:
This misogyny, the use of prostitutes to act out one’s contempt for the lower and degraded sex, is
the single most powerful reason why prostitution has always been considered a cultural
universal—the oldest profession, the indestructible institution, the necessary social service. It
intersects with the domination of women at all levels of society.
KATHLEEN BARRY, FEMALE SEXUAL SLAVERY 137 (1984).; see also KATHLEEN BARRY, THE
PROSTITUTION OF SEXUALITY 37 (1995) [hereinafter THE PROSTITUTION OF SEXUALITY]; JEFFREYS, THE
INDUSTRIAL VAGINA, supra note [x], at 1 (“the growing market sector [of prostitution] needs to be
understood as the commercialization of women’s subordination”); Andrea Dworkin, Prostitution and Male
Supremacy (1992) (rejecting prostitution as male dominance); Mary Ann Becker, A Review of The
Prostitution of Sexuality: The Global Exploitation of Women (reviewing Kathleen Barry), 52 DEPAUL L.
REV. 1043, 1044-45 (2003) (“while pornographic media are the means of sexually saturating society, while
rape is paradigmatic of sexual exploitation, prostitution, with or without a woman's consent, is the
institutional, economic, and sexual model for women’s oppression.”).
17
“The abolitionist position treats all prostitution as a problem of human rights, to be condemned
uncompromisingly, like slavery, and never to be equated with acceptable practices like work, or with
legitimating ideas like consent and contract.” Jane E. Larson, Prostitution, Labor, and Human Rights, 37
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 673, 680 (2004).
18
Bernstein, supra note [x], at 109. Some contend that legalized sex markets “effectively places the
government in the role of pimp.” Carrie Benson Fischer, Employee Rights in Sex Work: The Struggle for
Dancers’ Rights as Employees, 14 LAW & INEQ. 521, 552 (1996). See also Almog, supra note [x], at 735
(“The Victoria government, apparently motivated by the profits brought in by the prostitution market, is
ignoring the accumulating evidence regarding the sorry situation of women in the ‘sex industry,’ the
growing violence towards them and the normalization of this violence.”); Sex Workers and Sex Work, supra
note [x], at 5 (“Under legalization . . . [t]he state becomes a licit pimp . . . .”).
19
CAROLE PATEMAN, THE SEXUAL CONTRACT 208 (1988). See also Laurie Shrage, Should Feminists
Oppose Prostitution?, 99 ETHICS 347 (1989) (“most feminists find the prostitute’s work morally and
politically objectionable. In their view women who provide sexual services for a fee submit to sexual
domination by men, and suffer degradation by being treated as sexual commodities.”).
20
Catharine A. MacKinnon, Prostitution and Civil Rights, 1 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 13, 13 (1993). See also
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 168 (1991) (“Because the stigma
of prostitution is the stigma of sexuality is the stigma of the female gender, prostitution may be legal or
illegal, but so long as women are unequal to men and that inequality is sexualized, women will be bought
and sold as prostitutes, and law will do nothing about it.”); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, WOMEN’S LIVES,
MEN’S LAWS 159 (2005) (“Perhaps when women in prostitution sustain the abuse of thousands of men for
economic survival for twenty years, this will, at some point, come to be understood as nonconsensual as
well.”).
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women who, for the men, do not exist as human beings.” 21 Legal philosopher Margaret
Radin makes a different point, that commodified sex cannot co-exist with our aspirations
for its decommodified form. 22 These insightful and influential feminists conclude that
the injuries and harms of commercial sex warrant its continued criminalization, and many
contend the state does not do enough to eradicate it. 23 Indeed, for some, ending
prostitution is “feminist abolitionism.”24 (And within abolitionism, some limit their
criticisms to prostitution while others are all encompassing criticisms of commercial sex
more generally. 25) In sum, opposition to sex markets has a long and rich feminist
pedigree.
On the other side, different strains of feminist thought argue the legitimacy of
professional sex. Some do so from a pro-sex perspective, arguing that [add quote]. 26
Relatedly, some contend that decriminalized sex exchanges have the potential to subvert
patriarchy, challenging the social mechanisms by which some women are socially slotted
and raised to be “good girls.” In this conceptualization, commercial sex becomes a
“category of radical sexual identity.” 27 Others argue that all women bargain and “work”
for sex, a claim that dates back to nineteenth-century critiques of the dichotomy between
marriage and prostitution as a false one. 28 Still others root their support for sex markets
21

BARRY, THE PROSTITUTION OF SEXUALITY, supra note [x], at 37.
MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES. See also Margaret Jane Radin, MarketInalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1915-1917 (1987) (characterizing prostitution as double bind
where both commodification and non-commodication can be harmful); ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN
ETHICS AND ECONOMICS (1993) (commodified sex has negative influences on gratuitous sex); Elizabeth
Anderson, Is Women’s Labor a Commodity?, 19 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 71 (1990) (add parenthetical).
23
See also Bernstein, supra note [x], at 93 (“Radical feminists usually have argued that legalization is the
state’s official endorsement and the ultimate patriarchal expression of ‘the traffic in women.’”).
24
See, e.g., Dempsey, supra note [x], at 1733 (“Feminist abolitionism, as I understand it, is action taken in
an effort to end sex trafficking that is motivated by a belief that such trafficking harms women in ways
tending to sustain and perpetuate patriarchal structural inequalities.”). Dempsey emphasizes “the ways in
which feminist abolitionism is importantly distinct from conservative and reactionary flavors of
abolitionism.” Id. Elizabeth Bernstein provides a comprehensive and insightful discussion of the neoabolitionist advocacy movement. See Elizabeth Bernstein, The Sexual Politics of the "New Abolitionism, 18
DIFFERENCES 128 (2007) [hereinafter Bernstein, New Abolitionism] (focusing on the converging factors
underpinning the neo-abolitionist movement); Elizabeth Bernstein, Militarized Humanitarianism Meets
Carceral Feminism: The Politics of Sex, Rights, and Freedom in Contemporary Anti-trafficking
Campaigns, 36 SIGNS 45 (2010) [hereinafter Bernstein, Militarized Humanitarianism] (add parenthetical).
25
Compare Barry, supra note [x], with Pateman, supra note [x], and Radin, supra note [x],.
26
see also Mary Joe Frug, A Postmodern Feminist Legal Manifesto (An Unfinished Draft), 105 HARV. L.
REV. 1045, 1059 (1992) (“The arguments that sex workers are making to assimilate their work into the
wage market appeal to a sexualized femininity that is something other than a choice between criminalized
and maternalized sex or a choice between terrorized and maternalized sex.”).
27
Bernstein, supra note [x], at 112. The sex work advocacy group COYOTE concurs that open markets for
sex subvert gender roles, in which some women are socially slotted and raised to be “good girls.”
28
This argument has a long pedigree, dating back to nineteenth-century gender activists and earlier. See,
e.g., MARY WOLLSTONECRAFT, A VINDICATION OF THE RIGHTS OF WOMAN (1792) (calling marriage
“legal prostitution”); Lucinda B. Chandler, (“when prostitution ceases inside of marriage it will cease
outside”); see also JEFFREYS, THE INDUSTRIAL VAGINA, supra note [x], at 40-44 (offering genealogy of
feminist equations of marriage with prostitution). More recent invocations include PATEMAN, supra note
[x], at 123 (“The husband’s conjugal right is the clearest example of the way in which the modern origin of
political right as sex-right is translated through the marriage contract into the right of every member of the
fraternity in daily life.”); Prabha Kotiswaran, Wives and Whores: Prospects for a Feminist Theory of
Redistribution, in SEXUALITY AND THE LAW: FEMINIST ENGAGEMENTS (Carl F. Stychin & Vanessa E.
22
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in liberalism, making agency arguments that women should have the ability to determine
their own trade-offs after discerning and evaluating their options. 29 In fact, one
sociologist finds that, ironically, prostitution may be the first time some women feel
empowered regarding sex, including to refuse it. 30 Those who embrace what they
conceive of as erotic autonomy criticize criminal law for labeling sex workers as sex
offenders, despite the consent of both parties. 31 In this sense they invoke Lawrence v.
Texas-like analyses over the scope of sexual autonomy and what the state should
criminalize. Most recently, some advocates for transactional sex have made arguments
from the “demand” side, pointing out that sex markets may be the only chance that the

Munro eds.,). Elizabeth Bernstein’s ethnography of prostitutes found this sentiment alive and well.
According to one San Francisco sex worker: “’All fucks are tricks anyway, and you’re always doing it for
the money. If you sleep with your husband and later he gives you $50, it amounts to the same thing.’”
BERNSTEIN, supra note [x], at 51. A classic example linking marriage’s mercenary element with
prostitution comes from Jenny Livingston’s documentary on drag queens in New York City:
I feel like, if you’re married? A woman, in the suburbs, a regular woman, if you want your
husband to buy a washer and dryer set, I’m sure she’d have to go to bed with him, to give him
something he wants, to get what she wants. So, in the long run, it all ends up the same way.
Jenny Livingston, Paris Is Burning (Venus Xtravaganza). See also ZELIZER, supra note [x], at 125
(describing how some professional sex workers view nonprofessionals as gullible). A slightly different
view is expressed by Laura Kipnis, who contends that normative, marital love and intimacy entails a
significant amount of emotional labor and participation in an ongoing commerce of affect. LAURA KIPNIS,
AGAINST LOVE: A POLEMIC (2003). Cf. JEFFREYS, THE INDUSTRIAL VAGINA, supra note [x], at 38-61
(from abolitionist side showing how child, forced, and trafficked marriages can literally be prostitution).
29
One activist/scholar contends that feminist opposition to sex work flies in the face of feminism’s
insistence on women’s agency in other matters regarding their bodies:
This hypocrisy is evident in the abortion debate. Many feminists champion a woman’s right to
choose—as long it is abortion that is being discussed. But let someone suggest that women have a
right to sell their bodies and suddenly these women no longer advocate choice. Prostitution must
be the same issue for feminists as abortion. It is the right to choice. Both involve the right of a
woman to control what happens to her body. If one claims self-ownership as the basis of a
woman's right to choose an abortion, then the logical implication of such ownership cannot be
limited to abortion. If a woman owns her body, she should be able to choose to do with it what she
will.
Norma Jean Almodovar, For Their Own Good: The Results of the Prostitution Laws as Enforced
by Cops, Politicians and Judges, 10 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 119, 122 (1999); see also Cynthia Chandler,
Feminists as Collaborators and Prostitutes as Autobiographers: De-Constructing an Inclusive Yet Political
Feminist Jurisprudence, 10 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 135, 136 (1999) (“Many feminists champion a
woman’s right to choose—as long as it is abortion that is being discussed.”).
30

Prostitution may, nevertheless, be experienced by some of these women as both an economically
and sexually liberating option. Given the range of economic and sexual alternatives in a society in
which female sexuality is already appropriated, in which rape, incest and forced sex with
boyfriends have been the routine litany of their coming of age, prostitution may ironically be the
first time that they have experienced the notion of “consent” as at all meaningful.
Bernstein, supra note [x], at 105 (footnotes omitted). See also BERNSTEIN, supra note [x], at 180 (“for
many women, the quid pro quo of cash for sex made sex work less morally troubling than other economic
options, and more personally empowering than other forms of heterosexual intimacy.”).
31
See, e.g., Almodovar, supra note [x], at 123 (“For mutually agreed upon financial transactions it should
not matter to anyone outside the relationship how many times sexual activity occurs, or with how many
sexual partners.”); Law, supra note [x], at 526 (“The exchange of sexual services for money is the only
form of consensual adult sexual activity that is systematically subject to criminal sanctions in the United
States at the end of the twentieth century.”).
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disabled and other sexually marginalized groups have for non-autoerotic sex. 32 Finally,
some make anti-exceptionalism arguments, that professional sex is just like any other
form of labor and should be respected and regarded as such.
Of course, these arguments are not mutually exclusive, and there is significant
overlap. In particular, erotic autonomy overlaps with labor discourse. Moreover,
increasing international attention to human trafficking has deepened the stakes for both
sides. Since the 1990s the rise of both trafficking and anti-trafficking advocacy has put
substantial pressure on the pro-sex work position. Many abolitionists make a persuasive
cases that “voluntary” commercial sex cannot be meaningfully disaggregated from sex
trafficking. Abolitionists’ denial of a sphere of autonomous sexual transactions has
caused the opposing camp to double-down on their labor claims. The remainder of this
paper will explore the discourse of professional, transactional sex as legitimate labor.
B. The Labor Claim
Grounded in labor discourse, the term “sex worker” originated in the 1970s to
legitimate professional sex in the face of the then-dominant feminist thought that objected
to prostitution as exploitation and sought to abolish it and “rescue” the women who did
it. 33 Unlike earlier reform efforts, based on tolerating prostitution either to preserve
men’s sexual privilege or to end women’s victimization, the new discourse of sex as
labor emerged from the prostitutes’ rights social movement. 34 Sex work emerged in this
context as “a term that suggests we view prostitution not as an identity—a social or
psychological characteristic . . . often indicated by ‘whore’—but as an income-generating
activity or form of labor.” 35 Elizabeth Bernstein concurs: “Unlike the word ‘prostitute,’
with its connotations of shame, unworthiness or wrongdoing, the term ‘sex-worker’ tries
to suggest an alternative framing that is ironically both a radical sexual identity (in the

32

See infra notes [x] and accompanying text. This is also the case for commodified reproduction, or
surrogacy. See, e.g., JOHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE: FREEDOM AND THE NEW REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGIES (1994) (arguing a “right” to use assisted reproduction for those who cannot otherwise
reproduce); Lindsey Coffee, A Rights-Based Claim to Surrogacy: Article 23 of the Convention on Rights of
Persons with Disabilities, 20 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 259 (2012).
33

The term is attributed to Carol Leigh, an activist for prostitutes and member of COYOTE. Oliver J.
McKinstry, We’d Better Treat Them Right: A Proposal for Occupational Cooperative Bargaining
Associations of Sex Workers, 9 PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 679 n.18 (2007). Many credit the 1975 strike of
prostitutes in France as the start of a movement to conceive of sex bargainers’ rights in the language of
labor. Sylvia Law, however, documents an earlier strike in Hawaiian during World War II, in which
prostitutes used their alliances with the military to resist and renegotiate legal restrictions and police
surveillance. Law, supra note [x], 563-64. For a comparison of the relative weakness of prostitute rights
movement with more successful contemporaneous gay and abortion rights movements, see generally
Ronald Weitzer, Prostitutes Rights in the United States: The Failure of a Movement, 32 SOCIOLOGICAL Q.
23 (1991).
34
See, e.g., Carol Leigh, A First Hand Look at the San Francisco Task Force Report on Prostitution, 10
HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 59 (1999) (“The current movement includes a recognition of the rights of
prostitutes to autonomy and self-regulation.”). For discussion of “rescue” criticisms of prostitution, see, for
example, BERNSTEIN, supra note [x], at 8-10.
35
GLOBAL SEX WORKERS: RIGHTS, RESISTANCE AND REDEFINITION 3 (Kamala Kempadoo & Jo Doezema
eds., 1993).
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fashion of queer activist politics) and a ‘normalization of prostitutes as ‘service workers’
and ‘care-giving professionals.’” 36 More recently, sex-as-labor advocates also derive
their claim from human rights discourse, which guarantees choice of occupation as a
right. 37
Others embrace the term sex worker to invoke other associations. For instance,
influential theorist and activist Kamala Kempadoo endorses “sex worker,” but
analytically substitutes “gender” for “sex.” In her view, the denomination sex worker
“insists that working women’s common interests can be articulated within the context of
broader (feminist) struggles against the devaluation of women’s work and gender
exploitation within capitalism.” 38 Relatedly, some urge the term to call attention to the
multiplicity of people—men, women, heterosexual, homosexual, transgender, etc.—who
sell sex.39 Thus some adopt “sex worker” to invoke identitarian or coalitional discourses
and critiques. Overwhelmingly, though, those who endorse the sex worker rubric do so
to embrace a discourse of transactional sex as legitimate labor. Hence, the website for
the Live Nude Girls Unite!, a documentary about erotic dancers’ efforts to organize, takes
care to proclaim: “This site is about a labor film.” 40
Yet, among those who advocate professional sex-as-labor there is a deep split that
has gone largely unnoticed. Universally, this contingent urges decriminalization of
professional sex, contending that criminalization results in stigmatization,
marginalization, and punishment. 41 They observe that the long-standing criminalization
of markets for sex has invited both organized crime and police corruption, while also
heightening the vulnerability and isolation of those who transact sex. 42 Criminalizing
36

Bernstein, supra note [x], at 111.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, both sides use human rights frameworks. While sex work advocates urge a right
to work and privacy guarantees, abolitionists invoke a different set of norms against sexual discrimination,
state-sanctioned patriarchy, and rights to be free from inter-personal violence. The dominant human rights
agencies have taken a strong stand against forced prostitution and trafficking, but have largely remained
neutral on the question of prostitution itself. See, e.g., A Modern Form of Slavery: The Human Rights
Watch Global Report on Women’s Human Rights 196-273 (1995); Nussbaum, supra note [x], at 710
(noting human rights organizations have focused attention on forced sexual labor and also on alleviating
material conditions that give rise to prostitution).
38
KEMPADOO, supra note [x], at 8. See also Heidi Tinsman, Behind the Sexual Division of Labor:
Connecting Sex to Capitalist Production, 17 YALE J. INT’L L.J. 241, 241, 245 (1992) (contending “sex is
central to the way in which all women are exploited in all types of work” and hence “all types of women’s
work should be treated alike under the law”).
39
McKinstry, supra note [x], at 683.
40
Live Nude Girls Unite, at http://www.livenudegirlsunite.com/\.
41
Prabha Kotiswaran points out how criminal, prohibitory laws have become fetishized by both sides of the
decriminalization debate. “While the normative status of sex work remains deeply contested, abolitionists
and sex work advocates alike display an unwavering faith in the power of criminal law; for abolitionists,
strictly enforced criminal laws can eliminate sex markets, whereas for sex work advocates,
decriminalization can empower sex workers.” Kotiswaran, supra note [x], at 579. In sum, contra Michel
Foucault’s injunctions against juridical understandings of modern regulation, “Both camps thus view the
criminal law as having a unidirectional repressive effect on the sex industry.” Id. at 613. See also
Nussbaum, supra note [x], at 708 (“Criminalization and regulation are not straightforwardly opposed; they
can be closely related strategies.”).
42
Kathleen Barry notes that
Separating women from their neighborhoods into distinct red-light districts and brothels [as a
result of the Contagious Diseases Acts] identified the women as prostitutes more specifically and
thereby made their ability to leave prostitution much more difficult...In turn, this social and
37
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prostitutes’ labor also serves as an obstacle to their reporting sexual assaults, enforcing
their consensual contracts for transactional sex, and even accessing public health
services. But, while unanimously endorsing lifting criminal bans on professional sex,
sex-as-labor advocates disagree whether there is a further role for the state in regulating
this market. Frequently, this is cast as a disagreement between those who limit their
arguments to calls for decriminalization and those who urge full legalization and
regulation. 43 Overlooked, though, is the extent to which these positions actually embed
contradictory views of sexual labor itself.
1. Decriminalization, or, Erotic Exceptionalism
Emblematic of the decriminalization without regulation position, two
commentators insist, “Sex workers’ ability to control their lives is most undermined by
state regulations that criminalize, penalize, stigmatize, and therefore isolate sex workers,
rendering them unable to counter harassment and abuse.” 44 In this view, not only
criminalization, but also affirmative regulations lead to further vulnerability and social
isolation. In its strongest form, these arguments embrace decriminalization but oppose
the regulation and protectionism full legalization would entail. 45 For instance, the World
Charter for Prostitutes’ Rights insists that “It is essential that prostitutes can provide their
services under the conditions that are absolutely determined by themselves and no one
else.” 46 Activist and writer Norma Almodovar puts the case even more bluntly:
“Decriminalization would . . . repeal all existing criminal codes applying to non-coercive
adult commercial sex activity. It would require no new legislation to deal with harmful
effects of prostitution, as there are already plenty of laws which cover problems outside
the realm of personal choice.” 47 The International Prostitute Rights organization is more
specific: “There should be no law which implies systematic zoning of prostitution.
Prostitutes should have the freedom to choose their place of work and residence.” 48
Feminist theorist Anne McClintock concurs: “A central tenet of the prostitution
movement is the demand that sex workers be given the right to exchange sexual services
on their terms and on their conditions, not on the terms of the state, the police, pimps,
geographic isolation facilitated the criminal organization of prostitution, compete with pimps,
procurers, and organized brothels.
BARRY, THE PROSTITUTION OF SEXUALITY, supra note [x], at 111.
43
I rehearse the decriminalization/legalization distinction in my earlier work on polygamy. See.e.g.,
Adrienne D. Davis, Regulating Polygamy: Intimacy, Default Rules, and Bargaining for Equality, 110
COLUM. L. REV. 1955 (2010) [hereinafter Davis, Regulating Polygamy] (disagreeing with many
polygamists who urge decriminalization but not full legalization).
44
Mgbako & Smith, supra note [x], at 1193. Elsewhere Mgbako and Smith contend that “Illegality renders
sex workers dependent upon pimps, brothel owners, clients, and police officers.” Id. at 1206.
45
See, e.g., Fischer, supra note [x], at 526 (equating regulations and restrictions with “condemnation” of
prostitutes).
46
World Charter for Prostitutes’ Rights; International Committee for Prostitutes’ Rights February 1985,
Amsterdam, reprinted in 37 Social Text 183 (1993) [hereinafter World Charter fro Prostitutes’ Rights].
47
Almodovar, supra note [x], at 132 (emphasis added).
48
http://www.bayswan.org/ICPRChart.html. They also oppose public health regulations of sex work.
“Since health checks have historically been used to control and stigmatize prostitutes, and since adult
prostitutes are generally even more aware of sexual health than others, mandatory checks for prostitutes are
unacceptable unless they are mandatory for all sexually active people.” World Charter, supra note [x], at
184.
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male managers, or clients.” 49 Indeed, she contends “most prostitutes regard legalization
as legalized abuse.” 50 In sum, this camp opposes state regulation, arguing the only role
of government in sex work is to enforce contracts and respond to complaints of assault.
Parsed more finely, they claim professional sex is just like any other labor in that
it should not be subject to criminal bans and should instead be a matter of individual
choice, but, because it is sex, it should be exempt from any government regulation or
supervision, such as zoning, licensing, or public health protocols. While modern labor
contracts are intensely regulated, to this camp, the sexual contract remains exceptional. It
operates, in effect, as sex, or erotic, exceptionalism. 51
Of course, such insistence on complete workplace autonomy is unrecognizable to
most working adults. But several ideological positions can account for this set of
arguments. Most obviously, erotic exceptionalism reconciles easily with a classical
freedom of contract perspective, in which the state has little role to play beyond enforcing
agreements between consenting adults. 52 This view, that the state should not intervene in
otherwise voluntary agreements, also aligns with constitutional and social sexual privacy
norms. Indeed, implicit in these strong-form claims for a completely deregulated sex
market is the decisional privacy ideology that both constitutional norms and political
liberalism often associate with sex.53 Rooted in Griswold v. Connecticut, and most
recently elaborated in Lawrence v. Texas, decisional privacy casts sex and reproduction
as within a sphere of intimacy liberty into which government should not intrude. 54
49

Anne McClintock, 37 SOC. TEXT 2, 2 (1993) (emphasis in original). McClintock also claims, “Removing
sex workers fundamental right to choose—whether to work, how to work, when to work and where to work
is a flagrant infringement of basic working rights, their integrity, their humanity, not a universal and
inherent feature of the sexual exchange.” Id. at 6.
50
“A recent call has gone up from some quarters for the legalization rather than the decriminalization of
sex work. But most prostitutes regard legalization as legalized abuse. Despite its benign ring, legalization
places prostitution under criminal instead of commercial law, where it is tightly curtailed by the state and
administered by the police.” Id. at 2 (emphasis in original)
51
In an earlier article, I discuss sexuality exceptionalism. See, e.g., Adrienne D. Davis, Bad Girls of Art
and Law:Abjection, Power, and Sexuality Exceptionalism in (Kara Walker’s) Art and (Janet Halley’s) Law,
23 YALE J.L. & FEM. 1 (2011) [hereinafter Abjection, Power, and Sexuality Exceptionalism] (labeling
Janet Halley’s urge that left/liberals “take a break from feminism” as sex exceptionalism). Hence, I label
the sex work decriminalization position as erotic exceptionalism both to distinguish it from my earlier
claim and because the business is often referred to in that term.
52
Gregg Aronson, Seeking A Consolidated Feminist Voice for Prostitution in the US, 3 RUTGERS J. L. &
URB. POL’Y 357 (2006) (COYOTE “regard[s] prostitution as a contract between two consenting adults, and
believe[s] that these contracts should be respected by law like other legitimate contracts.”).
53
Although much-criticized, the legal protection for women’s sexual autonomy that emerged in the 1960s
and 1970s was grounded in constitutional privacy doctrine. More recently, constitutional protections for
sexual minorities have similarly been articulated in the language of privacy. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas,
539 U.S. 558 (2003). Cultural and social norms of sex as part of private and not public life supported this,
as well.
54
The plurality opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut, upholding married couples' rights to contraception,
discusses privacy in both spatial terms, i.e., the marital bedroom, and decisional terms, i.e., married couples
making decisions about their private life together. This decisional logic was elaborated in Eisenstadt v.
Baird, which extended Griswold’s holding to unmarried individuals. ("If the right of privacy means
anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental
intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a
child."). Roe v. Wade further developed the constitutional ideology of decisional privacy, although it
shifted the grounding to the fourteenth amendment’s protection of due process. In declaring criminal bans
on sodomy unconstitutional, Lawrence v. Texas extended the decisional privacy logic into the explicitly
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Others register their concerns in a more explicitly feminist register; in language that
echoes that of the strongest abolitionists, Anne McClintock insists, “Legalizing female
prostitution serves only to put women more firmly under male control.” 55 Liberalism
similarly promotes autonomy, consent, and choice within this sphere, construing these as
the definitive principles that guarantee sexual and reproductive rights. 56 Drawing on
these strong legal and cultural norms, the International Prostitute Rights charter “affirms
the right of all women to determine their own sexual behavior, including commercial
exchange, without stigmatization or punishment.” This view of sex work thus embraces
a hybrid position, often urging commercial sex as labor while simultaneously claiming
the legal and social autonomy and privacy that sex often brings.
Finally, at least some arguments are better understood as anti-statist in nature,
rather than as claims to state-sponsored legal privacy or liberal autonomy. The antistatist argument is that the state has rarely acted in the interests of sex workers and almost
uniformly against them. 57 These views align forcefully with gender theorist Wendy
sexual arena. Like Griswold, Justice Kennedy’s opinion noted both the decisional and the spatial
dimensions of privacy. Sodomy laws, he wrote, "touch[] upon the most private human conduct, sexual
behavior, and in the most private of places, the home." Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965);
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S.
558 (2003).
Hence, sex work activist Norma Amodovar proclaims, “A woman’s body belongs to herself and
not to the government. The individual’s rights to own, use and enjoy her body in any manner that she
deems appropriate, as long as she does not violate the rights of others has long been protected in this
country.” Almodovar, supra note [x], at 132. Discussing the California Constitution, Almodovar notes it
“explicitly grants a right to privacy, and although this right is not absolute, it should be interpreted to say
that as long as no coercion is involved, any private consenting adult activity is none of the government’s
business. But this is apparently not the case when private activity involves money!” Id. at 129.
55
McClintock, supra note [x], at 4.
56
See, e.g., Nussbaum, supra note [x], at 706 (arguing “the issue of choice is the really important one”).
Sylvia Law uses consent to impose some interesting limits on the professional sex as labor position. While
interviewing welfare rights organizers in Nevada, Law learned that some of them feared that if sex work
were fully legalized, the government would require it as a condition of receiving need-based entitlement
programs. Law grounded an exemption of sex work from universal requirements to labor in liberalism:
A society could address this paradigm conflict by saying that the norm of authentic consent,
generally applicable to sexual relations, should control and that people should not be forced to
engage in commercial sex, as a condition of subsistence. Even if commercial sex is legal, many
women regard it as inconsistent with their deepest sense of self and inconsistent with moral and
religious principles. We should recognize that choice with respect to sexual relationships is so
integral to individual identity and integrity that sex should not be compelled, even if it could
provide subsistence to a person who would otherwise depend on the state.
Law, supra note [x], at 590. Cf. Kotiswaran, supra note [x], at 581 (citations omitted) (“the feminist
critique that this work position is undertheorized, with the result that it falls back on the liberal discourse
around choice, consent, work, and the market.”).
57
Consider observations from sex professionals working in legal jurisdictions in Nevada:
Under Nevada’s regulatory system, the “pimp/prostitute” relationship is redefined. It is clear that
the only kind of prostitute who is legal and protected is the licensed brothel prostitute. Equally
clear is that individual pimps controlling a number of prostitutes are replaced by a small number
of legal brothel owners who are closely monitored by the government. The only legal pimps then
become these limited numbers of brothel owners who have direct links with the local government.
Some might consider this arrangement to mean that the state becomes the pimp by exploiting and
abusing prostitutes through the system of licensed brothels.
Micloe Bingham, Nevada Sex Trade: A Gamble for the Workers, 10 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 69, 93 (1998)
(citing WENDY CHAPKIS, LIVE SEX ACTS: WOMEN PERFORMING EROTIC LABOR 163 (1997)).
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Brown’s critiques of leftist calls for regulations as “wounded attachments.” 58 In this
view, left liberalism should maintain a healthy suspicion of the state, not embrace
positions that enhance and increase state power. 59
Anti-statism, decisional privacy, and autonomy each are seductive rationales for
stark deregulationism. Yet, when erotic exceptionalism enters the conservative space of
the market, its claims to conduct commerce free from government intervention or
regulation can begin to sound a lot like libertarianism.
2. Legalization, or, Assimilationism
Other sex work advocates, though, urge not only decriminalized, but fully
legalized and regulated markets for sex. This camp views sex workers as deeply
vulnerable to exploitation and risk and envisions an active role for the state in regulating
sex markets and workplaces. 60 “Like traditional prostitutes, women working in the legal
sex industry have been treated as though they are not entitled to the same legal
protections as other ‘socially accepted’ workers.” 61 Monica Moukalif concurs,
“organizing around decriminalization is part of organizing for better occupational health
and safety.” 62 Less tied to erotic exceptionalism than their erotic exceptionalist
counterparts, these advocates view professional sex work as not meaningfully different
58

WENDY BROWN, STATES OF INJURY: POWER AND FREEDOM IN LATE MODERNITY 53 (1995). See also
Wendy Brown & Janet Halley, Introduction, LEFT LEGALISM/LEFT CRITIQUE 1, 5 (Wendy Brown & Janet
Halley eds., 2002) (“the left’s current absorption with legal strategies means that liberal legalism threatens
to defang the left we want to inhabit, saturating it with ant-intellectualism, limiting its normative
aspirations, turning its attention away from the regulatory norms it ought to be upending, and hammering
its swords into boomerangs.”).
59
Perhaps implicit in the anti-statist view is the radical claim articulated above—that all sex, and
particularly normative, marital sex, has an economic dimension. (Similarly, both feature affective labor.)
Hence sex work should not be regulated the same way that marital sex work is not regulated; commodified
sex is no more commercial than other forms of non-market sex. See supra note [x] and accompanying text.
60
Indeed, sex workers are a classic vulnerable population. According to the UCLA nursing school, “The
term ‘vulnerable populations,’ refers to social groups with increased relative risk (i.e. exposure to risk
factors) or susceptibility to health-related problems . . . . VPs are often discriminated against, marginalized
and disenfranchised from mainstream society.” Who Are Vulnerable Populations?, Ctr. for Vulnerable
Populations Research, http:// www.nursing.ucla.edu/orgs/cvpr/who-are-vulnerable.html (last visited Dec.
21, 2010). Legal feminist Martha Fineman views the framework as
an alternative to traditional equal protection analysis; it is a “post-identity” inquiry in that it is not
focused only on discrimination against defined groups, but concerned with privilege and favor
conferred on limited segments of the population by the state and broader society through their
institutions. As such, vulnerability analysis concentrates on the structures our society has and will
establish to manage our common vulnerabilities. This approach has the potential to move us
beyond the stifling confines of current discrimination-based models toward a more substantive
vision of equality.
Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human Condition, 20 YALE
J.L. & FEMINISM 1 (2008).
61
Fischer, supra note [x], at 551. See also Bindman & Doezema, (“[T]heir vulnerability to human and
labour rights violations is greater than that of others because of the stigma and criminal charges widely
attached to sex work.”); Adrienne Cuoto, Clothing Exotic Dancers With Collective Bargaining Rights, 38
OTTOWA L. REV. 37, 48 (2006) (If not viewed as criminals, sex workers are at the very least considered to
maintain “deviant lifestyles, roles and identities.”).
62
Monica R. Moukalif, No Evil: Applying a Labor Lens to Prostitute Organizing, 20 HASTINGS WOMEN’S
L.J. 253, 271 (2009).
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from other forms of marginalized labor. For instance, Moukalif “constructs a marginsoriented labor lens and then applies it to sex labor discourse,” in the process showing how
“[p]rostitutes are organizing and advocating in ways that could be beneficial to all
marginalized workers.” 63 This camp thus urges assimilating sex work into our existing,
heavily regulated labor and employment law regime. 64
Influential legal feminists Sylvia Law, Jane Larson, and Martha Nussbaum all
embrace versions of this assimilationist view. For instance, Jane Larson views
prostitution as a “laboratory” to determine “what makes certain voluntary labor so
dangerous or so exploitative as to violate the worker’s human rights?” 65 Sylvia Law
makes a strong protectionist case when she argues that not only should criminal
prohibitions be repealed, but “legal remedies and programs to protect commercial sex
workers from violence, rape, disease, exploitation, coercion and abuse should be
enhanced.” 66 Finally, legal philosopher Martha Nussbaum combines an assimilationist
approach with the straightforwardly liberal feminist emphasis on choice to make a case
for legalized sex work as a constrained or bounded autonomy claim: “[A] fruitful debate
about the morality and legality of prostitution should begin from a twofold starting point:
from a broader analysis of our beliefs and practices with regard to taking pay for the use
of the body and from a broader awareness of the options and choices available to poor
working women...” 67 In sum, contrary to erotic exceptionalists, the assimilationist camp
contends sex work is truly no different than other forms of marginalized, vulnerable, and
63

Moukalif, supra note [x], at 253.
Akin to hostile worlds and abolitionism, intimacy theoriest Viviana Zelizer offers a framework to
understand assimilationism as well. If hostile worlds proclaims the intrinsic incompatibility of economics
and intimacy, another approach rejects this primitive dualism by proffering a single, prior principle that
purports to “actually explain[] what is going on” through a powerful rhetorical device Zelizer calls “nothing
but.” In this view, “the ostensibly separate world of intimate social relations . . . is nothing-but a special
case of some general principle,” typically, economic rationality, culture, or politics.” Akin to how hostile
worlds pervades abolitionism, nothing but logic is rampant in assimilationism, as advocates proclaim
professional sex to be “nothing but” work or labor, thereby staving off serious inquiries of how work might
be distinctive from other forms of labor and from “amateur” sex, and hence in need of special consideration
and regulation. (Zelizer characterizes Kathleen Barry as exemplifying “nothing but” power and patriarchy;
in contrast, I would locate Barry within the hostile worlds camp.) ZELIZER, supra note [x], at 29, 31. In the
end, Zelizer rejects both hostile worlds and nothing-but ideologies: “As long as we cling to the idea of
hostile worlds we will never recognize, much less explain, the pervasive intertwining of economic activity
and intimacy. Yet nothing-but reductionism fails to allow for the distinctive properties of coupling, caring,
and households.” She offers as an alternative framework “connected lives” or “differentiated ties”, which
focuses on how people “create connected lives by differentiating their multiple social ties from each other,
marking boundaries between those different ties by means of everyday practices, sustaining those ties
through joint activities . . ., but constantly negotiating the exact content of important social ties.” Id. at 28,
32.
65
Larson, supra note [x], at 676.
66
Law, supra note [x], at 524.
67
She continues:
Most, though not all, of the genuinely problematic elements turn out to be common to a wide
range of activities engaged in by poor working women, and the second inquiry will suggest that
many of women’s employment choices are so heavily constrained by poor options that they are
hardly choices at all. I think that this should bother us and that the fact that a woman with plenty
of choices becomes a prostitute should not bother us, provided that there are sufficient safeguards
against abuse and disease, safeguards of a type that legalization would make possible.
Nussbaum, supra note [x] at 696. In this sense, revulsion against payment for bodily services results from
class biases.
64
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risky labor. Rebelling against the privacy rubric many exceptionalists invoke to cloak
labor that is sexual, this camp advocates full legalization and assimilation of sex work
into our current regulatory regime.
C.Summary
Thus, while both camps view the labor framework as a way to access both
legitimacy and power for workers in the sex industry, there is a split, a contradiction
even, within the movement. For assimilationists, “worker” empowerment stems from full
legalization. Seeking to intervene in the oppression and exploitation of a highly
vulnerable population, they envision the full integration of sex workers into the existing
labor and employment regulatory regime. Erotic exceptionalists embrace the labor lens
from a classic freedom of contract perspective—that the state should not interfere in
otherwise voluntary agreements. Unrecognizable to modern democratic marketplaces,
this claim finds support in constitutional and cultural sexual privacy norms, liberalism’s
emphasis on autonomy, choice, and consent, and leftist anti-statism. In sum, erotic
exceptionalists, insisting on a regulatory exemption for sex work, claim it is just like any
other consensual sexual act. Labor assimilationists, embracing a deeply regulatory
stance, say it is just like any other work. Just like sex or just like work—that is the
underlying question.
This latent contradiction between assimilationist and exceptionalist discourses of
professional sex undergirds the remainder of this paper, which tries to push through into a
robust second-generation discussion about regulation and what it might look like. First,
Section II considers the assimilationist claim that “sex is like any other work.” As
facially persuasive as this argument is, it rests on the idea of a monolithic workplace
subject to monolithic regulation. In contrast, what this next Section demonstrates is that
modern workplaces, and work, vary drastically, and are subject to diverse regulatory
regimes. Law regulates work differentially, and it is unclear which model professional
sex advocates seek to invoke. As much as assimilationists urge us to treat professional
sex as any other labor, Section III shows that sex markets have distinctive characteristics
that it would be irresponsible to ignore in crafting regulatory policy. Nor is sex work
itself monolithic; rather it exhibits vastly different working conditions and risks. This
Section also answers assimilationists’ concerns with a set of proposals that will hopefully
address the specificity of sex work, while Section IV takes up the erotic exceptionalists’
claims that because the labor is sexual, it should be outside of and beyond regulation.

II.TESTING ASSIMILATIONISM
At bottom, the assimilationist invocation of sex as “just like any other work” is a
recognition claim—that sex professionals should be considered legitimate laborers with
the protections of the “applicable legal standards relating to labor rights.” 68 This Section
explores this set of claims within the context of the relevant state and federal law. It first
sets out the sex workplace hazards and conditions that prompt assimilationists to seek
regulatory protection, and then summarizes the main bodies of extant law—health and
68

Audrey Macklin, 37 INT’L MIGRATION REV. 464, 493.
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safety, workers’ compensation, and discrimination—that address them. By exposing the
diversity of workplaces and their regulation, the Section complicates the assimilationist
claim in a few ways.
A.

The Assimilationist Claim

Assimilationists anticipate a host of benefits from recognizing sex professionals
as legal workers, primarily ameliorating their substantive work conditions. 69 As an initial
matter, legal status would give sex workers access to courts to enforce their contracts
with customers and third party intermediaries alike. 70 Primarily, though, assimilationists
make specific labor claims.
First, they seek recognition of sex workers as legally employees. Workers
classified as full-time employees rather than part-time workers or independent contractors
are entitled to basic employment benefits, including unemployment, health insurance,
retirement, social security benefits, and minimum wage and overtime. Neither
prostitutes, whose work is illegal, nor dancers, whose employers often classify them as
independent contractors, qualify for these benefits under federal and state laws. 71 (In
addition, in Nevada, where prostitution is legal, brothel owners often classify prostitutes
as independent contractors. 72) One crucial benefit of legal recognition is that workers
classified as employees have the right to unionize and collectively bargain for improved
working conditions. 73 Rather than relying solely on the state to enforce minimal,
universal benefits, collective action and bargaining allows workers to craft terms and
conditions of employment that are tailored to their needs. 74 Sex professionals, especially
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One important benefit, not immediately linked to work itself, is that legalization would enable sex
workers to access more social support services. See, e.g., Kate DeCou, U.S. Social Policy on Prostitution:
Whose Welfare Is Served?, 24 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 427, 438-39 (1998) (“due to
criminalization, prostitutes on the street are isolated from health and social services.”).
70
Michèle Alexandre, Sex, Drugs, Rock & Roll and Moral Dirigisme: Toward A Reformation of Drug and
Prostitution Regulations, 78 UMKC L. REV. 101, 116, 118-19 (2009) (“It is long settled legal doctrine that
illegal contracts are unenforceable. Consequently, persons who enter into illegal drug or sexual
transactions are incapable of seeking legal protection in the event of breach of the underlying contract. This
incapacity renders the most vulnerable members of those transactions subject to abuse and victimization.”).
71
The current case law is split on whether to classify dancers as employees. Compare Bosco v. Tampa
Food & Beverage, LLC, 8:11-CV-1651-T-26AEP, 2013 WL 49477 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 3, 2013), Reich v.
Circle C. Invest., Inc., 998 F.2d 324 (5th Cir.1993) (holding that topless dancers are employees under the
FLSA), and Yard Bird, Inc. v. Virginia Employment Comm'n, 28 Va. App. 215, 219, 503 S.E.2d 246, 248
(1998) (exotic dancers were employees for the purposes of unemployment compensation, despite the
existence of an “Independent Contractor Agreement.”) with Lewis v. L.B. Dynasty, Inc., 400 S.C. 129, 732
S.E.2d 662 (Ct. App. 2012), reh'g denied (Oct. 18, 2012) (holding that the South Carolina Workers'
Compensation Commission did not err in finding that an exotic dancer was an independent contractor and
not an employee).
72
See, e.g., Law, supra note [x] (“[b]rothel owners typically regard women as independent contractors and
do not provide them with health insurance, workers’ compensation, unemployment insurance, vacation pay,
or retirement benefits.”).
73
The National Labor Relations Act, 29 USC §157 (1988).
74

Unions have often played a critical role in raising and negotiating over issues of health and safety.
Because they implicate working conditions, safety issues are a mandatory subject of bargaining in
a unionized workplace, and employers are therefore obligated to provide safety information upon
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dancers, have sought to unionize, although with little success. 75 Still, many
assimilationists continue to urge collective action through unionization as sex workers’
best chance to achieve decent working conditions. 76 Thus, assimilationists view
recognition as legitimate labor as the first step toward the basic but significant rights that
inure to all workers recognized legally as full-time employees.
Even more so than basic employee benefits, charges of unabated risks and hazards
pervade assimilationist arguments to legalize and regulate professional sex as work. 77
The two dominant forms of risk that most endanger sex workers are injuries or illnesses
from working conditions and violence. Sex professionals often work in unsanitary
workplaces that expose them to infection and other health risks. 78 Dancers are at risk
from both accidents and chronic injuries from poor lighting, disrepair of equipment, e.g.,
poles and stage floors, and dancing in high heels. 79 The second major axis of risk is
violence. Sex professionals—dancers, masseuses, and prostitutes—all have significantly
higher rates of assault, rape, and even murder than other workers. Importantly, physical
and sexual assault comes from not only customers and third parties but also club and
the union’s request. . . . In addition, unions frequently negotiate for improved safety measures, or
alternatively, higher wages to compensate for the risks, through the collective bargaining process.
MARION CRAIN ET AL, WORK LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 2d ed. 946 (2010) [hereinafter WORK LAW]
(describing different states’ statutory language).
75
In addition to the challenges of organizing an itinerant and relatively powerless group of workers, prounion sex workers encounter resistance from unions themselves, which, though desperate for new
members, still often reject sex traders as illegitimate workers. See, e.g., Law, supra note [x], at 599
(“[w]here women have sought to organize a union, they have been rebuffed by established labor
organizations.”); Margot Rutman, Exotic Dancers' Employment Law Regulations, 8 TEMP. POL. & CIV.
RTS. L. REV. 515, 553, 554 (1999) (“Exotic dancers, because they are a stigmatized group of women, often
have problems finding outside labor support or unions that will allow them to join.”). See supra note [
x].
76
As Sylvia Law notes, “One of the most effective ways for commercial sex workers to promote decent
working conditions and protect themselves from violence, abuse, and health and safety hazards, is to work
in a collective context.” Law, supra note [x], at 598. See also Chun, supra note [x] (advocating
unionization as best route to empowerment for exotic dancers). Others are more skeptical, however.
Margot Rutman observes that in the first successful effort to unionize a dance club, the Lusty Lady, the
dancers got 1 sick day and 1 holiday. “The union contract is impressive because it exists despite the
challenges that the exotic dancers faced, but generally, the contract fails to offer work benefits comparable
to those of other more established unions.” Rutman, supra note [x], at 555.
77
As Monica Moukalif observes, “[o]ccupational health and safety is the major organizing point for
prostitutes and other sex labor activists.” Moukalif, supra note [x], at 270.
78
Dancers complain that employers do not properly sanitize the stage poles and floors, club furnishings,
and props with which their bare genital areas come into contact. Moreover, lapdancing requires intimate
contact with customers and their clothing, over which employers have less control. Constant exposure to
body fluids and unsanitized surfaces puts dancers at high risk for infection and disease. Prostitutes often
work in unclean hotels, brothels, or worse, in cars, on the street, or in alleys. See, e.g., Maticka-Tyndale,
supra note [x], at 95, 99; Exotic Dancing Health and Safety,
http://www.nnewh.org/images/upload/attach/7098star-policy-brief.pdf (dancers spend eight hours or more
in high heels, which can cause injuries to their feet); A VINDICATION OF THE RIGHTS OF WHORES 109, 141,
142-143 (Gail Pheterson ed., 1989) (“Criminalization of prostitutes for purposes of public health is
unrealistic and denies human rights to healthy work conditions. As outlaws, prostitutes are discouraged, if
not forbidden, to determine and design a healthy setting and practice for their trade. . . . [Criminalization]
forces prostitutes into medically unhygienic, physically unsafe and psychologically stressful work
conditions.”); Ronald Weitzer, Sociology of Sex Work, 35 ANN. REV. SOC. 213, 217 (2009) (finding
correlation between public sex work and worker risk).
79
See, e.g., Exotic Dancing Health and Safety, supra note [x].
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brothel owners and operators, pimps, other employees, e.g., bouncers, bartenders, and
servers, and even their own intimate partners. 80 The statistics bear out that stakeholders
in sex markets, customers, co-workers, and employers, feel entitled to physically abuse
the workers, making sex work among the most dangerous forms of labor. 81
Assimiliationists call for regulators to develop and mandate standards to protect sex
workers’ health and safety.
Finally, assimilationists anticipate that legalization would bring access to
discrimination law. Those with whom sex professionals interact at work—customers,
employers, and other employees—can treat them with contempt, frequently using
misogynist slurs and epithets. Ironically, then, the stakeholders within this market sector
reinforce its image as filled with immoral, sexually promiscuous women who are not
entitled to the basic human respect or dignity accorded other workers. Assimilationists
contend that this behavior, much of it intensely gendered, comprises illegal sexual
harassment under Title VII’s anti-discrimination provisions. Ann McGinley argues that
“[a] business that creates a risk of serious harassment should develop systems to prevent
and correct harassing behavior.” 82 Other commentators agree that even within sexualized
workplaces workers should be entitled to be free from unwelcome sexual behavior. 83
Assimilationists also identify a second axis of discriminatory behavior. A pointed
critique of sex markets is that they erect hierarchies along the lines of race and other
forms of body capital. Hence, one study of prostitution found women sorted along lines
of race, with white, Asian, and lighter-skinned black women dominating the higher-end
“strolls” and darker-skinned and older women relegated to less lucrative, and more
harassing and dangerous, ones. 84 Similarly, as the Live Nude Girls Unite! documentary
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Women who provide commercial sex, particularly streetwalkers, are subject to violence. Many
studies of women who work the street report that eighty percent have been physically assaulted
during the course of their work. Women who provide commercial sex are often the victims of
rape. They are murdered, perhaps at a rate forty times the national average. Police systematically
ignore commercial sex workers' complaints about violence and fail to investigate even murder.
Indeed, police officers rape and beat sex workers, and are rarely prosecuted for their wrongdoing.
Customers, pimps, police and other men inflict these harms on women.
Law, supra note [x] at 553 (footnotes omitted). See also LEVITT & DUBNER, supra note [x], at 29 (“Most
of the incidents of violence by johns is when, for some reason, they can’t consummate or get erect.”); Mimi
Silbert, Sexual Assault on Prostitutes, research report to the National Center for the Prevention and Control
of Rape (1980) (detailing high rates of assault among sex workers); Vicki Neland, Council for Prostitution
Alternatives Handbook, Portland, Oregon (1995). Even their own intimate partners assault them at higher
rates.
81
Sylvia Law points out that, “Since the 1980s there have been dramatic changes in the legal and social
understanding of violence against women in the United States. These new understandings, laws, practices
and services have not been extended to commercial sex workers.” Law, supra note [x], at 572.
82
Ann C. McGinley, Harassment of Sex(y) Workers: Applying Title VII to Sexualized Industries, 18 YALE
J.L. & FEM. 65, 98 (2006).
83
See infra notes [x] and accompanying text for discussion of the debate over sexual harassment liability in
sexual workplaces.
84

The predominantly White, Asian and light-skinned Black women on the crowded and brightly lit
Geary-Mason stroll command the highest prices. They are young, slim and expensively dressed;
their tightly-fitted suits, sweater sets and fur or leather coats code them for a relatively upscale
market. Physically, only their shorter-than-average skirts, “big hair” and heavy makeup set them
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described, racial minorities in the dancing industry have fewer opportunities, and less
lucrative ones, than white dancers. Siobhan Brooks’ recent study of three dance clubs in
New York and Oakland found:
When women of color are working in predominately White clubs that offer more
security and are located in areas with higher property values, they often are paid
less than their White counterparts, marginalized as token hires, or employed in
lower-tier job positions. Women of color working in clubs predominately
employing people of color, may make good money, but are subject to unjust
working conditions, customer expectations that services will be cheaper, and
unsafe neighborhood spaces . . . . 85
Thus, racial groups have very different “erotic capital,” and this translates into very
different work opportunities in sex markets. 86 Assimilationists such as Brooks make
much of this disparity. She observes: “Racism against Black women in this industry is
usually viewed as normal because, like other appearance-based industries (such as
modeling, acting), the sex industry is based on ideas of customer taste and preference.” 87
Yet she contends that racialized desire in the erotic industry is no less socially
constructed than in other areas of social interaction 88 and should be considered
impermissible employment discrimination. 89 While less visible in the assimilationist
discourse, presumably older sex workers and disabled ones experience discrimination in
mainstream markets for sex. 90
Discrimination against sex workers then takes two forms. Women working in sex
markets are routinely subject to a degree and form of gendered harassment that is
exceptional compared to other contemporary U.S. workplaces. In addition, disparate
treatment of women with non-normative bodies is pervasive, resulting in hierarchies
along lines of race, age, and ability. Legal norms have shifted in the last fifty years, to

apart from many of the dressed-up female tourists or theater and restaurant goers who walk past
them, and the differences may be quite subtle.
Bernstein, supra note [x], at 103 (footnotes omitted). Bernstein’s article then gives the pricing structures
per class.
85
BROOKS, supra note [x], at 3-4, 101. She finds that clubs where women of color are concentrated have
the worst terms and conditions, e.g., higher stage fees, more harassment, and coerced prostitution. See also
Tanya Kateri Hernandez, Sexual Harassment and Racial Disparity: The Mutual Construction of Gender
and Race, 4 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 183 (2001) (discussing how race is at work in sex tourism industry).
86
By erotic capital Brooks means the extent to which desire is inflected by historical structures of
subordination.
87
BROOKS, supra note [x], at 99.
88
In sex work as elsewhere, these consumer preferences mirror broader systems of oppression. And, of
course, the same identity characteristics that put these workers at the bottom of the consumer preference
ladder also make them the most economically vulnerable more generally, i.e., more likely to experience
adverse economic shocks and with less cushion to absorb them.
89
See also Rutman, supra note [x], at 534 (“Despite the seemingly obvious requirement that dancers be
attractive, Title VII protections still adhere to prevent discrimination against protected classes.”).
90
In fact, the propensity for marginalizing older dancers was one point of contention at the Lusty Lady.
And Margot Rutman speculates: “Obese exotic dancers might be protected under the ADA from
discrimination in some instances.” Rutman, supra note [x], at 534 n.165.
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hold employers liable for discriminatory practices, including, of course, disparate
treatment and harassment. Assimilationists want access to this set of rules. 91
In sum, assimilationists lay claim to labor discourse to access greater regulation
and protection for sex workers. They anticipate that recognizing sexual labor as
legitimate work will give sex professionals protection from hazardous working conditions
and degrading discriminatory practices, as well as basic benefits and rights, including
wage and hour legislation and unionization and collective bargaining, that inure only to
those workers classified as employees. This next part explores the web of laws—OSHA,
workers’ compensation, sexual harassment, and disparate treatment doctrine—that
regulates the modern workplace. It also briefly summarizes the guidelines for
determining who is an employee, which is often a threshold for accessing the other,
crucial benefits and rights sex bargainers seek.
B.

Hazards

One of the most significant transformations of twentieth-century American
employment law was the increasing liability of employers for protecting employees from
workplace hazards. Workplace health and safety are regulated primarily through two sets
of doctrine, state workers’ compensation laws and the federal regulations and guidelines
enacted by the Occupational Health & Safety Act (OSHAct). 92
Workers’ compensation is, in effect, a state-based insurance system that covers
injuries stemming from “accidental injuries” that “arise out of” or “in the course of”
employment. 93 Originally inspired by industrial accidents, the system has two signal
features. 94 It limits employer liability, 95 and, in exchange, injured workers do not have to
91

Of course, not every assimilationist is optimistic about legalization and assimilation. Regarding dancers,
Margot Rutman’s extensive analysis of how bona fide occupational qualifications interact with statutory
protections leads her to conclude that “[e]ven if ordinary employment law protections were available to
exotic dancers, many benefits would be negated by unique factors within the industry.” For instance, most
dancers already earn above minimum wage, and, in those instances in which dancers have succeeded in
classifying themselves as employees, employers often re-structure the relationship to maintain the same
level of compensation. See, e.g., Chun, supra note [x], at 234-35 (footnotes omitted) (“Dancers at one San
Francisco club successfully challenged the twenty-five dollar ‘stage fee.’ In response, the club reclassified
the dances performed at ‘property’ of the club and charged dancers a one hundred fifty dollar commission
for using club ‘property.’”); Rutman, supra note [x], at 536 (footnote omitted) (“Wages are not beneficial
to dancers because the form of compensation is mostly derived from the performance of private dances,
which is revenue for the club if dancers are classified as employees.”).
92
There are also state plans, supervised by the federal OSHA.
93
WORK LAW, supra note [x] (describing different states’ statutory language). There are some federal
iterations as well. See, e.g., Federal Employees’ Compensation Act, 5 U.S.C. sects. 8101-93 (federal
employees); Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. sects. 901-50 (ship, harbor,
and railroad employees).
94
Initially, workers’ compensation was designed to address industrial accidents. As legal historian John
Fabian Witt observes, “Nineteenth-century observers believed both that the number of accidental injuries
was increasing and that the cause of the increase was the mechanization of production.” Coal mining and
railroads topped the list for workplace accidents, followed by logging, bricklaying, and masonry. These
industrial accidents devastated not only the worker, but also their families. “Work accidents, it seemed,
threw the ambiguous status of the industrial worker into bold relief, compelling victim and observer alike to
ask hard questions about the relationships among capital, labor, and the public.” Of course, as the title of
Witt’s book, Crippled Workingmen and Destitute Widows, suggests, this was all intensely gendered. The
jobs that dominated the public and regulatory imaginary as “dangerous” were ones limited to male workers.
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prove employer fault. 96 Workers’ compensation transforms workplace liability questions
from ones of employer fault and causation (and accompanying common law tort
defenses 97) to worker need. While there is significant variance across states, these
statutes now cover most workplaces, providing workers with a safety net. 98
Operating alongside state workers’ compensation statutes are federal health and safety
regulations, which are aggregated under the Occupational Health & Safety Agency
(OSHA). 99 Unlike workers’ compensation, which functions primarily as an insurance
scheme, labor reformers and Congress conceived the OSHAct explicitly to deter risk and
achieve safer workplaces. 100 Indeed, the prophylactic stress of OSHAct-type hazard
prevention stems in part from the failure of workers’ compensation to provide adequate
ex post protection. Although criticized by employers and workers alike, OSHA is
credited with helping to reduce the number of annual workplace fatalities from 70,000 to
approximately 5,000 in the last decade. 101
Together, workers’ compensation and the OSHAct are the primary mechanisms for
achieving healthy and safe workplaces. Yet, workers receive vastly different degrees and
types of protection, depending on their workplace, the work they do, and the type of risk
they confront in the workplace. 102 Under the OSHAct workers receive the most
Similarly, the ideal of a worker who would provide the sole or primary “family wage” was imagined to be a
male head of household. Hence, in its initial formulation, workers’ compensation was actually legally and
culturally conceived as workman’s compensation. JOHN FABIAN WITT, THE ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC:
CRIPPLED WORKINGMEN, DESTITUTE WIDOWS, AND THE REMAKING OF AMERICAN LAW 2 (2004).
95
Importantly, actual loss is not part of the equation, and in the vast majority of states neither punitive
damages nor emotional pain and suffering are available. “[T]he concepts of punishment and deterrence
that lie behind punitive damages are absent from the system.” WORK LAW, supra note [x], at 954. In
addition, the exclusivity of remedies rules limit employees to workers’ compensation claims, barring them
from bringing claims through tort suits, which could yield much greater awards. For further discussion of
this doctrine, see infra note [x].
96
Instead, an administrative agency addresses claims, typically more rapidly and inexpensively than
litigation would. See, e.g., WORK LAW, supra note [x], at 953 (it is a “fundamental compromise—no fault
compensation in exchange for limited liability”).
97
WORK LAW, supra note [x], at 946 (describing how fellow-servant rule, assumption of risk, and
contributory negligence operated as employer defenses to liability for workplace injuries).
98
“[T]he various state laws vary greatly in their details on such issues as what types of injuries are
compensable and how benefit levels are determined.” WORK LAW, supra note [x], at 953.
99
Congress created OSHA in 1970 and charged it with “promulgating regulations, inspecting workplaces,
and prosecuting violations of its regulations and standards.” WORK LAW, supra note [x], at 1000.
Operating within the Department of Labor, OSHA oversees private workplaces, regulating “more than 100
million workers in more than eight million workplaces.” Id. at 1001. In addition, states are authorized to
enact their own OSHA’s, using the federal statute as a floor. Id.
100
Of course, as an insurance scheme, workers’ compensation, too, has some deterrence function.
Employee pay-outs affect employers’ contributions, thus giving them incentives to reduce injuries.
101
WORK LAW, supra note [x], at 939. “Today OSHA is perhaps best known for being one of the most
criticized agencies that regulates the workplace.” Id. at 1000. OSHA’s goal is to “assure so far as possible
every working man and woman in the Nation safe and healthful working conditions . . . .” 29 U.S.C sect.
651(b). However, because of the political difficulties it faces in enacting new regulations, “OSHA has
promulgated far fewer permanent standards than was originally contemplated, and it often relies on other
means to enforce its statutory mandate.” Instead, OSHA “commonly relies on . . . [its] general duty clause”
or temporary standards in lieu of enacting specific regulations. WORK LAW, supra note [x], at 1001, 1004,
1005.
102
Some OSHAct regulations, for instance requiring appropriately placed exit signs and fire extinguishers,
translate well into enforceable regulations across workplaces.
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comprehensive protection from the unpredictable, single-incident workplace risk, often
industrial injuries that animated the initial workers’ compensation system. 103 Ex post,
after a single-incident injury, workers’ compensation provides medical benefits to cover
rehabilitation, as well as benefits to cover temporary and permanent loss of income. 104
However, beyond these single-incident injuries, there remains significant uncertainty
regarding what kinds of worker injuries are covered and when. “In particular, coverage
of occupational diseases, repetitive stress injuries and mental injuries have [sic] proven
controversial.” 105 Hence, even miners, whose workplace hazards inspired workplace
regulation, have found it more difficult to recover for black-lung and related chronic
diseases than for incident-related injuries. 106
In addition, both workers’ compensation statutes and the OSHAct have developed
categories of inclusion and exclusion. For instance, professional athletes playing contact
sports are statutorily or functionally excluded from workers’ compensation in many
states. Although these athletes are frequently injured and disabled from working,
legislators and courts, “lobbied heavily by sports team owners,” 107 have concluded this
category of worker does not warrant coverage because the “deliberate” nature of the
physical contact meant injuries were not “unexpected.” 108 In these workplaces, e.g.,
football and boxing, regulations are designed to minimize injury through equipment
specifications and codes of conduct that govern the workers, but are excluded from
compensation. In this sense, injury is a tolerated, and uncompensated, residuum of the

103

See supra note [x]. For instance, OSHA has developed adequate standards to address worker risk posed
by machines and other equipment typically found in factories and manufacturing workplaces.
104
As noted above, these benefits are paid according to a pre-determined schedule, and workers receive
only partial compensation.
105
WORK LAW, supra note [x], at 955. After decades of struggle, workers won the inclusion of “disease” in
workers’ compensation statutes, yet, “those suffering from work-related diseases still face considerable
hurdles” in obtaining benefits. Id. at 955.
106
The first two workers’ compensation statutes were for miners. Arthur Larson, The Nature and Origins
of Workmen’s Compensation, 37 CORNELL L.Q. 206, 231 (1952). OSHA, meanwhile, has struggled to gain
authority over this type of chronic workplace risk. In the 1990s, the agency tried to establish erogonomic
standards to address repetitive-motion injuries, but was hindered by a powerful employers’ lobby and a
hostile Congress. WORK LAW, supra note [x], at 1004-05. After its ergonomic standard was rescinded by
the Bush Administration, the Department of Labor issued guidelines for discrete industries. Id.
107
Stephen Cormac Carlin & Christopher M. Fairman, Note, Squeeze Play: Workers’ Compensation and
the Professional Athlete, 12 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 95, 108 (1994).
108
Palmer v. Kansas City Chiefs Football Club, 621 S.W.2d 350, 357 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981). See also
Frederic Pepe & Thomas P. Frerichs, Injustice Uncovered? Worker’s Compensation and the Professional
Athlete, in SPORTS AND THE LAW 18, 19 (Charles E. Quirk ed., 1996) (noting misconception that all
professional athletes are overpaid and arguing that professional athletes need same legal protection as
ordinary working people precisely because they do not earn large salaries); Rachel Schaffer, Grabbing
Them by the Balls: Legislatures, Courts, and Team Owners Bar Non-Elite Professional Athletes from
Workers’ Compensation, 8 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 623 (2000); Carlin & Fairman, supra note
[x], (noting how both workers’ compensation statutes and their own contracts limit professional athletes’
claims for injury); PROFESSIONAL AND AMATEUR SPORTS 15-1, 15-17, at 15.04 (Gary A. Uberstine ed.,
1991) (contrasting temporary disability benefits and permanent disability benefits).
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activity. 109 These categorical exclusions are most apparent, however, when it comes to
one workplace hazard targeted by sex work assimilationists—nonconsensual violence. 110
Over two million workers are victims of workplace violence each year. 111 In fact,
homicide, not cave-ins or machine malfunctions, is the fourth leading cause of workplace
fatalities and the leading cause for women workers. 112 OSHA nominally is charged with
protecting workers from violence in the workplace. Although the agency does not have
specific standards for workplace violence, its general duty clause imposes a broad
obligation on employers to guarantee their employees a safe working environment. 113
However, as numerous critics have pointed out, “there has been virtually no enforcement
of this duty with regard to workplace violence,” and workplace violence seems to fall
through the regulatory cracks. 114 As with other workplace hazards, risk of violence is not
equally distributed across workplaces—workers in health care, service jobs, and late
night retail, i.e., convenience stores, are the most vulnerable to workplace violence. 115
Convenience stores also share with sex businesses a particular form of violence, sexual
assault. OSHA has issued specific guidelines and recommendations for three of these
high-risk industries, health care and social service workplaces, taxi driving, and late-night
109

Duncan Kennedy uses tolerated residuum to describe how law under-regulates sexual violence and
harassment, thereby benefitting heterosexual men. DUNCAN KENNEDY, SEXY DRESSING, ETC.: ESSAYS ON
THE POWER AND POLITICS OF CULTURAL IDENTITY (1993).
110
I characterize it as nonconsensual to distinguish it from the consensual violence in contact sports.
111
“Workplace violence is any act or threat of physical violence, harassment, intimidation, or other
threatening disruptive behavior that occurs at the work site...Nearly 2 million American workers report
having been victims of workplace violence each year.” U.S. Dept. of Labor, “Workplace Violence,”
Occupational Safety and Health Administration, accessed 22 Jan. 2012 at
http://www.osha.gov/SLTC/workplaceviolence/ (“Workplace Violence”).
112
Bureau of Labor Statistics Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries n. 137 (CFOI). “In 2009,
approximately 572,000 violent crimes (rape/sexual assault, robbery, and aggravated and simple assault)
occurred against persons age 16 or older while they were at work or on duty, based on findings from the
National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS). This accounted for about 24% of nonfatal violence against
employed persons age 16 or older. Nonfatal violence in the workplace was about 15% of all nonfatal
violent crime against persons age 16 or older.” Erika Harrell, US Dept. of Justice "Special Report:
Workplace Violence, 1993-2009," (March 2011), available at
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/wv09.pdf.
113
The general duty clause states: “[e]ach employer [] shall furnish to each of his employees employment
and a place of employment which are free from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause
death or serious physical harm to his employees[.]” 29 USC 654 (a)(1).
114
Note, Sheryl L. Erdmann, Eat the Carrot and Use the Stick: The Prevalence of Workplace Violence
Demands Proactive Federal Regulation of Employers, 43 VAL. U.L. REV. 725, 727 ( 2009) (footnote
omitted). See also Davis, supra note [x], at 726-27 (“The Occupational Safety & Health Administration . .
. holds employers to a general duty to shield employees from hazards and injury. However, there has been
virtually no enforcement of this duty with regard to workplace violence.”) (footnote omitted). In addition,
in 1995 there was an administrative law ruling that strict liability would not be imposed on employers for
hazards that were not recognized by the employers’ industry. Id. at n. 47.
115
For homicide, “most of the victims work in retail trade, security services, or transit services
occupations.” Jane Lipscomb et al, Preventing Injuries & Abuse: Perspectives on Legal Strategies to
Prevent Workplace Violence, 30 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 166, 166 (2002). On the other hand, “[t]he majority
of non-fatal workplace injuries occur in settings in which the victim and the attacker are in a custodial or
client-caregiver relationship, such as in health care or social services.” Id. These statistics also vary
according to geography. For instance, in New York City, in [dates] the workers at greatest risk from
violence were taxi drivers and grocery store workers. Susan L. Pollett, Violence in the Workplace: Are
Employers Legally Responsible?, 22 WESTCHESTER B.J. 133, 138 (1995).
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retail stores, but the guidelines remain advisory only, and no workplace is subject to
mandatory rules from OSHA with regard to violence prevention. 116
In the absence of effective deterrence from OSHA, workers’ compensation has
emerged as the “primary compensatory remedy” for workplace violence. 117 While
OSHA has issued guidelines covering only three high-risk industries, workers’
compensation statutes facially cover 90% of workers for violence. Yet, state systems
have developed their own doctrinal exclusions, which disproportionately affect many
workers at highest risk. For instance, while late-night retail is a high-risk industry, many
courts have denied workers’ compensation claims for convenience store assaults as not
meeting the requirements that injuries “arise out of” or “in the course of employment.” 118
Moreover, there is no statutory recovery for emotional suffering, which can severely limit
relief. Ironically, the gender dynamics of violence exacerbate the problem, making
women’s injuries more likely to be excluded from workers’ compensation. Male workers
are more likely to be assaulted by strangers; female workers by someone they know.
Because the “arising out of employment” requirement bars “private” or “personal”
assaults, which courts construe as including both stalkers and domestic violence, women
victims of workplace violence are more likely to be excluded from relief. 119 The same is
true for another gendered form of violence prevalent in both sex businesses and
convenience stores: sexual assault. 120 Like assaults deemed “personal,” many courts
have found that workplace rapes do not “arise from the employment” and hence are
exempt from workers’ compensation benefits. 121 Moreover, a rape victim may not suffer
the kind of lasting physical impairment required for workers’ compensation benefits, and
the emotional suffering and trauma many sexual assault victims do experience is
excluded. 122 In sum, the workplace hazard many sex workers fear most, violence, and
specifically sexual assault, is ineffectively and sporadically regulated by existing law.

116

U.S. Department of Labor Occupational Safety and Health Administration, Guidelines for Preventing
Workplace Violence for Health Care and Social Service Workers, OSHA 3148-01R (2004), available at
http://www.osha.gov/Publications/OSHA3148/osha3148.html; U.S. Department of Labor Occupational
Safety and Health Administration, Recommendations for Workplace Violence Prevention Programs in
Late-Night Retail Establishments, OSHA 3153-12R (2009), available at
http://www.osha.gov/Publications/osha3153.pdf; U.S. Department of Labor Occupational Safety and
Health Administration, Preventing Violence Against Taxi and For-Hire Drivers, OSHA Fact Sheet (April
2010), available at www.osha.gov/Publications/taxi-driver-violence-factsheet.pdf.
117
Goldberg, supra note [x], at (footnote omitted).
118
See, e.g., WORK LAW, supra note [x], at 974-75. In some jurisdictions, this has become a categorical
exclusion. See, e.g., Goldberg, supra note [x].
119
Goldberg, supra note [x].
120
“For time of day, the 1990 National Crime Victimization Survey reports that seventy-one percent (71%)
of rapes occur at night which is consistent with our finding of eight-nine percent (89%) occuring at night.”
NACS Online, Convenience Store Security Report, National Association of Convenience Stores, July 1,
2007, available at
http://www.nacsonline.com/NACS/Resources/Research/Pages/ConvenienceStoreSecurity.aspx.
121
It is an interesting question whether courts would be more likely to conclude that sexual assaults in sex
workplaces meet the link to employment. This is addressed infra notes [x] and accompanying text.
122
See, e.g., Doe v. Purity Supreme, 664 N.E. 2nd 815 (1996) (holding that rape victim’s claims against
employer for negligence, assault and battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligent
infliction of emotional distress were barred by the exclusive remedy provision).
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OSHAct does not reach it, and workers’ compensation has effectively declined to insure
these workers. 123
In sum, not all work or workers are treated alike when it comes to risk. Some
workplace injuries are the object of both deterrence and compensatory regulation. But
workers susceptible to other kinds of risk continue to struggle for legal attention and
intervention. This differential is particularly noteworthy with regard to workplace
violence. Some industries enjoy special, targeted regulation to ameliorate workplace
violence. However some of the most hazardous workplaces are the ones where the risk is
largely unregulated or the injury is incompensable. Hence, the assimilationist invocation
of an ideal “workplace” is a miscue when it comes to health and safety regulation. It
does not account for the highly differential regimes and rules. Equally importantly,
absent specific guidelines, it is very likely that given the nature of the risk and its
gendered dimensions, sex work would largely fall outside the scope of both deterrence
and compensatory regulation.
C.

Discrimination

Assimilationists also anticipate that recognizing transactional sex as work will bring
sex professionals access to anti-discrimination law, especially racial discrimination law.
Several federal laws curb the extent to which employers can discriminate against their
workers. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employers from
discriminating in hiring, promotion, termination, training, and other employment terms
on the basis of race, sex, religion, color, or national origin. 124 Passed shortly after Title
VII, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) bars employment
discrimination against workers aged 40 or older. 125 The final piece of employment
discrimination legislation came in 1990 with the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),
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Other state and federal regulations have stepped into this regulatory void, to target some of the most
dangerous workplaces. For instance, responding to a massive increase in violence against workers at allnight convenience stores, Florida passed the Convenience Business Security Act, which imposed security
obligations on stores that had experienced a violent incident. Florida’s statute has emerged as a model for
other states. Similarly, the state of Washington passed a statute that imposes certain obligations on health
care employers to prevent workplace violence. Violence against workers at abortion clinics led both the
federal government and the state of California to enact clinic access laws that give “local police and district
attorneys a clearer mandate to prosecute anti-abortion violence.” Finally, some commentators have
responded to the regulatory void by urging a return to the common-law system as the best option for
victims of workplace violence. Convenience Business Security Act, FLA STAT. § 812.173 et seq. (1997);
Workplace Violence Prevention Law, Safety--Health Care Settings, Rev. Code Wash. (ARCW) §
49.19.005 et seq. (2011); “The success of the [Gainsville, FL] ordinance has prompted more than 260
communities nationwide to request copies of the law for conducting their own studies.” Ann E. Phillips,
Violence in the Workplace: Reevaluating the Employer’s Role, 44 BUFFALO L. REV. 139, 146-147, fn. 46
citing Dale D. Buss, Combating Crime, NATION'S BUS., Mar. 1, 1994 at 19.
124
42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1964). Within this doctrine, courts recognize both disparate treatment and
disparate impact claims. The former bars intentional acts of discrimination while the latter extends Title
VII to hold employers liable for policies that have a disproportionate impact on one group and cannot be
justified by a valid business necessity. See, e.g., Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp. (1971) (holding
employer’s refusal to accept applications from women with pre-school aged children constituted disparate
treatment based on sex); Griggs v. Duke Power, Co., (1971) (establishing disparate impact).
125
29 U.S.C. § 621-634 (1967).
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a broad mandate prohibiting discrimination, including in the workplace. 126 Finally,
Section 1981 of the 1866 Civil Rights Act also offers protections from racial
discrimination, but is limited to private employers and in other ways. 127 Taken together,
these anti-discrimination laws sharply limit the extent to which employers can indulge
their preferences and biases, and, equally crucially, the preferences and biases of their
customers.
Importantly, courts do not treat all categories of discrimination the same, carving
significant exceptions into some legislation, but not all. Although regulated under
different statutory regimes, in age, religion, national origin, and sex discrimination cases
employers can defend against charges of disparate treatment by showing that the
contested selection criteria is a bona fide occupational qualification (bfoq). 128 Classic
bfoq’s include mandated retirement ages for bus drivers and airline pilots and
“authenticity” of a service or product, mainly exempted for religion and national
origin. 129 In particular, authenticity reaches gender, as filmmakers can hire men to play
male parts and women to play female ones. 130 Beyond authenticity, gender has
126

42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (1990). The Act requires employers to make “reasonable accommodations”
for employees with disabilities.
127
Section 1981 provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the
same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts,
to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all
laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is
enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment,
pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no
other.
Although Section 1981 was the first law to prohibit discrimination in employment, for historical reasons
litigants opt for Title VII’s protections in far greater numbers. See Danielle Tarantolo, From Employment
to Contract: Section 1981 and Antidiscrimination Law for the Independent Contractor Workforce, 116
YALE L.J. 170 (2006) (describing origins of Section 1981, its historic and contemporary limitations, and
urging a more expansive interpretation of its protections).
128
The corollary exemption under disparate impact claims is business essence.
129
Hence, the Catholic Church can hire only Catholics (and men) as priests, and Chinese restaurants can
hire Chinese chefs. In one controversial decision, the religion bfoq was even extended to hiring a
philosophy professor at a religious university. Pime v. Loyola Univ. of Chicago, 803 F.2d 351 (7th Cir. Ill.
1986) (holding that hiring a Jesuit to teach philosophy at a Jesuit university was a BFOQ and did not
violate Title VII). But see Stacey M. Brandenburg, Employment Law: Alternatives to Employment
Discrimination at Private Religious Schools, 1999 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 335 (1999) (arguing, inter alia, that
42 U.S.C. 2000e-1(a) (1994), the section allowing for religious exemptions to employment discrimination
in Title VII, should be repealed); Jane Rutherford, Equality as the Primary Constitutional Value: The Case
for Applying Religious Discrimination Laws to Religion, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 1049 (1996) (arguing that
equality, as described in the Fourteenth Amendment, is the most important component of the Constitution,
and that anti-discrimination laws like Title VII should be enforced even against religious institutions).
Consistency, however, is required. Hence, a Chinese restaurant that hired French, Italian, and Japanese
chefs could not then exclude Mexican applicants.
130
In fact, the acting bfoq is included in a comment in the EEOC Guidelines. The Guidelines purport to
authorize sex discrimination in casting insofar as it is “necessary for the purpose of authenticity or
genuineness.” EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 CFR § 1604.2(a)(2) (1965),
available at http://law.justia.com/cfr/title29/29-4.1.4.1.5.0.21.2.html. Mary Anne Case called it “bizarre
that sex is considered a BFOQ, in the interests of ‘authenticity or genuineness,’ for the job of actor or
actress . . . . After all, the very essence of this job is to be something one is not. All that a producer should
be allowed to require is that the pretense be convincing.” Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Gender
from Sex and Sexual Orientation: The Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE
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developed its own, complex jurisprudence of bona fide occupational qualifications, which
is especially apparent in the service sector. Service workers are the last stage in
satisfying and fulfilling customer needs. 131 Unlike, for instance, manufacturing, where
customers typically differentiate among products, in service work, customers can develop
strong preferences for particular kinds of workers or characteristics. 132 Employers
develop and exploit these preferences to market their business in ways the law has
deemed both legitimate and illegitimate. 133
In a series of 1970s cases courts rejected employer efforts to justify
discriminatory treatment practices based on gender stereotypes, including both nurturing
and what Kimberley Yuracko calls sexual titillation. Most famously, faced with airlines’
efforts to limit the position of flight attendant to young, “attractive” women, courts held
L.J. 1 (1995). Russell Robinson elaborates, “Actors generally do not face authenticity requirements
regarding many character traits; for example, an actor need not be gay or have a disability or pregnant in
order to play a character with that trait. Indeed, good acting is often defined as the ability to pull off a role
quite different from the actor’s own identity.” Russell K. Robinson, Casting and Caste-ing: Reconciling
Artistic Freedom and Antidiscrimination Norms, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 31-32 (2007). However, the reverse
is not true. An actor with a non-concealable disability probably would not be cast to play a non-disabled
person. In addition, actresses often struggle to work around pregnancy. In what is probably the most
famous case actress Hunter Tylo received a jury award of $4.8 million for her pregnancy discrimination
suit for being fired from Melrose Place. Many speculate the jury was influenced by the fact that producer
Aaron Spelling had accommodated previous pregnant actresses on the same show, including lead Heather
Locklear.
131
“[S]ervice sector employers are more dependent upon front-line employees’ loyalty and willingness to
go the extra mile to further the firm’s mission than manufacturing employers because service businesses
offer no tangible product; the firms’ service is the product, and it cannot be separated from the workers who
provide it.” WORK LAW, supra note [x], at 65.
132

Two types of customer preferences define each business: preferences for products and preferences
for people. . . . Businesses are also shaped, however, by customer preferences for certain types of
employees or service providers. Customer preferences to have certain services provided by
employees of a particular sex may . . . be grounded in (1) a belief that individuals of one sex are
superior in all or particular activities to individuals of the other sex, (2) socially, or perhaps
biologically, conditioned feelings of discomfort at having certain services performed by an
individual of a particular sex, (3) a desire to experience or avoid sexual titillation, or (4) a sense of
socially or aesthetically appropriate gender roles.
Kimberly A. Yuracko, Private Nurses and Playboy Bunnies : Explaining Permissible Sex Discrimination,
92 CAL. L. REV. 147, 164 (2004). Of course, many businesses may use their workers to try to link their
products to an idea or image. Frequently, this is an effort to turn a product into a service. The Saturn car
exemplifies this. “In ads, Saturn describes itself as: ‘A different kind of car. A different kind of company,’
hoping to win over buyers who might otherwise shop for a competitive foreign or American car.” Doron P.
Levin, Saturn Stands Out Brightly Amid the Car-Sales Gloom, NY TIMES, Dec. 17, 1991, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/1991/12/17/business/saturn-stands-out-brightly-amid-the-car-salesgloom.html?scp=2&sq=saturn+different+kind+car&st=nyt.
133
Dianne Avery and Marion Crain describe employer efforts to differentiate their business and create
consumer loyalty through the “brand.” See, e.g., Dianne Avery & Marion Crain, Branded: Corporate
Image, Sexual Stereotyping, and the New Face of Capitalism, 14 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 13, 84
(2007) (“In entering new gaming markets outside the orb of Las Vegas and the Strip, Harrah’s, like other
casino operators, has struggled to negotiate delicately the boundary between commercially viable sexiness
and unpalatable (if not clearly illegal) sexual exploitation of female service workers.”). See also Marion
Crain, Managing Identity: Buying into the Brand at Work, 95 IOWA L. REV. 1179 (2010) (describing how
employers use “brand” to induce worker loyalty in absence of traditional incentives such as retirement
benefits and job security).
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that their exclusions of men, as well as their subjecting women but not men to weight
restrictions and other grooming, age, and marital status requirements violated Title
VII. 134 Other cases used a similar logic to limit employers’ discriminatory practices.
Yet, the sex discrimination bfoq remains robust. Courts have upheld gender as a valid
criterion in hiring nurses who work in labor and delivery rooms, nursing home attendants
who bathe and dress patients, restroom attendants, and, in some cases, for prison
guards. 135 Courts cite as the relevant factor the employer’s reasonable regard for its
patrons’ privacy. 136 Unlike the decisional privacy associated with sexual acts and also
reproduction that underlies some erotic exceptionalism, this is spatial privacy, rooted in
the comforts of homosociality. 137
Yet decisional privacy is arguably operative in as well. Yuracko observes a
second exemption in which courts have affirmed the right of employers to employ only
women (or, presumably, only men) in workplaces that sell sex.138 Myriad businesses use
sex to market other goods or services, e.g., meals, clothes, transportation, gambling, etc.,
and to enhance revenues. But Yuracko distinguishes these from businesses that actually
charge for and derive receipts from the sale of sexual services, or what I call erotic
receipt businesses. Unlike stripping, prostitution, and phone sex, in Hooters and
Abercrombie and Fitch the cash register has no provision for ringing up erotic sales. 139
134

See, e.g., Diaz v. Pan American Airways, 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971) (holding airline could not exclude
men from position of flight attendant); Wilson v. Southwest Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292 (1981) (holding
that being female was not a BFOQ for flight attendants or ticket agents and finding Southwest’s single-sex
hiring practices to be sex discrimination); Sprogis v. United Air Lines, 308 F. Supp. 959 (N.D. Ill. 1970)
(holding that a requirement that female flight attendants be unmarried was sex discrimination under Title
VII); Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, 366 F. Supp. 763 (D.D.C 1973) (holding, inter alia, that rules
prohibiting eyeglasses for female flight attendants and height and weight restrictions applied only to female
flight attendants violated Title VII).
135
Yuracko observes a spectrum of privacy from touching (labor room and other care givers) to seeing to
embarrassment but not touching or seeing (rest-room attendants). Yuracko, supra note [x], at 157. See
also Michael J. Frank, Justifiable Discrimination in the News and Entertainment Industries: Does Title VII
Need a Race or Color BFOQ?, 35 U.S.F. L. REV. 473, 491 (2001) (noting that “within the privacy cases,
the courts deem the interests of ordinary customers in their privacy to be less than those of patients in
nursing and health care facilities”).
136
“The courts that have permitted the privacy-based sex BFOQ believe that the very sex of the excluded
individuals prevents them from giving customers adequate privacy. Accordingly, the test for the privacybased sex BFOQ is whether the excluded applicants can satisfactorily respect the privacy of customers in
the performance of the job.” Frank, supra note [x], at 490. While Yuracko notes the “symmetry” in
privacy preferences, Frank notes that the privacy bfoq defense typically only is applied to women’s privacy
preferences, not to men’s. Id. at 489-91; Yuracko, supra note [x], at 181-83.
137
See supra note [x] and accompanying text.
138
See, e.g., Wilson v. Southwest Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292, 301 (1981) (“Generally, a male could not
supply the authenticity required to perform a female role. Similarly, in jobs where sex or vicarious sexual
recreation is the primary service provided, e.g. a social escort or topless dancer, the job automatically calls
for one sex exclusively; the employee’s sex and the service provided are inseparable. Thus, being female
has been deemed a BFOQ for the position of a Playboy Bunny, female sexuality being reasonably
necessary to perform the dominant purpose of the job which is forthrightly to titillate and entice male
customers.”).
139
By the same token, even when sexual services are not actually provided, e.g., a phone sex or prostitution
interaction in which the parties talk non-sexually, they could be. In addition, even outside of erotic receipt
businesses, workers often receive an erotic premium in wages or tips. See, e.g., Dianne Avery, The Female
Breast as Brand, in Invisible Labor (forthcoming). Compare Ohio’s General Assembly defined a “sexual
encounter establishment” in a 2001-2002 bill as “’Sexual encounter establishment’ means a business or

30

Yuracko shows that employer efforts to assert bfoq’s in the former instances rarely win,
while courts have been more willing to permit employers to practice sex discrimination
for erotic receipt businesses, in which selling sex is the “inherent business essence.” 140
Yuracko distinguishes these erotic receipt cases from the privacy ones. Yet, one might
understand the erotic receipt exemption as extending the logic of decisional privacy, that
decisions about sex lie in a zone of protected intimacy liberty, to the commercial sphere.
Hence, spatial privacy and decisional privacy for erotic receipt businesses are
noteworthy as the only forms of sex discrimination in which customer “tastes for
discrimination” trump workers’ rights to equal treatment. 141 There is overlap—both
embed a sexual logic. 142 Yet they are conceptually distinct, and Yuracko contends that
courts “are far more permissive” of sex discrimination on behalf of spatial privacy
concerns than they are of discrimination on behalf of what I characterized as decisional
privacy in erotic receipt businesses. 143 Thus service remains a deeply complicated and
contested terrain for sex discrimination claims.
In an important contrast, when it comes to race, employers cannot defer to their
own or their customers’ preferences or biases. Unlike sex, race and disability have no
explicit bona fide occupational qualification. The standard for disability is that
employers must make “reasonable accommodations” and not deny an opportunity to an
otherwise qualified individual. 144 And race is straightforward: 145 the only explicit
commercial establishment that, as one of its principal business purposes, offers for any form of
consideration a place where two or more persons may congregate, associate, or consort for the purpose of
specified sexual activities or when one or more of the persons is nude or seminude.’” Ohio S.B. No. 251
(2002) (introduced), available at http://www.legislature.state.oh.us/bills.cfm?ID=124_SB_251.
140
“Attempts to discriminate on the basis of sex in hiring for plus-sex businesses are virtually always
unsuccessful.” Yuracko, supra note [x], at n.28. She claims that airlines and related cases demonstrate that
“courts simply do not permit employers to explicitly sell sexual titillation along with other goods and
services.” Id. Yuracko also believes that most employers would not risk association as an erotic receipt
business. “Businesses explicitly selling sexual titillation may do so only by positioning themselves within
the traditionally marginalized and stigmatized sex industry. Businesses that seek to bring sexual titillation
into the mainstream by combining sexual titillation (and sex-based hiring) with the sale of other goods and
services are not permitted to exist.” Id. at 196. Ann McGinley, on the other hand, is not as sanguine about
the plus-sex/sexual gratification dichotomy. McGinley finds “[t]he lines between sex work, work in a
highly sexualized environment, and other work requiring employees to ‘sell’ their sex or gender to give up
control over their intimate emotions are hazy.” McGinley, supra note [x], at 95 (footnote omitted).
Instead, “[o]ften, a woman’s job prospects and ability to advance within an enterprise are linked to her
setting the proper gender tone on the scale of commodification.” Id. at 94 (footnote omitted).
141
See Avery & Crain, supra note [x] (showing that employers are successfully recasting appearance
discrimination in the language of “branding.”).
142
While sexual gratification rests on an explicitly sexual logic, privacy too can be implicitly sexual. It
assumption that people are comfortable with care attendants of the same sex are heteronormative.
Although lesbians may also object to male invasions of their privacy, rooted in perceptions of male
supremacy and objectification rather than in assumptions of heterosexual desire.
143
Yuracko, supra note [x], at 152.
144
Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12112(b). As used in subsection (a) of this section, the term
“discriminate against a qualified individual on the basis of disability” includes... (5)(A) not making
reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified
individual with a disability who is an applicant or employee, unless such covered entity can demonstrate
that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business of such covered
entity.”
145
“The bona fide occupational qualification ("BFOQ") defense is an extremely narrow exception, . . .and
is not available for racial discrimination.” 10 (citations omitted). See also Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S.
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exception is a narrow one recognized by the Seventh Circuit for correctional officers. 146
But there appear to be other exemptions operative in race jurisprudence. For instance,
one judge speculated that law enforcement could assign undercover agents by race, i.e.,
limit Klan infiltration to white officers. 147 In a radically different context, Michael J.
Frank and Russell Robinson have both observed that race has been effectively exempted
from discrimination law in the highly influential and profitable filmmaking industry. 148
Writing in 2001 and 2007, neither author found any published adjudication of the highly
prevalent racial preferences in casting decisions. 149 Robinson observed, “the EEOC
carves out casting as an arbitrary exception to the normal requirement that an applicant be
considered as an individual and not saddled with group-based stereotypes and the ban on
catering to customer preferences.” 150 These racial breakdowns are defended as protecting
authenticity, but, unlike cuisine, religion, and Klan infiltration, in film casting
authenticity is linked to first amendment protection for artistic expression, including
character and plot creation. Robinson rejects the authenticity exemption, contending,
“Indeed, when it comes to casting, an entire industry effectively disregards Title VII.” 151
Judicial dicta similarly suggests protection for another market sector that regularly
employs racial preferences, advertising. A district court noted that advertisers might

321, 334 (1977); Swint v. Pullman-Standard, 624 F.2d 525, 535 (5th Cir.1980), overruled on other grounds
by 456 U.S. 273 (1982) (omission of race as bfoq was intentional on part of Congress and that the defense
is not available in race discrimination cases); Burwell v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 633 F.2d 361, 370 n. 13
(4th Cir.1980) (same); Knight v. Nassau County Civil Serv. Comm'n, 649 F.2d 157, 162 (2d Cir.1981)
(same); EEOC Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2 (describing bfoq for gender but not race).
146
Wittmer v. Peters, 87 F.3d 916 (7th Cir.1996) (adopting narrow, judicially-crafted racial bfoq for
correctional officers). See also Robinson, supra note [x], at 41 (“A few courts have suggested without
holding that Title VII could permit a BFOQ for race in certain contexts, like police forces and prison
security.”).
147
Some have also suggested that newspapers might send white reporters to interview Klan members.
Frank, supra note [x], at 506 (“Discriminatory practices may also exist in the television news industry,
where it sometimes may be necessary to use reporters of a particular race to do undercover work, such as
an expose on the Ku Klux Klan, or where an Asian-American reporter might have better success getting
other Asians to volunteer information during an interview.”).
148
Frank, supra note [x]; Robinson, supra note [x].
149
Frank, supra note [x], (“There is not a single reported case in which an actor has sued a director for
race-based casting decisions, even though it is common.”); Robinson, supra note [x] (noting his research
“did not turn up a single published decision in which a court adjudicated an actor’s Title VII claim of race
or sex discrimination.”).
Robinson contrasts race and sex specifications in casting breakdowns, finding that 45.2% had
racial codes, compared with 94% for gender and “women over 40 [who] are as much a minority as any
ethnic group.” “This common sequencing suggests that sex forms the foundation of a character more than
the traits that follow, such as race and age.” Robinson, supra note [x], at 19.
150
Robinson, supra note [x], at 34. Compare Robinson, supra note [x], at 40 (“advocat[ing] a different
approach that acknowledges First Amendment concerns and focuses not on whether a female can
‘authentically’ play a male, but on whether the sex of the character could be changed without doing
substantial harm to the narrative.”) with Frank, supra note [x], at 498 (“Despite Congress’ omission of race
from the BFOQ provision, people accept the reasonableness and morality of recognizing a BFOQ for race,
at least in some instances involving the entertainment industry. Indeed, to demonstrate the necessity of a
race BFOQ, some scholars use as their prime example the need to employ black actors to portray black
characters.”).
151
Robinson, supra note [x], at 5.
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select actors based on race in order to “solicit products to a certain group.” 152 An
appellate court further clarified and refined the hypothetical test as employers’ ability to
take racial appearance into account. 153 A final looks-based profession that appears to
inhabit at least a litigation-free zone with regard to anti-discrimination law is modeling.
Fashion designers and editorial directors routinely use race as an organizing principle,
either excluding non-white models from highly lucrative runway shows and editorial
campaigns, or, alternatively, use race to organize how they showcase clothes and trends.
Thus, while nominally there are no bfoq’s for race discrimination (Section1981 follows
Title VII in denying one), the reality is that some appearance industries, film, advertising,
and modeling, routinely make hiring and other employment decisions based on race. 154
Perhaps ironically, it is these looks-based, or “appearance,” markets that enjoy expressive
protection to discriminate.
A second form of sex discrimination prohibited by Title VII is sexual harassment,
another characteristic of sex workplaces that assimilationists anticipate fuller recognition
and regulation would ameliorate. In 1986 the U.S. Supreme Court recognized that sexual
harassment comprised impermissible sex discrimination under Title VII. 155 This
included both quid pro quo, i.e., conditioning terms and conditions on sex, and creating a
hostile work environment, i.e., holding employers liable for failing to prevent unwelcome
sexual advances, including from customers. While nominally a universal norm,
commentators dispute whether there should be different standards, depending on the type
of workplace, with some urging that sex workplaces should be excluded or held to a
lower standard. 156
In sum, anti-discrimination law doctrine operates in two registers in disparate
treatment cases. Age, religion, national origin, and sex have formal exemptions for bona
fide occupational qualifications. Bfoq’s for sex are complex and unpredictable, with
some courts giving deference to discrimination motivated by both spatial privacy and
decisional privacy for erotic receipts. Reasonable accommodations governs disability,
152

“The District Court expressed some concern that its decision ‘might well prevent advertisers from
employing, based on race, actors to solicit products to a certain group.’ This conclusion, however, does not
necessarily follow. A film director casting a movie about African-American slaves may not exclude
Caucasians from the auditions, but the director may limit certain roles to persons having the physical
characteristics of African-Americans. Indeed, the drafters of Title VII expressly anticipated this issue. In
their interpretative memorandum, Senators Case and Clark explained that although there is no exemption in
Title VII in which race might be deemed a bona fide job qualification, a director of a play or movie who
wished to cast an actor in the role of a Negro, could specify that he wished to hire someone with the
physical appearance of a Negro.” 110 Cong. Rec. 7213, 7217 (1964) (emphasis added). See also Miller,
615 F.2d at 654 (suggesting that a director wishing to cast the role of Henry VIII may announce that only
applicants of sufficient physical likeness to Henry VIII will be considered). As applied here, TPG could
have legally assigned jobs based on accent, speech pattern or dialect, but not expressly on race.) (emphasis
added). “Although the statutory language allows gender to be a valid BFOQ for hiring an actor or actress
where it is necessary for the ‘purpose of authenticity or genuineness.” 29 C.F.R. sect. 1604.2(a)(2).
Congress specifically rejected race as a BFOQ. See generally 110 Cong. Rec. 2550-63 (1964) (House
discussion on inclusion of race and color in the BFOQ exception).
153
Ferrill v. Parker Grp., Inc., 168 F.3d 468, fn. 10(11th Cir. 1999).
154
Siobhan Brooks recasts these as “desire industries.” “Desire industries can include various forms of
media and industries, which operate on ideas of desire and attractiveness such as fashion modeling, acting,
and selling retail.” BROOKS, supra note [x], at 6.
155
See, e.g., Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
156
See infra notes [x] and accompanying text.
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and race doctrine facially does not have bfoq’s but appears to still have exemptions based
either on an implied bfoq analysis (the Seventh Circuit’s exception for corrections
officers) or on first amendment law trumping anti-discrimination law in expressive,
appearance industries. Finally, sex discrimination law holds employers liable for
conditioning employment on sex or failing to protect workers from unwanted and
unwelcome sexual conduct. It is unclear whether and how sex work would fare as an
object of anti-discrimination law.
D.

Threshold Tests
Finally, a threshold test for accessing many of these protections is that workers be
employees rather than independent contractors. While all workers are entitled to work in
conditions defined as safe by OSHA and can collect workers’ compensation, as described
above, only full-time employees can unionize, have access to basic benefits, including
unemployment and health insurance, retirement, and social security, and are entitled to
minimum wage and overtime. Tests vary according to the statute with the National
Labor Relations Act, Fair Labor Standards Act, ERISA, 157 IRC, Social Security Act, and
workers’ compensation statutes all adopting different tests. With the exception of
Section 1981, the same holds true for discrimination law. 158 The Americans with
Disabilities Act and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act both limit protection
from discrimination to those classified legally as employees. Although the language of
Title VII states that “individuals” are protected from discrimination in law, courts still
distinguish between employees and independent contractors, restricting protection to the
former. While the various statutory and legal tests are diverse, all entail a substantial
assessment of the allocation of control over work between the employer and the
worker. 159 What remains universal though, across these distinct employee
jurisprudences, are employers’ efforts to characterize workers as independent contractors
rather than employees to lessen costs and liability.
E.

Summary

In the end, then, the assimilationist claim that professional sex is just work and
could be easily assimilated into extant regulatory structures is a miscue from the diversity
of workplaces and their regulation. Regulation for health and safety and against violence,
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See, e.g., Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company v. Darden, 503 U.S.318, 323-24 (factors for assessing
employee status include skill, source of tools, location, duration of relationship, rights to assign, discretion,
method of payment, incorporation of work into hiring party’s regular work, provision of benefits, and tax
treatment).
158

Because Section 1981’s language is not limited to employees, Danielle Tarantolo urges it could become
a broad remedy for workers in private workplaces. Tarantolo, supra note [x]. She notes, though, that in
order for Section 1981 to emerge as an effective remedy, several procedural and doctrinal obstacles would
need to be overcome, including that it only applies to racial discrimination, its inability to reach disparate
impact claims, its restriction to private causes of actions, and similarly the fact that it only reaches private
employers. Id.
159
Judicial interpretation has contributed significantly to the thick “employee” jurisprudence, elaborating
the various tests, including common law agency, economic realities, [complete].
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as well as anti-discrimination law, applies in varying ways to different market sectors and
types of work. To gain maximum protections in a world of decreasing regulation,
workers have to define themselves as certain kinds of workers doing certain kinds of
work. Workers successfully gained regulatory interventions in the factories, mines,
slaughterhouses, and other worksites that labor reformers targeted after the industrial
revolution. These regulatory interventions aligned particularly well with Fordist factories
in which employers’ efforts to standardize production also showcased their control,
responsibility, and liability. Applying anti-discrimination law to these same workplaces
was similarly straightforward: neither employers nor consumers have any legitimate
interest in the race or gender of the worker who produces their coal, car, or widget. 160
But as many commentators have noted, labor’s golden age ended with the manufacturing
economy. Workers in the service economy struggle to make their needs legible to
regulatory agencies and gain access to protections. Even the OSHAct, despite efforts to
expand it, continues to envision an historical, increasingly non-relevant workplace.
Despite over a century of effort by labor activists and reformers, workplace law
remains unpredictable and many workers find its protections remain inadequate for their
needs. Beyond that, the regulation of work is deeply instrumentalist. It is neither natural
nor inexorable, and assimilationists should be thoughtful about which type of labor sex
work would be most likely to be assimilated into. While assimilationists might be
envisioning those laborers and labor with the most conventional set of protections, e.g.,
manufacturing, which features relatively strong protections from both single-incident
injuries and racial and other forms of discrimination, it is just as likely that sex work
would be assimilated into labor in which workplace hazards are un- or under-regulated.
Regulators might find sex work to be akin to in-home health care providers, late-night
retail, or other relatively invisible, powerless service work. Or modeling. 161
In addition, as the next Section shows, the assimilationist claim is a miscue not only from
the diversity of workplaces, but also from the diversity of sex workplaces. Sex
workplaces differ not only from many other workplaces, but also from each other. The
next Section explores both the diversity of sex markets, and the distinctive challenges of
regulating them, in order to contemplate whether and how sex workplaces could be more
effectively regulated in order to ameliorate both danger and the degradation of
discrimination.
III.PROFESSIONAL SEX: A NEW MODE OF WORK
“[J]ust what is so unique about sex-work?” 162
Even determining the status of one contested form of sex work, prostitution, is
complicated. While some countries completely criminalize prostitution, in most it has
some sort of legally liminal status, in which some aspects are criminalized and others are
160

But see DAVID ROEDIGER, THE WAGES OF WHITENESS: RACE AND THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN
WORKING CLASS (1991) (describing economically irrational behavior in which white workers accept lower
wages for racial premium of not working with blacks).
161
As explored in Section III, modeling and sex work have much in common. See infra notes [x] and
accompanying text. According to [x], modeling is one of the worst jobs.
162
Tinsman, supra note [x].
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not. 163 Importantly, many jurisdictions differentiate between prostitution itself, i.e.,
selling sex, brothels, or operating an establishment in which prostitution occurs, and
“pimping,” defined variously as “assistance” or “living off the earnings of prostitution,”
"controlling prostitution for gain,” or “exploitative” or “coercive” behavior. 164 In one
study, of 100 countries surveyed, thirty-eight currently completely criminalize
prostitution.165 In every country that criminalizes prostitution, brothel ownership and
pimping likewise are illegal. 166 Liability and penalties vary by country, and, within some
countries, by jurisdiction. 167 In seven countries prostitution, brothels, and pimping all are
legal. 168 Another forty countries have partially decriminalized sex work, otherwise

163

Procon.org is a website that surveyed 100 countries, seeking to be “inclusive of major religions,
geographical regions, and policies towards prostitution.”
http://prostitution.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourceID=000772; see also
http://www.justice.govt.nz/policy/commercial-property-and-regulatory/prostitution/prostitution-lawreview-committee/publications/international-approaches/3-directory-of-countries. Germany exemplifies
how difficult it can be to discern the status of prostitution. Some set Germany’s legalization date at 1927,
when the country passed its Law for Combating Venereal Diseases. Others though insist that the relevant
date is the 2002 passage of the Prostitution Act because prior to that, although prostitution was legal under
the German Constitution, both regulations and court decisions restricted the legal and social welfare rights
of prostitutes because prostitution was considered in violation of Germany's moral code.
164
Rationales differ. Some jurisdictions target brothels and pimping to prevent “organized” prostitution.
Others are concerned about trafficking or gender equality.
165
100 Countries and Their Prostitution Policies, ProCon.org, Nov. 4, 2009, available at
http://prostitution.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourceID=000772. These include China, Egypt, India,
both North and South Korea, Jamaica, Afghanistan, Slovenia and Romania, and Kenya and South Africa.
166
In China prostitution is criminalized “as a social practice that abrogates the inherent rights of women to
personhood.” (Taiwan, on the other hand, legalized prostitution in 2009.) Another primary rationale is to
combat trafficking. See, e.g., United States Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report (2004),
available at www.state.gov/documents/organization/34158.pdf (“The United States government takes a firm
stance against proposals to legalize prostitution because prostitution directly contributes to the modern-day
slave trade and is inherently demeaning.”); Nicholas Kulish, Bulgaria Moves Away from Legalizing
Prostitution, NY TIMES, Oct. 5, 2007 (“The Bulgarian government Friday abruptly reversed its
longstanding move toward legalizing prostitution, part of a broader trend in Europe to make prostitution
illegal as a way to combat sexual trafficking.”).
167
In Egypt, the penalty for prostitutes is 3-36 months in prison and/or a fine. In Iran, prostitutes can be
imprisoned, lashed, or executed by stoning; brothel owners can be imprisoned for up to ten years, and
customers also face criminal penalties. Some countries impose only fines; others differentiate punishment
by gender or by role, i.e., prostitutes and customers. For instance, in Bangladesh, prostitution is legal for
women over 18, but male prostitution is illegal. US Department of State Bureau of Democracy, Human
Rights, and Labor, 2008 Human Rights Report: Bangladesh, Feb. 25, 2009, available at
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/sca/119132.htm.). And Sweden is emblematic of/ Iceland and
Norway in criminalizing the purchase, but not the sale of sex. In both the United States and Australia
penalties differ by jurisdiction. BROTTSBALKEN [BrB] [Criminal Code] 6:8 (Swed.); General Civil
Penal Code 22 May 1902 nr. 10 §202-206.
http://www.aic.gov.au/documents/F/B/5/%7BFB5E3FDC-1AB5-4F04-A1B89D4B5C30B42C%7Dti22.pdf ; see also Barbara Sullivan, When (Some) Prostitution Is Legal: The Impact
of Law Reform on Sex Work in Australia, 37 J.L. & SOC’Y 85 (2010).
168
These seven are Ecuador, Germany, Greece, Indonesia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, and Venezuela.
As in jurisdictions that have criminalized sex work, jurisdictions that have legalized it embrace different
rationales. For instance, Argentina’s constitution provides, “The private actions of people that do not
offend in any way the public order and morality, nor damage a third person, are only reserved to God, and
are exempt from the authority of the magistrates.”
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known as restricted legality. In addition to the brothel/pimping differentiation, 169
countries can restrict legality by geography, 170 gender, 171 jurisdiction, 172 “role,” that is
buying or selling, 173 sex act, 174 and the role of the state. 175 Finally, the “status” of
prostitute can influence the worker’s other rights and capabilities, almost uniformly
negatively. 176
Despite the complexity of how countries impose and implement criminalization,
the overwhelming majority have a narrow vision of regulatory options. These are limited
to complete criminalization, or variations on decriminalization. Those jurisdictions that
169

For instance, in ten countries, prostitution and brothel ownership are legal, but pimping is not. See, e.g.,
(Belgium, Columbia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Panama, Peru, Singapore, Switzerland, and
Turkey). Other countries criminalize both brothels and pimping. As noted above, in no country is pimping
legal if brothel ownership is not. See supra note [x] and accompanying text.
170
Several countries ban prostitution from “public” places. France and Canada both explicitly restrict
prostitution to “private” places and make solicitation in public places illegal. The United Kingdom recently
replaced its “kerb crawling” provisions with ones banning street or public solicitation. section 51A of the
Sexual Offences Act 2003. Other countries, such as Singapore, take the opposite approach, limiting
prostitution to designated “red-light districts.” In Mexico, prostitution is legal, but many cities restrict it to
certain districts. See, e.g., Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 213 (Can.).
171
Some countries engender the criminalization or liability for prostitution. In Bangladesh female
prostitution is legal but male prostitution is not. In Egypt, the man, assumed to be the customer, is
considered a witness and is exempt from punishment in exchange for testifying against the prostitute,
assumed to be a woman.
172
In Mexico and Australia, prostitution is left to the individual states, although it is criminalized in the
former and legal in the latter. The United States leaves the status of prostitution to the individual states, but
it is criminalized everywhere except for eleven rural counties in Nevada, with populations of less than
250,000. See supra note [x], and accompanying text. Between 1980 and 2009, “indoor” prostitution was
legal in Rhode Island because of an unintentional legislative loophole. The state enacted new legislation
criminalizing all prostitution in November 2009. Rhode Island: 2009 R.I. Pub. Laws 185-186 “Prostitution
and Lewdness.” Some municipal jurisdictions, such as San Francisco, intermittently contemplate
decriminalization. Proposition K, City of San Francisco: Changing the Enforcement of Laws Related to
Prostitution and Sex Workers (2008, defeated), text available at
http://www.smartvoter.org/2008/11/04/ca/sf/prop/K/. See also Law, supra note [x], at 583-585 (discussing
Rhode Island and San Francisco). Some call for explicit non-enforcement of state laws at the local level or
for implicit deprioritizing. See, e.g., Law, supra note [x], at 584-85 (discussing San Francisco and New
Jersey Task Forces as case studies of local reform); Leigh, supra note [x] (discussing San Francisco Task
Force recommendations to suspend enforcement of state laws against prostitution and redirecting resources
to services for sex workers and enforcing nuisance laws).
173
In some countries, selling sex is legal, but buying it is criminalized. This is the case in Iceland,
Norway, and Sweden. These countries recently introduced this differentiation, influenced in large part by
sex work advocacy groups.
174
For instance, Japan criminalizes only intercourse; other sexual acts are legal. KEIHō [KEIHō] [PEN.
C.] 1907 art. 182 (Japan).
175
In Turkey, the brothels are state-owned, and it is illegal to “shelter a person for prostitution.” Turkish
Criminal Code, Law No.: 5237 Official Gazette [Resmi Gazete = R.G.], 12 October 2004 No. 25611,
enacted: 26 September 2004..
176
For instance, in Turkey sex workers cannot be married and their children are barred from occupying
high rank in the army or police, or marrying persons of such rank, although they can work in other areas of
government service. ProCon.org, Nov. 4, 2009, available at
http://prostitution.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourceID=000772#turkey. In the United States,
prostitution can preclude an alien from obtaining a visa. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1001,
et. seq., as amended (naming as ineligible for a visa anyone who “is coming to the United States solely,
principally, or incidentally to engage in prostitution, or has engaged in prostitution within 10 years of the
date of application for a visa, admission, or adjustment of status.”).
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have moved from decriminalization to active “legalization” through regulation mainly
confine it to mandating age limits, health requirements, and registration for sex
workers. 177 A very few countries have, following the erotic exceptionalist call,
decriminalized prostitution without enacting any other accompanying regulation. 178 The
absence of positive laws appears to be a regulatory vacuum rather than an intentional
alignment with exceptionalism. 179 The lone exception is New Zealand, whose
Occupational Health and Safety agency has issued a comprehensive set of guidelines for
the sex industry. 180 In sum, the regulatory imagination seems extraordinarily constrained.
What would an approach look like, that took professional sex, prostitution and other
forms, seriously as work, while simultaneously confronting the real and high
vulnerability its workers experience?
A.Markets for Sex
Section II argued that assimilationists’ insistence that sex work be regulated like “any
other labor” ignores the diversity of workplaces and their regulation. This Section makes
an additional point. In the strong form version, the homogeneity of labor claim insists
and in the weak form version it assumes that sexual labor is no different from other, nonsexual work. Jane Larson offers a case in point: “commercial sex workers, like other
part-time, self-employed, and contingent workers, confront problems of economic and
social insecurity that are particularly acute in fields, like commercial sex, where most of
the workers are women. It seems more likely that such problems would be addressed
through measures applicable to all workers, and extended to commercial sex workers if
commercial sex were legal, rather than through special programs for commercial sex
workers.” 181 But, as this next part shows, sex workplaces are not like most workplaces.
Rather, they are distinct in ways that have regulatory significance.
Sex workers are disproportionately cis-women or trans-women but cater to a
customer base that is overwhelmingly male. 182 Sex work is not alone in these ratios;
177

Compare Austria (requiring prostitutes to register, undergo periodic health examinations, be 19 years old
or older, and pay taxes); Latvia (requiring monthly health check); Netherlands (prostitutes must be over 18
and clients must be over 16 and prostitutes must register and pay taxes); Singapore (requiring mandatory
health checks, that prostitutes be 16 years or older, and confine their work to designated districts);
Switzerland (requiring prostitutes register with city authorities and health authorities and get regular health
checks). Other countries impose far more intrusive requirements and restrictions. In Turkey and Greece,
health checks can be as often as twice a week and in Turkey workers must carry an identity card indicating
the dates of his or her health checks. Costa Rica has minimal requirements. Prostitutes “must be over 18
years old and carry a health card showing how recently they had a medical check-up.”
178
See, e.g., [fill in Brazil code and regulation].
179
Some countries do not address or define prostitution at all, leaving its status unclear. This is the case in
long-standing nations such as Bulgaria, Spain, and Indonesia, as well as newer ones. In Kyrgyzstan, for
instance, prostitution is not a crime but its exact legal status is unclear.
180
A GUIDE TO OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY IN THE NEW ZEALAND SEX INDUSTRY.
181
Law, supra note [x], at 599 (footnote omitted). See also Moukalif, supra note [x], at 258 (“the issues
that affect sex work are essentially labor issues common to all marginalized workers.”).
182

There exists a great gender asymmetry in prostitution: it is almost always the man that is paying
for sex. Even male prostitutes have mainly male clients. Research by Atchison, Fraser, & Lowman
provide evidence for the idea that women do not pay for sex: in a study using several multimethod searches for clients of prostitution they only found two women. Of interest is that both
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historically secretarial work also manifested these dynamics. However in sex markets,
these ratios can engender distinct dynamics that pose real risk to the workers. For
instance, exotic dancers typically cater to a male customer base, working for multiple
customers simultaneously, either in clubs or for parties—bachelor, fraternity, work,
etc.—held in private or rented places, i.e., at outcall locations. While clubs typically have
regular customers who may come alone, many men patronize dancers together seeking
homosocial bonding through group interaction with the worker. 183 Several sociological
studies have found that in these spaces patrons may experiment with and negotiate social
norms and expectations of masculinity that differ from and would be condemned as
unacceptable in other social contexts.184 These same homosocial masculinities can
trigger violence against male sex workers. Violence against men in the sex trade is well
documented. Overwhelmingly, this violence is perpetuated against them by male
customers, not women, and is triggered by perceived threats to the same masculinity that
degrades women sex workers.
Customers’ significant alcohol consumption can further loosen social inhibitions and
lubricate behavior that puts workers at risk of both verbal abuse and violence. Moreover,
sex workplaces are some of the only ones in which the workers are not only permitted but
expected to themselves consume alcohol. In dance clubs in particular, operators may
require dancers to “hustle” drinks from customers, which the dancers are then expected to
drink. 185 Hence, not only are the customers often intoxicated but the workers are
women did not purchase sex on their own, but rather were engaging in group sexual activity with a
male partner.
Kathleen D. Vohs & Jannine Lasaleta, Heterosexual Sexual Behavior Is Governed by Social Exchange and
Basic Economic Principles: Sexual Economics Theory, 9 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 785, 791-792 (2008).
See also Chancer , supra note [x], at 151 (describing sex work as “an overwhelmingly female work force
that services an overwhelmingly male clientele); Posner, supra note 5, at 91-92 (“Even in societies in
which women are prosperous and independent (modern Scandinavia, for example), and therefore could
easily afford to patronize prostitutes, there is no demand for prostitutes of either sex to service women.”).
But see [add citations] (observing women do not seek out sex in brothels or on the street but increasing
numbers partake of sex tourism).
183
According to one of Siobhan Brooks’ informants, men “show off in front of their friends and may refer
to you as a bitch or a ho, you just never know what can happen, especially at a bachelor party where you
don’t even know if security will be there.” BROOKS, supra note [x], at 67.
184

For the male customers, the stripping experience initially seems to provide opportunities to enact
masculinity by using economic power to achieve emotional and sexual intimacy. The setting of the
club reinforces the general social construction of women as ubiquitously available sex objects,
despite the fact that dancers actually maintain a certain form of power in their particularized
interaction. It is power, though, that does not really challenge male authority, and ultimately
embeds even the con woman in stigmatizing, exhausting and dangerous work. The money may be
good, but the social consequences for the women are profound.
Lisa Pasko, Naked Power: The Practice of Stripping as a Confidence Game, 5 SEXUALITIES 49-66 (2002).
See also Viva Las Vegas, MAGIC GARDENS: THE MEMOIRS OF VIVA LAS VEGAS 39 (2009) (“Lawyers were
always the worst. They seemed to feel they could get away with murder. Probably could. At the Magic
they were constantly getting tossed for taking out their erect cocks.”).
185

In the clubs that serve alcohol, management expects the dancers to accept drinks from the
customers because most club owners make the bulk of their profit from alcohol
purchases...Customers invariably want dancers to drink alcohol and are savvy to the tricks dancers
use to stay sober. A client reasons that if he can get a woman sufficiently intoxicated, it might
loosen her inhibitions enough that she'll have sex with him later.
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required to work in a state in which their own judgment is definitionally impaired. 186
Compared to other workers, then, sex professionals endure a combination of gender
ratios, homosociality, masculinity threats, and alcohol consumption that heightens
workplace risk.
A second distinctive characteristic of the work is the dangerous blurring of when sex
professionals are “on” versus “off” duty. In sex work, part of what is being “sold” is a
fantasy of interpersonal connection. 187 Customers purchase vastly differing fantasies,
but, with the exception of domination fantasies, the scenario typically entails erotic
attraction from and personal interest in them by the worker. Hence the popularity of The
Girlfriend Experience, which Elizabeth Bernstein dubs “bounded authenticity.” 188 Good
BERNADETTE BARTON, STRIPPED: INSIDE THE LIVES OF EXOTIC DANCERS 55-56 (2006). See also Panagos
v. Industrial Commission, 524 N.E.2d 1018, 1021 (Ill. App. 1988) (holding that dancer injured in an
alcohol-related automobile accident after her shift at a club could receive worker’s compensation because
her drinking on the job arose out of and occurred in course of employment) discussed in Margaret A.
Baldwin, “A Million Dollars and an Apology”: Prostitution and Public Benefits Claims, 10 HASTINGS
WOMEN’S L.J. 189, 201-202 (1999) (“The common-sense acknowledgment by these courts that drinking is
a job requirement for women in strip clubs—affecting women’s lives inside and outside the club—has
potentially radical ramifications for women’s benefit eligibility.”). In contrast, Elizabeth Bernstein’s study
of prostitutes in Stockholm, Amsterdam, and San Francisco found that many “career” prostitutes were
“vigilant” about working “straight”, i.e., not drunk or high, carefully distinguishing themselves from
“survival” prostitutes who bartered their bodies for drugs. BERNSTEIN, TEMPORARILY YOURS, supra note
[x], at 49.
186
In one case, the court upheld a worker’s claim to compensation when she accepted a ride after work
from an intoxicated driver who then had an accident. The court concluded:
We find the commissioner’s conclusion that claimant’s intoxication was caused by her drinking
while at work is supported by substantial evidence. The employer required its dancers to socialize
with customers and to hustle the purchase of drinks for the dancers. It should expect this
requirement to result in intoxication of the dancers. This practice also benefited the employer in
two ways. First, it profited from the sale of the drinks, which customers paid for. Second, the
dancers’ socializing contributed to the lounge’s goodwill by creating an atmosphere appealing to
its customers.
2800 Corp. v. Fernandez, 528 N.W.2d 124, 128 (Iowa 1995) (emphasis added).
187
“What a john wants is for the woman to act like the woman he wants, and for the woman to maintain a
credible performance as part of the bargain. She is to act as if she is the role he wants her to play.”
Baldwin, Split at the Root: Prostitution and Feminist Discourses of Law Reform, 5 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM
47, 118 [hereinafter, Baldwin, Split at the Root]. Discussing dancers, Brooks says that dancers circulating
with patrons “allows for increased individual attention to the male guests and the formation of relationships
between ‘regulars’ and the dancers. Gentlemen’s clubs rely on fantasy to run their businesses. The fantasy
is that the dancer is sexually and personally interested in the customer.” BROOKS, supra note [x], at 78
(footnote omitted).
188
“One of the most sought after features in the prostitution encounter has . . . become the ‘girlfriend
experience,’ or GFE. Ads for escorts in print media and online now routinely feature this in their
advertisements, and there are entire Web pages where people who specialize in this service can advertise.”
Sex workers market “the Girlfriend Experience” by “advertis[ing] themselves as “girlfriends for hire” and
describe[ing] the ways in which they offer not merely eroticism but authentic intimate connection for sale
in the marketplace . . . .” BERNSTEIN, supra note [x], at 126, 7. Although the emotional and erotic
authenticity they offer is sincere, they remain, as Bernstein notes, “bounded,” in large part by the market
mediated nature of the transactions. Neither the clients nor the workers want unbounded eroticism as
demonstrated by the fact that many sex workers report that when they offer favored clients “freebies” or
discounts the men often do not return. “For many clients, one of the chief virtues of commercial sexual
exchange is the clear and bounded nature of the encounter” and the “clarifying effect of payment.” Id. at
120, 121. The Girlfriend Experience is not a substitute or second-best to conventional, amative
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sex workers deliver the fantasies their customers want. 189 It should not be surprising that
some customers confuse the fantasy with reality and attempt to pursue the relationship
beyond the transactional contract. 190 One regular customer at a dance club in New York,
who often volunteers to escort dancers to the subway or help them hail a cab after their
shifts, observed, “It’s leaving the club that’s dangerous.” 191 This happens to other service
workers, as well, who may be stalked or harassed by clients or customers, but the risk is
higher in sex work, given that the customer’s fantasy is embedded in an actual sexual
relationship and interest, feigned or not.
Heightening the risk is the fact that some employers appear to purposely blur lines
between on-work/off-work. They may demand sexual favors, or “entertainment” as they
put it, for themselves or for friends, as a condition of employment or receiving favorable
treatment, such as good shifts or referrals to clients. In contrast, factory workers typically
are not asked to make widgets for free, for the boss’s personal use after hours. Both of
these dynamics are exacerbated by the attribution to sex professionals of an identity as
always sexually available and willing, or, alternatively, as a lesser human being,
deserving of exploitation, because s/he has explicitly commodified he/r sexuality. Both
beliefs can lead to threatening behavior towards workers, including stalking, harassment,
and even assault and murder. While many customers do get and respect the boundaries
between “on” and “off” duty, the nature of the work lends itself to confusion, thereby
heightening risk.
Similarly, the line between re-negotiating terms and harassment or assault also can be
blurry. A dancer who is asked to perform a sexual act on a client may prefer not to do so,
be offended, or even feel threatened or coerced. Another dancer, or the same dancer in
different circumstances, might be open to the request, depending on the price point,
client, or context. The same is true for a prostitute who has agreed in advance to a certain
set of transactions but who may or may not be open to expanding the sexual menu.
While workers in non-sexual contexts might characterize the request for additional work
or more work or different work as unpleasant, exploitative, and/or coercive, law and
society typically do not perceive such requests as criminal behavior the way that
violations of sexual contracts can easily cross into sexual assault.
A third meaningful distinction stems from the fact that sexual labor entails a social
stigma that is almost unique. The stigma results in significant social isolation, as it
interferes in the worker’s relationships with friends and family and, importantly, with
other workers. For instance, dancers trying to unionize have found their organizing

relationships; it, or bounded authenticity, is itself the desired experience. See also ZELIZER, supra note [x],
at 17 (complicating idea of authenticity in intimate relationships).
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“This emotional labor, which she describes as more tiresome than the work of exotic dance, is crucial to
the financial success of the dancer.” Bernstein, supra note [x], at 80 (footnotes omitted). One sociologist
observed “the interactions between dancer and customer become complicated because the dancer not only
displays her body, but also sells versions of her ‘self’—including her personality, attention, and
conversation—in order to sustain the relationship with the customer.” McGinley, supra note[x], at 79
(footnote omitted).
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“The dancer uses emotional labor to develop clients into ‘regulars’ who spend hundreds of dollars at
each visit to the club. The emotional labor, which is invisible to the regular clients, results in clients’ belief
that they are ‘boyfriends’ rather than customers.” BROOKS, supra note [x], at 80-81 (footnotes omitted);
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BROOKS, supra note [x], at 96.
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efforts rejected by several unions. 192 In addition, while other workers who labor in
stressful or high-risk jobs can find solace from family, friends, and community, many sex
professionals hide their work from those closest to them, resulting in profound social
isolation. 193 Some commentators also attribute the isolation to the extreme control that
employers exert over sex workers which “leads to the erosion of other relationships and
thwarts personal autonomy.” 194 Importantly, the stigma runs both ways; it also afflicts
customers, who are largely unwilling to admit they consume professional/commercial
sexual services. 195 Unlike, say, those who consume fossil fuels produced by coal miners,
“[m]any people watch pornography, but few are willing to write to their assemblyperson
about it.” 196
Of course some contend this stigma is a product of the criminalization of sexual
labor. Stigma is associated with most illegal activities (and many legal ones associated
with lower classes) and can be exacerbated by gender. 197 Yet other criminalized
activities do not incur the intensity of the stigma associated with sex work. Some lawbreakers, including drug dealers and even, ironically, pimps, enjoy cultural
valorization. 198 In contrast, the stigma associated with commercial sex appears to stem
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Margot Rutman notes that “[T]he Screen Actors Guild excludes such performers from membership and
their independent-contractor status precludes their protection under the National Labor Relations Act.”
Rutman, supra note [x], at 519.
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“[B]ecause of the stigmatized nature of their work, many dancers cannot tell their families or friends
about what they do for a living.” Chun, supra note [x], at 233. The main dancer featured in the
documentary Live Nude Girls Unite! had more difficulty coming out to her mother as a sex worker than as
a lesbian, even though her mother works with prostitutes.
194
Baldwin, supra note [x], at 197 (footnote omitted). Baldwin, who is an anti-prostitution activist and
scholar, further contends that the isolation of women who work in the sex industry is not unlike that of
battered women. She also speculates that “[p]rostitution and stripping also require women to create an
illusion of personal interest in the customer, a dynamic that in and of itself hedges the difference between
work and personal life.” Baldwin, supra note [x], at 197-98, 198 (footnote omitted).
195
But see CHESTER BROWN, PAYING FOR IT: A COMIC-STRIP MEMOIR ABOUT BEING A JOHN (memoir in
form of graphic novel recounting self-described “john’s” sexual encounters with prostitutes); see also
Dwight Garner, A Graphic Memoir that Earns the Designation, N.Y. Times, May 25, 2011, at C6. (“It’s a
factual and often graphic recounting of the author’s many erotic sessions with sex workers; it’s a bitter
critique of the inanities of romantic love; and it’s a sustained argument in favor of decriminalizing
prostitution.”); Annie Sprinkle, A John’s Story, N.Y. Times, Sunday Book Rev. July 3, 2011, at BR15
(noting that in her forty years among sex workers she has only known one john, and arguably Charlie
Sheen, “to come out voluntarily — with honesty, integrity and pride”).
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Rutman, supra note [x], at 558 (footnote omitted).
Martha Nussbaum offers an interesting contrast with the stigma she associates with domestic workers.
In domestic service as in prostitution, one is hired by a client and one must do what that client
wants or fail at the job. In both, one has a limited degree of latitude to exercise skills as one sees
fit, and both jobs require the exercise of some developed bodily skills. In both, one is at risk of
enduring bad behavior from one’s client, although the prostitute is more likely to encounter
physical violence. Certainly both are traditionally professions that enjoy low respect, both in
society generally and from the client. Domestic service on the whole is likely to have worse hours
and lower pay than (at least many types of) prostitution, but it probably contains fewer health
risks. It also involves no invasion of intimate bodily space, as prostitution (consensually) does.
Nussbaum, supra note [x], at 702.
198
The most recent example is the movie Hustle and Flow about a pimp striving to become a musician.
The theme song, It’s Hard Out There for a Pimp, won the 2006 Academy Award for Best Achievement in
Music Written for Motion Pictures, Original Song.
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from deep-seated biases, discomforts, and ambivalences about sex itself, which, while
culturally specific, are almost universal in their attribution of differential meaning to men
and women and particularly to prostitutes. 199
Finally, while autonomy is a concern for all workers, sex work puts a distinct spin on
it. Feminists have fought long and hard for consent to be the determining principle in the
legal governance of sex. 200 These liberal iterations of sexual agency and autonomy that
characterize our current legal and moral moment mandate that a person can change their
mind and withdraw consent at anytime during a sexual encounter. 201 In keeping with this
autonomy premium, sex professionals insist they should be able to refuse their services to
any customer for any reason and change their mind and withdraw consent at any time
while a sexual service is being provided. Importantly, they include among these reasons
racial and gender preferences and biases. Sex workers may, and do, restrict their
clientele based not only on a potential customer’s gender (which should not be
surprising), but race as well. Disability proves to be a fascinating category of its own in
sexual commerce. 202 Thus, although this autonomy premium puts sex professionals in
direct conflict with public accommodations and consumer protection law, many embrace
and insist on the same norms of personal choice and preference that govern non-market
intimacy. 203
In sum, while it may be tempting to “view[] them through the same labor lens as
other workers,” professional sex is not like “most” work. 204 Contrary to assimilationists’
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Certainly prostitutes can be romantic figures in literature, for instance the work of Dostoyevsky, but one
is hard pressed to find actual prostitutes who enjoy status and influence in their communities due to their
work.
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Consent governs not only rape law, but also sexual harassment. The main exception is statutory rape,
which is a strict liability regime.
201
See, e.g., State v. Baby, 404 Md. 220, 271-72 (Md. 2008) (“We conclude that post-penetration
withdrawal of consent negates initial consent for the purposes of sexual offense crimes and, when coupled
with the other elements, may constitute the crime of rape.”); In re John Z, 60 P.3d 183 (Cal. 2003) (the first
state supreme court to hold that post-penetration continuation of intercourse after consent is withdrawn
constitutes rape); State v. Robinson, 496 A.2d at 1067, 1069 (Me. 1985) (instructing jury that "if a couple
consensually engages in sexual intercourse and one or the other changes his or her mind, and communicates
the revocation or change of mind of the consent, and the other partner continues the sexual intercourse by
compulsion of the party who changes his or her mind, then it would be rape. The critical element there is
the continuation under compulsion.”) (emphasis in original); State v. Siering, 644 A.2d at 961(Conn. App.
Ct. 1994) (instructing jury that “if there exists consensual intercourse and the alleged victim changes her
mind and communicates the revocation or change of mind of consent and the other person continues the
sexual intercourse by compelling the victim through the use of force then it would be sexual assault in the
first degree.”). A Kansas statute “proscribes all nonconsensual sexual intercourse that is accomplished by
force or fear, not just the initial penetration.” State v. Bunyard, 281 Kan. 392, 133 P.3d 14, 28 (Kan. 2006)
(emphasis in original) (but also requires use of force or fear in addition to absence of consent).
202
See, e.g., Adrienne D. Davis, Erotic Entitlements Part I: A Reply to “Sex Therapy in the Age of Viagra,”
35 WASH U. J. L. & POL’Y 421 (2011) [hereinafter Davis, Erotic Entitlements Part I] (discussing disability
and erotics).
203
In this sense they embrace the exceptionalist stance, that the sexual nature of their work trumps its role
as labor. The 1964 Civil Rights Act prohibits discrimination against consumers in places of public
accommodation. 42 U.S.C. §2000a (“All persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the
goods, services, facilities, and privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of public
accommodation, as defined in this section, without discrimination or segregation on the ground of race,
color, religion, or national origin.”).
204
Moukalif, supra note [x], at 254.
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claim of homogeneity, most workplaces are not characterized by the particularities of sex
work: the culture of alcohol, drinking, and drugs; the homosocial “mob” context; the
blurred line between legitimate re-negotiations and criminal assaults; a similarly blurred
line between on-site/off-site (that is on-duty/off-duty) identities; and employer
expectations of “free” services that all can combine to create distinct risks and hazards.
Nor does most work entail the stigma and resulting isolation or threaten entrenched
liberal norms of autonomy in the same way.
Hence, on the one hand, sex professionals share many basic concerns with nonsexual workers, e.g., exploitation by management, weak rights, dangerous and unsanitary
working conditions, as well as distinctly gender-based harms, e.g., wearing stiletto heels
and sexual harassment. If recognized as employees, many existing workplace regulations
would also apply to sex workplaces. For example, exit signs and fire extinguishers are
mandatory in brothels and dance clubs as they are in factories and restaurants. Other
requirements will be relatively straight-forward to enforce, for instance that stages, poles,
sex toys, beds, i.e., “equipment,” be safe and meet specified standards of hygiene.
However some types of risks and hazards, such as the violence, sexual harassment, and
discrimination described in Sections II.A and III.A, tend to be specific to or intensified by
sex work. Importantly, many of these are areas in which current workplace law is
especially weak and constrained. OSHA and workers’ compensation are characterized by
constrained enforcement powers and both categorical and gendered exclusions of much
of the risk that characterizes sex workplaces. Many urge exclusions or limitations on the
application of Title VII’s sexual harassment prohibitions to for erotic receipt businesses.
Bfoq defenses similarly complicate the application of discrimination law to race and
gender. Finally, sex workers will battle with employers over their characterization as
employees, which is necessary to access many protections.
In the end, Section II showed how much of standard workplace law will almost
certainly fail sex workers. As that Section concluded, the assimilationist claim obscures
the distinctive characteristics of much sexual labor and the distinct regulatory challenges
it poses. The remainder of this Section explores a potential regulatory structure that
would try to take account of and ameliorate these risks.
B.Sexual Geography & Mitigating Violence
1. Violence
As described above, violence poses one of the biggest risks to sex professionals’
well-being. But because sex work is highly internally differentiated, violence threatens
some sex workers more than others. Face-to-face interactions that occur in isolation from
others pose the biggest threat. Elizabeth Bernstein finds that “while it is true that
streetwalkers are at exceptionally high risk of physical violence, by their own accounts,
the chief danger exists when they’re alone with a john—in a car or hotel room—not
standing on the street.” 205 Audrey Macklin’s study of lapdancing in Canada observes the
same dynamics at work: “It requires little imagination to recognize that the risk of harm
to performers in the form of non-consensual contact could only be exacerbated in
205

She continues, “In this regard, the pimps are of little or no use . . .” Bernstein, supra note [x], at 107
(footnote omitted).

44

circumstances where the patron and the performer are secluded from observation.” 206
Hence, although some municipal codes associate public sexual acts with “indecency,”
from the workers’ perspective, the more “private” the sexual activity, the greater the risk.
In this view, the degree of risk correlates not with the type of activity but with the
proximity and isolation of the interaction.
We might map this sexual geography as follows. Organizational forms of sexual
labor that do not require personal contact, that is, that entail no proximity, pose the least
risk. This would include phone sex or other new media sexual services, as long as the
workers remain “virtual” and unidentifiable. 207 Importantly, because employers, coworkers, and third party intermediaries can pose as great a threat to workers as customers
do, another crucial factor is the degree of contact between workers and these actors. The
more limited these interactions, the lesser the risk. In sum, in sexual geographies with no
proximity, i.e., physical or face-to-face interactions, between the worker and customers
and employers, the risk of violence is minimal. These types of activities ought not
require significant regulation to protect workers from violence, other than clear rules and
protocols to prevent cyberstalking and also to preserve the virtual nature of the
interaction and also. 208
In contrast to the anonymized, virtual institutional form, proximate, or face-toface, sexual services that occur in commercial establishments can pose a greater risk for
workers. Brothels typically have private rooms or spaces in which prostitutes provide
services to clients; similarly, some dance clubs offer separate rooms or lounges for
customers who want private lapdances or massages. It is during these proximate
interactions, while isolated from others, that clients are most likely to assault or threaten
workers. In addition, as described above, many assaults and threats against sex
professionals occur when they are leaving the establishment, i.e., while they are alone in
parking lots, on the street, etc.
Although commercial establishments have a heightened risk of violence, these
institutional geographies are arguably the most straightforward to regulate for worker
safety. Mandatory protections for the commercial institutional form might include
bodyguards, panic buttons, a security service, escorts out of the workplace, and
surveillance if appropriate. 209 All of the regulations of this institutional form rest on two
principles. The first is to ameliorate the risk correlated with both proximate and isolated
sexual transactions through surveillance, security, and/or empowering the worker to
quickly call on other stakeholders. The second principle is to make the establishment
operator, not the worker, responsible for the risk reduction. Many sex establishments try
to shift this cost, often by construing workers as independent contractors, but the point is
that in commercial establishments the operator is best situated to maximize economies of
206

Macklin continues, “The curtain shielding what happens on the other side of it from the public and,
therefore, judicial scrutiny is precisely what heightens the performer’s vulnerability; the parallels between
the regulation of public and private space in these cases and historic patterns of judicial treatment of
domestic violence are patent.” Macklin, supra note [x], at 165.
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Otherwise, stalking, both physical and cyber, becomes a severe threat.
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On the other hand, virtual workers might seek protections from privacy law to control their images and
how they are used. I thank Emily Danker-Feldman for this insight.
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Some brothels and clubs already include these safeguards. Workers recognize and discuss risk
management as they differentiate among worksites. See, e.g., BROOKS, supra note [x].
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scale and the geographic infrastructure. As in other workplaces compliance with these
requirements would be a condition of licensing. “Scores” akin to restaurant sanitation
ratings could be publicly posted to alert workers and customers alike to the degree of risk
and any conditions that might compromise their safety. 210
It is the final institutional form that generates the greatest risk of violence. In this
sexual geography, workers transact sex in proximity to their clients and isolated from
others, but outside of dedicated commercial establishments. Unlike those who work in
brothels or clubs, these sex workers largely provide their sexual services in private
homes, rented spaces such as hotel rooms, or on the street or other public places. (Sexual
services provided in the worker’s home is known as incall; services in other non-public
venues is known as outcall.) They might transact sex independently or for a third party
intermediary, such as an escort service or pimp. The defining characteristic of this sexual
geography is its absence of an institutional infrastructure. Unlike brothel or club
workers, outcall, street, and incall workers serve clients in unregulated private contexts
without any structural supports. Dancers in particular may serve multiple clients
simultaneously, but do so without co-workers, managers, or even other customers who
have a stake in the on-going stability of the enterprise, including the safety of its workers.
The presence of other stakeholders can provide formal or informal security for sex
workers.
In addition, in outcall or street work, unlike brothels, clubs, and commercial
establishments, the law cannot mandate a thick security apparatus—panic buttons,
security guards or bouncers, surveillance—because there is no stable worksite to regulate.
Sex professionals who provide incall services, working out of their own homes, have
greater control over their circumstances, but even they may struggle to reduce risk. 211 If
the worker is an independent contractor, working without a manager or intermediary,
then she must absorb the costs of security completely on her own and cannot achieve the
economies of scale that brothel and club operators can with security systems and guards.
Independent sex professionals may also be reluctant to reveal their profession to others
and resist the security apparatus that could compromise their privacy. Hence, because of
its lack of institutional infrastructure and isolation, this sexual geography, which I
classify together as “outcall,” poses the greatest risk of violence and is the hardest to
regulate.
Recognizing the particular risks posed by the outcall form, New Zealand has
issued specific guidelines and protocols that include panic buttons, cell phones, as well as
recommendations to carry flashlights in case of poor lighting. 212 Another protocol could
210

Sex workplaces could be subject to the same random audits by regulators as restaurants, day care
centers, etc.
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Many high-end prostitutes would resist this regulation, contending that they rely on closely monitored
referral networks to carefully screen their clients and protect themselves. My point is that if they
miscalculate, there are no protections in place from client violence. In particular, those who work out of
their homes are vulnerable to stalking and harassing behavior.
212
From the health axis of risk management, the New Zealand guidelines also encourage outcall workers to
inspect the premises and take other precautions. For instance, the guidelines encourage workers to
note whether the house is well lit and listen as she/he approaches the front door for voices that
may indicate more than one person. If the client is not alone, then the sex worker may require the
driver to accompany her/him inside. The sex worker should try to ascertain whether the client is
too intoxicated. If the sex worker feels uncomfortable or endangered at any stage, she/he should
leave immediately.
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be check-in systems, in which sex workers could confidentially document their schedule,
including the relevant customer information, location of the rendez-vous, and anticipated
time until the next check in. This could function akin to an answering service or we
could anticipate software companies creating apps that would manage such information.
Regulations might also mandate body guards for incall and outcall work, or other isolated
venues, although this might make the cost unaffordable to most customers. Finally,
hotels or landlords could market to sex professionals, offering rooms that provide
security akin to brothels. 213 For both third party intermediaries and sole proprietors
performing incall or outcall work, adhering to regulations would be a condition of
licensing.
In sum, when viewed on a continuum of sexual geographies, isolation and
proximity are the biggest predictors of worker risk. The virtual form is the safest as long
as it remains anonymized, i.e., workers preserve their unidentifiability and minimize or
avoid physical interactions with third party intermediaries. The commercial form, i.e.,
club dancing and brothel prostitution, can pose significant risks but are the most
susceptible to regulatory interventions that can increase worker safety. Regulations can
require operators to provide a thick security apparatus as a condition of licensing.
Finally, unlike brothels and clubs, in informal sexual geographies without a stable
infrastructure workers are at the most risk. In the outcall form, there is no stable worksite
to regulate, i.e., require panic buttons, security, and surveillance, and the worker is
isolated from other stakeholders who might provide formal or informal security. These
workplaces will pose the greatest regulatory challenge, but New Zealand’s protocols
provide a starting point. 214 As is the case with extant regulation of workplaces, we can
imagine a range of regulatory approaches—mandatory requirements, guidelines,
aspirations supported by incentives. Regardless of the geographic structure and its
regulatory regime, compliance would be a condition of licensing. This would be as true
for sole proprietors as for commercial establishments and third party intermediaries. No
regulation will eliminate the risk of violence of course; that is as impossible as it is in
non-sexual workplaces. However, by taking seriously the institutional forms violence
takes in sexual workplaces, we can certainly align sex work with the harm reduction
approach found in other workplace safety regulation.
Others have distinguished kinds of sex work, of course, typically along the lines of
legality or bodily penetration. The former approach distinguishes illegal prostitution
from the legal forms of professional sex: dancing, phone sex, etc. 215 The latter approach
Occupational Safety & Health Service, New Zealand Department of Labor, A Guide to Occupational
Health and Safety in the New Zealand Sex Industry, “Fact Sheet 1: Safety and Security Guidelines for Sex
Workers Who Provide Outcall” 82-84 (2004). See infra note [x] and accompanying text.
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Kotiswaran, supra note [x] (describing complex relationships between lessors and sex workers in India).
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See supra notes [x] and accompanying text.
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Even absent criminal law complications, there are vast differences among trades within the sex
work industry. Consider, for example, organized dancing in direct contrast to organized
prostitution. Exotic dancing is generally legal and is performed at a specific worksite (club) for a
set hourly duration. Exotic dancers who work at a club or specific worksite arguably have a single
employer—the club/site owner. Prostitution, however, is generally illegal, performed on a per
client basis, and not necessarily at a single location for a set duration. Prostitutes are arguably selfemployed.

47

classifies sex work along a continuum of its proximity to sexual penetration. Embraced
by conservatives, liberals, and radicals alike, the spectrum ranges from phone sex to
dancing without sexual contact to dancing with sexual contact to prostitution, which is
assumed to entail penetration, vaginal, anal, or oral. 216 This paper has reorganized sex
work along the lines of sexual geography. The innovation of the sexual geography
approach is that it rejects both the legalistic binary of criminal/legal and the bodily
penetration approaches, replacing them with one based on institutional form and risk. 217
In this sense it is highly attuned to the internal differentiation and structure of sex
work. 218 In sum, the sexual geography approach blurs the moral and criminal lines
between prostitution and other legal forms of sex work in favor of a risk-based approach
to regulation.
2. Internal Differentiation and the Threshold Employee Test
Internal differentiation also recalls the question of when and whether sex workers are
employees, the threshold test for access to many legal protections. 219 Basic benefits,
including unemployment and health insurance, retirement, social security benefits, and
minimum wage and overtime, are only available to those legally classified as employees.
In addition, access to most discrimination law is only available to employees. Finally,
the ability to unionize also turns on employee status. Unionization offers an important
alternative to state regulation or industry self-regulation, i.e., improving worker
protections through collective bargaining. 220
As described above, the employee tests vary and are complex. A key recurring factor
is the allocation of control over how work is done between the worker and the employer.
Internal differentiation means that sex work differs radically in the allocation of
autonomy and control between sex professionals and those who operate their workplaces.
Those working in the commercial form, in dance clubs and brothels, are most susceptible
to employer control. Still, even within this form arrangements and conditions can vary
drastically. Outcall workers may be more likely to both seek and exercise autonomy in

Moukalif, supra note [x], at 255.
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The continuum privileges touching over looking and contact over looking and penetration over contact.
As described in Section I, liberals and conservatives both can condemn commmodified sex, although for
different reasons. Following conservative logic, the closer sexual acts come to penetration the closer they
are to religious sin, or, in secular terms, the threat to the family. For liberals and some radicals, the closer
to penetration a sexual act, the closer the act to the degradation of women, people who stand in for women,
and dignity and rights. Hence both subscribe to the penetration continuum. See supra note [x].
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Viviana Zelizer uses a site-based continuum in analyze caring relations. ZELIZER, supra note [x], at
163-85.
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As Prabha Kotiswaran notes, “Sex workers are highly internally differentiated according to their mode
of organization of sex work and their relationship to the institution of the brothel.” Kotiswaran, supra note
[x], at 581. She identifies several axes of differentiation: wage; conditions of labor, i.e., bonded labor,
sharing income with brothel keeper, or independent. She also incorporates scale of the institution as
influencing the autonomy of worker. Id. at 585-88. See also Law, supra note [x] (discussing brothels as
institutions).
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See supra notes [x] and accompanying text.
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Although unionization has thus far not been very helpful to sex workers, and indeed is becoming less
effective generally, some assimilationists and activists view it as a potential path to sex worker
empowerment. See supra notes [x] and accompanying text.
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their daily conditions and decisions. 221 Finally, the virtual form presents an intriguing
case. For instance, phone sex can as easily be done from one’s own home, as an
entrepreneur or independent contractor, as it can from a conventionally Fordist call
center. Margot Rutman’s analysis of several highly contested disputes between dance
club and brothel owners and sex professionals suggests that these crucial classifications
remain uncertain and unpredictable. 222
3. Other Risk
To be clear, I propose the geography model specifically to regulate against
violence, where I contend proximity and isolation are better predictors. However, the
nature of the activity will continue to dictate other regulatory structures. Most obviously,
health regulations would be pegged to the potential for exchange of bodily fluids, genital
contact with surfaces, etc. Thus, other forms of risk do continue to map onto activity.
4. Summary
In sum, the assimilationist claim obscures the diversity of sex work. It does not
take account of how sex work is internally differentiated and how these very real
differences translate into worker risk. By the same token, erotic exceptionalists ignore
the very real hazards posed by sex work, insisting that the sexual nature of the labor
should shield it from regulation. I have sympathy with both of these views. Yet, neither
does very much to accomplish goals of reducing the very real risks of sex work. To
combat and manage this risk, this Section has proposed a sexual geography approach that
parses sex work according to its institutional form and how that affects worker risk.
Mapping sex work in this way provides a pragmatic approach to harm reduction. It
should also appeal to feminists, on both sides of the debate, in that it suspends the typical
classifications of sex work grounded in binaries of criminality or moralizing continua of
penetration and instead assesses it according to risk assessment and reduction. 223
C.Discrimination

221

Of course under the current criminal regime pimps exercise such extreme control that few would
mistake that for an independent contractor arrangement. Yet, this paper is gambling on the reduction of
pimping as we know it under legalized regimes. If my optimistic bet is right, then outcall prostitution will
be more autonomous than it currently is, and more akin to outcall dancing.
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Rutman, supra note [x]. There have been some recent successes. In a recent class action between
dancers and club owners in seven states, the clubs settled for almost $13 million dollars and agreed to no
longer treat dancers as contractors and instead to treat them as either employees or part owners. Trauth v.
Spearmint Rhino, 2012 WL 4755682 (C.D. CA 2012) (upholding attorneys’ fees and incentive awards).
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An episode of the popular Tyra Banks Show discussed how sex workers themselves perpetuate this
hierarchy. “It’s always seemed odd that women in such a controversial line of work would even bother to
be judgmental of what the next person does, but there’s a silent hierarchy that exists within the sex
industry, e.g., topless models look down on girls who go bottomless, girls who go bottomless look down on
girls who strip, strippers look down on porn stars, porn stars look down on hookers, etc. During the
episode, Tyra had the women rank one another in order from most respectable to least respectable...” Tracie
Egan Morrissey, Sex Workers Go at It on Tyra, JEZEBEL, Nov. 17, 2008, available at
http://jezebel.com/5091460/sex-workers-go-at-it-on-tyra.
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If violence and safety are relatively straightforward, if controversial, to regulate, the
final major workplace challenge is far less so. A goal for many assimilationists is
accessing anti-discrimination laws. As described in Section II they want sex
professionals to have the same remedies against invidious bias that other workers do.
Can harassment and discrimination be regulated and ameliorated in sexual labor? Yes—
and maybe. Let me elaborate.
1. Sexual Harassment
As discussed earlier, sexual harassment is prevalent in markets for sex, and sex
workers are particularly vulnerable to it. 224 As in other workplaces, unwanted and
unwelcome sexual propositions and behavior should comprise impermissible harassment
in sex markets. This is relatively straightforward to implement in cases of quid pro quo
harassment, in which employers and intermediaries demand sex in exchange for
employment or favorable terms. In fact, in sexual workplaces quid pro quo rules should
be rigorously enforced precisely because of the prevalence of the practice and the
particular vulnerability of sex workers to it. This is a prime area in which law can play a
crucial role in shifting cultural norms and combating operators’ views of sex workers as
their own personal sex slaves. 225 In sum, there is nothing about the sexual nature of the
labor that should subject workers to quid pro quo demands. In contrast, hostile
environment doctrine is not such a neat fit with professional sex.
For instance, some commentators contend that employers should be excused from
hostile environment liability because exotic dancers, prostitutes, and other sex workers
have “assumed the risk” of harassment. 226 Alternatively, one Note characterizes sex
workers’ comparatively generous tips. 227 Margot Rutman, who is largely sympathetic to
the assimilationist cause, is less optimistic about sexual harassment claims in such “sexy
workplaces.” 228 According to this view, by its nature, sex work should be exempt from
sexual harassment liability.
224

See supra notes [x] and accompanying text.
Quid pro quo liability raises a fundamental question regarding the potential implications of legalizing
sex work: what was the legal logic behind making quid pro quo part of Title VII rather than bringing it
under the rubric of tort or blackmail law, as some urged? On the one hand, if the quid pro quo norm was
based on the inalienability of sex, grounded in the illegality of its explicit trade, then legalizing sex work
would undermine the rationale for quid pro quo harassment. However, this was not the logic. Rather, the
stated logic of quid pro quo liability was that demanding sex in exchange for work comprised sex
discrimination and an abuse of power. At the time it was largely men who used their power in the
workplace, and also schools, as a powerful mechanism to coerce sex.
226
See, e.g., Kelly Ann Cahill, Note, Hooters: Should There be an Assumption of Risk Defense to Some
Hostile Work Environment Sexual Harassment Claims?, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1107 (1995); Jeannie Sclafani
Ree, Redressing for Success: The Liability of Hooters Restaurant for Customer Harassment of Waitresses,
20 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 163 (1997); see also Robert J. Aalberts & Lorne H. Seidman, Sexual Harassment
of Employees by Non-Employees: When Does the Employer Become Liable?, 21 PEPP. L. REV. 447 (1994)
(arguing for a sliding scale of protection from sexual harassment based on classification of jobs as high,
mid-level, or low risk).
227
Cahill, supra note [x].
225
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Realistically, exotic dancers do tolerate much more than women in other professions. In fact, one
might suggest that in actuality exotic dancers harass customers by touching and cajoling the
customers to purchase private dances. When true sexual harassment does occur it may be difficult
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Others though, disagree. For instance Ann McGinley charges that exempting these
workplaces from liability for sexual harassment constitutes a windfall for employers. She
argues that because sexual commercial establishments rely on the fantasy that “the dancer
is sexually and personally interested in the customer” to maintain their profits, “[t]o
maintain this fantasy, the club walks a fine line between permitting the customers to
believe that the exotic dancers are completely available to the customers and protecting
the dancers from sexual harassment and criminal assault.” 229 McGinley rejects the
assumption of risk and combat pay constructions as “plac[ing] on women the
responsibility of regulating the sexualized aggression of heterosexual men without
placing any responsibility on the individual men, on the employer, or on society in
general.” 230 Finally, McGinley notes the class discrimination lurking in the assumption
of risk defense. She contends that the best economic option for some working-class
women may be to work in “sexy” work environments, and assumption of risk doctrine
imposes a penalty on them for trying to find economic security. 231 Indeed, McGinley
finds that at least some commercial establishments already are sensitive to harassing
behavior. 232
Instead, McGinley and others contend that hostile environment doctrine should apply
to sex workplaces, although the “welcomeness” standard should be adjusted to take
account of the sexual nature of the work. 233 Thus, because the work is to transact sex,

to distinguish from ordinary conduct of the dancers and customers. Zoning laws provide some
guidance to help determine when harassment has occurred because conduct that goes too far is
considered lewd conduct or prostitution, but this is not harassment if this conduct is
consensual. Applying the traditional notions of sexual harassment in an environment like a strip
club becomes virtually impossible.
Rutman, supra note [x], at 532-33 (1999) (citations omitted). Compare Yuracko, supra note [x] (“It seems
plausible to think that sexual comments that might otherwise be actionable might not be when aimed at
employees who are explicitly selling sexual titillation - either alone or with other goods and services.”).
229
McGinley, supra note [x], at 78, 81 (footnote omitted). She elaborates: “[A]dvocacy of the assumption
of risk defense fails to recognize that employers whose businesses rely on the display of masculine
practices consciously create and benefit from an environment in which harassment is likely to occur.”
McGinley, supra note [x], at 91; see also Burstein, supra note [x], at 307 (“Even if strippers are treated as
sexual objects as part of their jobs, they still can claim Title VII protection. It is the employers who profit
from the fact that male customers may react in a certain way who must assume the risk of that
misbehavior.”).
230
McGinley, supra note [x], at 91. Reinforcing this point, from a “cost of accidents” perspective, the
operator who “create[] the sexualized environment is on notice that customers will likely harass her
employees and has the means to prevent and correct such harassment.” Id. at 67. See also Yuracko, supra
note [x], at 229 (“Even if the law allows businesses to create jobs that involve selling sex appeal, why is it
that so often women alone are perceived to have that sex appeal?”).
231
McGinley, supra note [x], at 90.
232
“[I]t is usually obvious to the bouncer when a customer goes too far” at a dance club and “[t]he good b
ouncer will respond immediately, telling the customer to stop.” McGinley, supra note [x], at 104, 105.
Similarly, if “the john goes beyond the behavior agreed to and the brothel acts negligently in preventing or
correcting this behavior, the brothel prostitute should be able to establish a hostile work environment.” Id.
at 105.
233
She contends that, “[w]hile the context of sexualized work environments is significantly different from
non-sexualized work environments, Title VII should account for this context in determining whether a
hostile work environment exists, rather than rejecting a cause of action altogether.” McGinley, supra note
[x], at 92; see also Joshua Burstein, Testing the Strength of Title VII Sexual Harassment Protection: Can It
Support a Hostile Environment Claim Brought by a Nude Dancer?, 24 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 271,
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sexual conduct and advances in and of themselves cannot constitute a hostile
environment. Rather, “[b]ehavior that creates a cause of action for sexual harassment in a
non-sexualized workplace may actually constitute agreed-upon terms or conditions of the
employment of workers in sexualized workplaces.” 234 Sexual harassment liability then
should turn on whether the complained of behavior is a term or condition of the job. 235
Staring, comments on body parts, sexual propositions, and general lewd comments all
could be terms and conditions of an erotic receipts business. 236 Still, “aggressive sexual
behavior such as derogatory name-calling, clearly unwanted touching, stalking, or
physical assault may alter those terms or conditions of the dancer’s employment and may
create a legally cognizable hostile work environment.” 237 In these instances, employers
should have an obligation under Title VII to implement policies and procedures to protect
workers. 238
This may seem overly complex. But then I would answer that law still hasn’t figured
out the nuances of sexual harassment in non sex-work context. Thus we shouldn’t give
up on tackling sexual ones. Others may take a more pragmatic approach, doubting that
we can realistically apply sexual harassment law in these overtly sexual workplaces. To
this second concern I would say, skeptics made exactly the same reservations about the
very creation of sexual harassment law. Many doubted it was possible to make the
pinching of bottoms outlier behavior it currently is in most workplaces. Sexual

307 (1998) (“Perhaps the problem lies within male biology and socialization, and not within the jobs that
women take.”).
234
McGinley, supra note [x], at 68.
235
“Because the essence of the business and the prostitutes’ role in the business is selling sexual acts to
customers, sexual harassment will depend in large part on the negotiations and behavior agreed upon by the
prostitute and the john.” McGinley, supra note [x], at 86. Put differently, “[t]here can be no alteration of a
term or condition of employment if acquiescing to certain behavior is a term or condition of the job.” Id. at
99.
236
Regarding comments that would be deemed harassing in other workplaces, “dirty” talk for many people
is an inherent part of sex, for some verbal stimulation is the most exciting part, and for yet others it simply
is sex. See, e.g., McClintock, supra note [x] (discussing S/M practices that involve role playing in which
there is often no intercourse or even touch, just “talk”). [“For example, a term or condition of employment
for exotic dancers in gentlemen’s clubs may require tolerating hooting or staring from the
audience.”McGinley, supra note [x], at 102. She elaborates “[a]n exotic dancer who strips in a gentlemen’s
club should reasonably expect more customer sexual behavior than the blackjack dealer or the cocktail
waitress.” Id. at 104.
237
McGinley, supra note [x], at 104. I would change the sentence to “does alter” and “should create.”
238
Similarly, punishing workers who do not accept the impermissible behavior or who complain about it
would violate Title VII.
When confronting harassment by customers, the fact finder should therefore consider the threeway relationship between the supervisor, the customer, and the worker. If the supervisor punishes
or otherwise discriminates against women who refuse to accept harassing customer behavior or if
there is an expectation that the employee not complain or respond negatively to the customer’s
harassment, the jury should consider this fact as evidence that the woman did not welcome the
behavior, even though she may have acquiesced to it.
McGinley, supra note [x], at 99 (emphasis added). Dianne Avery’s recent work on “breastaurants”
suggests that lines will continue to be blurry. For instance, although touching clearly is not a term and
condition of employment at a breastaurant such as Hooters or others Avery studies, is flirting? And, does
drawing such a clear distinction then anger customers who feel “teased” and put workers at risk for stalking
or retaliation by customers? Avery, supra note [x].
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harassment law is not yet thirty years old; there is no reason to believe that it cannot
evolve standards to define and manage outlier behavior even in sexual workplaces.
2. Disparate Treatment
That leaves disparate treatment discrimination claims, a harder case. As described in
Section II, sex work is highly racially stratified. 239 Racial discrimination against sex
workers occurs not only in hiring but also in terms and conditions of employment, which
include lucrative shift and private lounge assignments and referrals to desirable
customers. Discrimination can also take another form, expectations by employers and
customers that racial and ethnic minorities will perform racial fantasies that some find
degrading. The assimilationist claim that anti-discrimination norms should apply to
sexual commerce as they do to other service work is persuasive at first glance. It
resonates with the generations of scholarship criticizing Jim Crow doctrine and the
particular role that employment segregation played in the U.S. system of racial caste.
Assimilationists contend that sex work is no different from other service jobs in which
Title VII bars discriminatory preferences, however strong, by both employers and
customers. 240 In fact, one of the most significant interventions of employment
discrimination law is prohibiting employers from using customers’ “taste for
discrimination” as a rationale to discriminate against employees. As one prominent
feminist theorist argued, lawyers are no different than prostitutes or club dancers:
Law firms aren’t allowed to hire only white lawyers on the ground that most of
their clients are white and would prefer to work with lawyers of the same race,
and I doubt that courts would allow that excuse if any other racial or ethnic group
were involved. So why not apply the same reasoning to sex and sexual
services? 241
Siobhan Brooks, one of the leaders of the first Title VII suit brought by dancers, strongly
concurs. 242 Hence, discrimination is a realm where assimilationists make a strong and
persuasive case.
What should be made of the assimilationist claim regarding discrimination law?
Can someone legitimately prefer one sex worker to another based on appearance? Is sex
work just like “all other work” in this realm? And what is the role of race relative to
other axes of discrimination, including gender, disability, and age? This Section attempts
an answer to these vexed questions. It argues that, in contrast to regulating sexual
commerce for health and safety and against sexual harassment, applying standard
discrimination law to sexual markets may not work the way assimilationists anticipate.
First, assimilationism may rest on an indefensible disaggregation of racial preferences
from other sorts of erotic discrimination. Imagine a brothel’s heterosexual male customer
239

In sex work as elsewhere, these consumer preferences mirror broader systems of oppression. And, of
course, the same identity characteristics that put these workers at the bottom of the consumer preference
ladder also make them the most economically vulnerable more generally, i.e., more likely to experience
adverse economic shocks and with less cushion to absorb them.
240
Presumably Section 1981 would also apply to such cases. For the sake of simplicity I confine my
analysis to Title VII as the assimilationists do.
241
Vicki Schultz, Sex for Sale: Sex and Work, 18 YALE L.J. 223, 229 (2006) (footnote omitted).
242
See supra note [x] and accompanying text.
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requests a woman sex worker. On its face, this should disturb assimilationists. Title VII
issues a clear prohibition against discrimination based on sex. A customer cannot request
a male librarian, flight attendant, or restaurant server. Yet, intuitively, to many, a market
for erotic services in which customers cannot request the gender of their worker does not
seem like much of an erotic market at all. 243
Courts have translated this intuition into doctrinal terms. As described in Section II,
law permits sex discrimination in two instances, to protect customers’ spatial privacy and
also for what I characterized as decisional privacy in erotic receipt businesses. 244
Explaining the second bfoq exemption, Kimberly Yuracko observes:
Prostitution is, of course, broader than heterosexual intercourse, and sex work is
broader than prostitution. Sex work also includes lap dancing, stripping, and
acting as a sexualized gaze object. Unlike heterosexual intercourse, these
activities can technically be performed by individuals of either sex. Yet, all these
other forms of sex work might also be thought to have inherent essences that
require customer sexual stimulation. Therefore, sex discrimination might be
required by the inherent essences of these broader forms of sex work—not
because individuals of the disfavored sex are unable to perform the acts desired,
but because of the depth and relative stability of customers’ sexual preferences.
That is, the sex of the person trying to arouse them really does matter for people’s
sexual stimulation.245
Yuracko concludes, “The sex industry may be one of the few arenas in which the
conception of inherent business essence has some traction.” 246 Judicial recognition of a
bfoq for decisional privacy in this context puts pressure on the assimilationist claim that
anti-discrimination law should apply to professional sex like any other job. Sex work,
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In fact, in discussions with many audiences, which included vociferous opponents of my claim, I have
yet to encounter anyone who contended that customers should not be able to exercise discretion regarding
the gender of their sex worker.
Elizabeth Emens echoes this argument in the non-market context, observing that “Most people
believe the sex of another is the starting point for their desire. That is, most people understand themselves
to be monosexual rather than bisexual, so another person’s maleness or femaleness is a prerequisite for
desire, or at least for sexual intimacy.” Hence, raising the legitimacy of sex in economies of desire
serves a useful conversation-forcing function, because it tends to frustrate the generalized assertion that
desire in its ideal form would operate independently of “superficial” identity traits and instead would track
something “deeper” in the self. Most people would, of course, not make the same assertion about the role of
sex in their desire. And so including sex forces the recognition that some of these traits make a difference
for many or most of us, and not necessarily in ways that are readily described as morally problematic.
Although Emens is writing about erotic preferences in the non-market context, her observations arguably
support my argument that the gender bfoq in sexual commerce should be extended to other suspect
characteristics, including race. Emens, supra note [x], at 1313-14 (footnote omitted).
244
See supra notes [x] and accompanying text. See also Crain, supra note [x] (observing an emerging third
doctrine, employer “branding”).
245
Yuracko, supra note [x].
246
She elaborates, “This view may justify courts' allowance of sex discrimination in the hiring of sex
workers. Consider prostitution aimed at heterosexual men. Arguably, the inherent essence of heterosexual
prostitution is vaginal intercourse. If this is so, then the essence of heterosexual prostitution requires sex
discrimination in the hiring of prostitutes.” Yuracko, supra note [x]. Vicki Schultz resists the sexual
gratification bfoq. “Even if the law allows businesses to create jobs that involve selling sex appeal, why is
it that so often women alone are perceived to have that sex appeal?” Schultz, supra note [x], at 229.
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doctrinally, is not like other work in which sex discrimination is impermissible and
illegitimate.
If customers have a doctrinally protected preference in the sex of their service
provider, then what does that mean for the assimilationist claim that racial preferences
are illegitimate and violate anti-discrimination mandates? Would decisional privacy
extend beyond sex to race? Nor are race and sex the only suspect characteristics
operative in sexual markets. Although assimilationists have limited their arguments to
race, their concerns about discrimination clearly implicate the entire range of legally
protected categories, including disability and age. Returning to our hypothetical brothel,
imagine a customer declined a sex worker the age of his grandmother. Or, in the
alternative, requested a “young” worker, under age 30. Similarly, a customer might
refuse a sex worker who was deaf, legally blind, or in a wheelchair. Or the customer
might request a sex worker with a disability, for any number of reasons. These
preferences might stem from active hostility to the elderly and the disabled, or they could
stem from fantasies or endogamous preferences. 247 But they also could be byproducts of
unconscious biases and preferences rooted in an idealized erotic image that embodies age
and disability as well as race and gender. Can racial, sexual, and other identity
preferences be meaningfully disaggregated in sexual markets?
For spatial privacy doctrine, the answer is yes. In the classic sex discrimination
spatial cases discussed in Section II, gender and race are doctrinally separable. A
consumer can prefer a woman “attendant” in certain settings—e.g., locker rooms,
restrooms, nursing homes, labor delivery room nurse (although not doctor)—but not a
white one. 248 In contrast, the only judicially recognized exemption for racial preferences
has been in some prison cases. 249 (And some contend that the gender privacy cases
should be extended to guarantee same-sex prison guards. 250) The doctrine is clear—in
spatial privacy, courts disaggregate gender from race, finding a bfoq defense for the
former but not the latter. In this sense, courts defer to social conventions that gender has
a defensible meaning, e.g., separate bathrooms, that race does not. 251
In contrast, I would contend that gender and race are not disaggregable for erotic
preferences, which are based not on spatial privacy concerns but on sexual preference and
desire that underlie decisional privacy. To disaggregate them would be to believe either
that Title VII’s bans on sex discrimination are less compelling than its racial ones, or that
there are not meaningful erotics of race. Racially discriminatory erotic preferences come
247

See infra notes [x] and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Kimberly Shayo Buchanan, Beyond Modesty: Privacy in Prison and the Risk of Sexual Abuse,
88 MARQUETTE L. REV. 751 (2005) (rejecting modesty or privacy framework in favor of fear of sexual
abuse).
249
See supra notes [x] and accompanying text.
250
See, e.g., Brenda V. Smith, Watching You, Watching Me, 15 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 225, 285 (2003)
(articulating a human rights approach that balances prisoner privacy with guards’ employment rights);
Jennifer R. Weiser, The Fourth Amendment Right of Female Inmates to Be Free from Cross-Gender PatFrisks, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 31, 65-66 (2002) (urging a general right to bodily integrity as a factor in
assessing reasonableness of cross-gender body searches because “[a]lthough privacy is genderless, concern
for symmetry in the treatment of searches must not mean that critical differences in the sexualization of
power get overlooked”).
251
Of course current controversies of transgender access to bathrooms troubles this easy determination.
See, e.g., Adrienne D. Davis, The Potty Is the Hardest Part: Irregular Intimacy, Gender Segregation, and
the Search for Equality (work in progress).
248
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in different forms. In the weak form, appearance can be a crucial part of erotic
stimulation, so integral, in fact, that Elizabeth Emens notes that “antidifferentiation” or
“not to notice someone’s race or disability” would be insulting. 252 Yet, it can be difficult
to disentangle racial preferences from other appearance-based erotic preferences, such as
for large breasts, red hair and freckles, large rear end, boyish figure, almond-shaped eyes,
deeply defined muscles, hairy chest, plump lips, tall, short, milky or bronze skin, each of
which are associated with racial phenotypes, if imperfectly so. Many would argue that
these characteristics function akin to gender, as intrinsic sexual preferences, necessary to
their sexual arousal and stimulation.253 The strong-form argument in erotic markets is for
explicit statements of racial preference. Many people limit their intimate relationships to
those of the same racial or ethnic background. But the same social forces that underlie
endogamy also produce fetish markets as well as run of the mill sexual fantasies about
the taboo and the forbidden, often termed race play. Even as some look to sex markets to
mirror the same preferences they pursue in their non-market lives, it should not surprise
us that others turn to sex markets in order to explore preferences that are considered
taboo in their amateur intimate lives. 254 And while some find race play reprehensible
others find these racial fantasies therapeutic. It would be difficult to engage in race play
or satisfy one’s dream of sleeping with a woman who looks like Miley Cyrus, or
Beyonce, if one cannot specify appearance, in either the weak or strong form. 255 These
fantasies may be as crucial to that customer’s erotic stimulation as specifying “male” or
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Emens, supra note [x]. For a discussion of how visually impaired people perceive and understand race,
see generally OSAGIE K. OBASAGIE, BLINDED BY SIGHT: SEEING RACE THROUGH THE EYES OF THE BLIND
(2013). She elaborates: “In the realm of sexual intimacy, [not noticing appearance] seems a particularly
odd way to understand the ideal treatment of others.” Emens, supra note [x] (footnote omitted). “Think
how offended a lover can be if a partner fails to notice trivial aspects of appearance, such as new glasses or
a haircut; imagine if it were the partner’s sex that went unnoticed.”
253
This is not to say that sexual preferences are any less socially constructed than are privacy ones; only
that they are distinct and almost certainly equally strong. These preferences might be the product of social
norms and constructions, but scholars make the same case for sexual orientation and gender identity more
broadly. See, e.g., Davis, Abjection, Power, and Sexuality Exceptionalism , supra note [x]. My point is not
that physical appearance has the same fixity as sexual orientation. Many will date people of varying
physical types, but still limit themselves to one gender rather than another. But fixity is not required in
order for the underlying case to be true: that physical attributes and appearance are part of the inherent
essence of the business of sexual markets. They believe that gender has a prior essence which race etc do
not. Viviana Zelizer’s hostile worlds framework provides some insight. She notes that the suspicion that
markets corrupt also rests on what Foucault articulated as the pre-social notion of sexuality. She uses as an
example Talcott Parsons who “saw society as providing the normative and social context for markets, but
assumed economic and personal spheres were highly differentiated from each other and operated on the
basis of contradictory principles.” ZELIZER, supra note [x], at 40, 43. ; use for point that those who don’t
believe race/appearance has a role seem to embrace this pre-social notion of a pure sexuality.
254
For instance, some disabled people prefer to date other disabled individuals. At the same time, there is
an active fetish market for disabled people as sexual partners, e.g., amputees. See, e.g., Emens, supra note
[x], at 1343-45 (describing “acrotomophilia,” or desire for amputees).
255
Indeed, one need only look at the dizzying array of ethnic pornography genres to comprehend how much
the accentuation of social categories can yield sexual pleasure. See, e.g. Xavier Livermon & Mireille
Miller-Young, Black Stud, White Desire: Black Masculinity in Cuckold Pornography and Sex Work
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (exploring genre of white heterosexual couples having
“cuckold” sex with black men).
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“female.” 256 This is not to say that decisional sexual preferences are any less socially
constructed than are spatial privacy ones; only that they are distinct and almost certainly
equally strong. 257 If this is the case, it would appear that the decisional privacy logic
could be extended from gender to racial preferences.
Of course, as this paper has shown, sex work is not monolithic, and not all of it
warrants an exemption from disparate treatment law. The exemption should inure to
sexual commerce in which there is a visual element to the business essence of sexual
stimulation and in which customers exercise individual discretion in satisfying their
preferences. Where they do not, the inherent business essence presents a far weaker case
and may be outweighed by Title VII’s equality norms.
In sum, discrimination doctrine is where I join with erotic exceptionalists.
Assimilationists urge that one cannot prefer the race, and by extension, the gender or age,
of one’s sex worker any more than of one’s secretary or lawyer. But, when we filter
personal preferences through the doctrinal lens of the essence of the business, clients do
not have a legally defensible interest in whether a secretary or lawyer is in a wheelchair,
African-American, or male. Filtering sex work through the same lens, clients do have an
interest in whether their sex worker is male, and, I would contend, in whether they have
other traits and characteristics that in almost all other instances would be protected
categories but in sex markets are prerequisites to the essence of the business, the
customer’s sexual preferences for stimulation and gratification. 258 Hence, contrary to the
assimilationist claim, in sex work, body type and physical appearance, including race,
gender, and other traits, are uniquely integral to the commodity and service. It would be
a bitter irony if sex markets became the ultimate policing mechanism for sexual desire,
only enabling and authorizing normative, vanilla sexualities. Thus, I embrace erotic
exceptionalism, but narrowly drawn, around the sex act itself. I endorse exemption from
state regulation to enable workers to refuse sex, for any reasons, and to enable customers
to exercise their sexual preferences.
256

One finds similar preferences at work in adoption “markets.” See, e.g., R. Richard Banks, The Color of
Desire: Fulfilling Adoptive Parents' Racial Preferences Through Discriminatory State Action, 107 YALE
L.J. 875, 899-900 (1998) (citations omitted) (“Prospective adoptive parents are generally allowed to
express preferences in a wide variety of areas. Health, age, sex, appearance, and prior experiences are all
areas in which parents may say what type of children they want. Race is recognized as one of many
reasonable preferences parents are likely to hold.”); Andrew Morrison, Transracial Adoption: The Pros and
Cons and the Parents' Perspective, 20 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 167, 181 (2004) (citations omitted)
(“During the application process, parents often request particular characteristics of the child they would like
to adopt. Most adoption agencies allow parents to specify the child's race, age, gender, level of disability,
or any combination thereof.”).
257
The sexual gratification bfoq differs with privacy in another way as well.
Michael Frank notes that the privacy bfoq defense typically only is extended to “protect the sensibilities
and preferences only of women.” Frank, supra note [x], at 490. In markets for sexual gratification in
contrast, it would be the reverse: the overwhelmingly male customers for sexual services whom the
exemption would protect.
258
It is worth noting that, although the paper has made the case for both sex workers and their customers to
exercise discretion/preferences in sex markets, they are grounded in very different logic. For the workers,
the rationale is the autonomy imperative, that sex professionals should not be compelled to do anything
they don’t feel comfortable doing. This is a nod to the need for heightened autonomy for sex professionals,
grounded in the goal of preventing their subordination. The rationale for customers to be able to exercise
discretion is very different. For them it is rooted in the essence of the business, erotic arousal, stimulation,
and gratification.
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My first point, then, was to argue that in sex industries discriminatory
preferences, including for race, would receive a very limited exemption, or erotic
exceptionalism. This would expand the existing doctrinal exemption for sex, based on
the disaggregation principle. This leads to a second intervention. On the one hand, one
would imagine that, following Yuracko’s analysis, this exemption would be unique to
sexual gratification, or erotic receipt, industries. In fact, though, sex work is on a
continuum with other market sectors in which appearance is an intrinsic part of demand
and “production.” As discussed in Section II, while facially there are no bona fide
occupational qualification defenses for race in employment law, there appear to be
various exemptions effectively operative. These include the first amendment based
exemption for racial breakdowns in casting observed by Robinson and Frank, judicial
dicta suggesting similar exclusions for racial specification in advertising, and, finally,
modeling seems to operate in a litigation-free zone, as runway shows and magazine
editorials routinely use race—and age and ability—to construct an aesthetics of fashion,
as exclusionary and offensive as many, including myself may find it. 259 Hence, rather
than being unique, sex work may be on a continuum with other “appearance” industries.
If conceived as a continuum, I would argue sex work would be at the strongest far
pole. This is partially because I find persuasive scholarly critiques of the film industry
exemption. Mary Anne Case has called it “bizarre that sex is considered a BFOQ, in the
interests of ‘authenticity or genuineness,’ for the job of actor or actress . . . . After all, the
very essence of this job is to be something one is not. All that a producer should be
allowed to require is that the pretense be convincing.” 260 Russell Robinson elaborates,
“Actors generally do not face authenticity requirements regarding many character traits;
for example, an actor need not be gay or have a disability or pregnant in order to play a
character with that trait. Indeed, good acting is often defined as the ability to pull off a
role quite different from the actor’s own identity.” 261 Together Case and Robinson make
a persuasive case to eliminate the racial exclusion in Hollywood casting breakdowns.
And their logic could be easily extended to advertising and modeling. Yet, sex work is
meaningfully different, or at least proximate sex work that involves physical contact or
face-to-face interactions, which I have argued implicates decisional privacy. “Acting” is
much harder naked. 262
3. Assimilationism Redux
The point that appearance can matter in sex markets should be an obvious one. And
yet, discrimination assimilationists resist this intuition. Contemplating whether people
259

See, e.g., Robin Givhan, http://nymag.com/thecut/2013/09/givhan-confronting-the-lack-of-blackmodels.html (criticizing absence of racial diversity in modeling). Of course, the distinction between
litigation-free zones and formal bfoq’s is a significant one. Unlike the sex-based bfoq for sex gratification
industries, these other appearance-based exemptions are not formal; they are recognized by courts only in
dicta. Given the stakes in sex work, I am calling for the same clear-cut and certain doctrinal guidelines and
mandates, i.e., formally recognized bfoq’s, as exist currently for sex to other forms of discrimination. See
supra notes [x] and accompanying text.
260
Case, supra note [x].
261
Robinson, supra note [x], at 31-32.
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can pursue their various preferences for sexual gratification in sex markets raises the very
real question whether assimilationists truly do endorse professional sex. Ironically, like
abolitionists who adamantly oppose commercial sex, many who proclaim to be pro-sex
work seem to display a suspicion of markets for sex. They purport to advocate sexual
commerce, yet, the prerequisite for sexual markets, the underlying commodification of
erotic preferences, seems to trouble them. Of course, feminist critiques of capitalism and
its deleterious effects on women are tried and true. Yet, in the case of sex work
assimilationism, I suspect something else is at work. I believe the gap stems from
assimilationists’ devoting their analytic and regulatory energy to the supply side of the
market, workers and their employers, while giving little theoretical or empirical attention
to the demand side, customer desire and preferences. Their emphasis is on safety, justice,
and full citizenship for sex workers, and laudably so. Largely absent from their analysis
is what demand looks like in markets for sex—erotic preferences and consumption of
sexual stimulation and gratification. Assimilationists may proclaim it as “just work,”
while at the same time doubting the legitimacy of customer tastes and preferences that we
find in most (all?) markets.
Ironically, abolitionists have developed thick accounts of demand in sex markets.
Kathleen, Barry, Sheila Jeffreys, Carol Pateman, and, of course legal scholar Catharine
MacKinnon, have offered rich accounts of demand as based in what Pateman calls “the
male sex right.” 263 In stark contrast, assimilationists have largely declined to wrestle
with the demand side, either conceptually or ideologically. Indeed, as this Section has
shown, the demand side is where many of the challenges and the problems reside. As a
conceptual matter, the absence of a theory of demand prevents assimilationists from
tackling complex regulatory problems of institutional design and reconciling sex markets’
distinct characteristics with broader goals for just and fair workplaces. Most keenly, we
have forbidden discriminatory demands, productions, and biases in other service sectors.
Ideologically, neglecting the demand side leads assimilationists to an almost certainly
unintentionally conservative view of sex markets. 264
Indeed, there is a sense in which assimilationist arguments can begin to sound a
bit Soviet: there is a strong rhetoric of worker solidarity and dignity from the supply side,
and yet a rejection of market logic from the demand side. In fact, the model may be the
Soviet car, that is, you can have any car you want as long as it is the state car. And you
will like it (envisioning legalized sex for hire as perhaps a sort of moral education of
customers.) This is in stark contrast to visions of sex markets as liberating sexual desire,
enabling fantasies that allow customers to explore the taboo and the verboten. 265 In sum,
when confronted with a fully commodified market for sex, and all that it entails,
assimilationists may be more squeamish about sex work than they know.
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Something has to give: either we use Title VII and other discrimination law to
impose tight restrictions on demand, producing vanilla sex markets, or we allow these
preferences but give up the basis of the assimilationist claim that sex work is no different
from any other labor. I recognize that permitting an exemption for racial preferences,
even a limited one, is a real cost of sex markets, and for some that cost may be too high.
But we would need a set of principled criteria to distinguish these costs of sex work from
the costs that flow from other appearance-industries, most notably the film industry,
modeling, and advertising. Not to mention the constant and relentless shaping of the
meaning of race, gender, ability, and age to our youngest citizens by toys, video games,
books, and, my personal favorite, child beauty pageants. 266 These billion dollar
industries, too, shape gender roles and their racial and other content. There may not be a
way to disaggregate sex work that does not rest on and reiterate anti-sex moralism.
D.Summary
The assimilationist claim is a miscue not only from the diversity of work and its
regulation, but also from the ways that sex workplaces differ from many other
workplaces and, crucially, from each other. Taking account of when, how, and to an
extent, why, various risks and problematic behavior occur is a prerequisite to fashioning
an effective regulatory regime. In its recognition that commercial sex is labor deserving
of recognition and regulation, assimilationism is an important first step. But its labor
essentialism rapidly can become an active impediment to regulating sex markets. 267 The
question is not to enable markets in sex; rather, which market to enable? As this Section
has shown, there are many regulatory switches that need to be thrown to begin to imagine
effective regulation of sex markets.
This Section has suggested that some workplace risk can be ameliorated in a
fairly straightforward fashion, once we embrace the right regulatory lens. The Section
rejects the common approach of differentiating sex work according to a legalistic binary
of criminal/non-criminal or a bodily integrity framework of proximity to heterosexual
intercourse. Instead, it urges an approach that rests on how institutional form influences
the risk to sex workers. This sexual geography approach has the benefit of actually
addressing the causes of risk, isolation and proximity, distinguishing virtual, commercial,
and outcall institutional forms, while also trying to preserve at least some of the tradeoffs
between risk reduction and autonomy that seem to matter deeply to sex workers.
In contrast with health and safety, addressing discrimination is far more vexed.
When it comes to markets for sexual gratification, protected categories of race, disability,
and age may be built into erotic preferences and fantasies, as gender is. We may not be
able to defensibly disaggregate racial and other preferences from the doctrinal
exemptions for gender. In addition, sexual commerce appears to be on a heretofore
unnoted continuum with other appearance markets that enjoy implied defenses and
exemptions or at least litigation-free zones, for racial discrimination. This Section has
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argued that erotic preferences are at the stronger end of the pole than businesses for
which there seem to already be exemptions in effect.
The discrimination analysis also sheds some light on one of the pro-sex work
camps. Their effort to eradicate customers’ racial and other preferences from sex markets
reveals an important analytic gap: assimilationists have theorized the supply side of sex
markets but sorely neglected the demand side. They may be pro-sex work, but seem to
be anti-sex market. In this sense, they more share more with abolitionists than they
assume.
This last section, Section IV, tries to answer assimilationists’ concerns with a set
of proposals that address the specificity of sex work, while also taking up the erotic
exceptionalists’ claims that professional sex should remain beyond regulation.
IV. POLITICAL FEASIBILITY, OR, IMAGINING SOSHA
Although this paper has not included pornography in its discussion and analysis,
a recent conflict raises some of the potential challenges posed by regulating sex work.
Last spring the city of Los Angeles began to contemplate whether it should exert
jurisdiction over policing condom usage in pornography and claim it as a municipal
role. 268 After the private clinic that had monitored HIV and other health status for the
pornography industry “abruptly shut its doors” in December of 2010, city lawmakers
voted to draft an ordinance that would require condoms in adult films made in the city. 269
Los Angeles’s plan would end the pornography industry’s long-standing self-regulation:
“The city law would be the first to impose safety standards specifically on the
pornographic film industry, which has largely been allowed to police itself.” 270 Plagued
with little oversight and enforcement power , the California division of OSHA had
unsuccessfully struggled to impose condom requirements. 271 Yet, here, as elsewhere,
OSHA is. 272 Instead, after several adult-film actresses contracted HIV in the 1990s and
sued production companies, the industry implemented a mandatory testing regime,
creating and funding a not-for-profit clinic that established a health status data base.
The adult-film industry has long touted the efficacy of its self regulation, citing only
five instances of HIV among performers since 2004. 273 Yet critics contend that “Testing
just acts as a fig leaf for producers, who suggest that it is a reasonable substitute for
condoms, which it is not.” 274 Observers predict that the Los Angeles plan will spark a
regulatory stand-off, as the city lacks jurisdiction over public health, while county
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officials claim they lack the resources to effectively monitor condom usage. 275 Not
surprisingly, faced with this new regulatory regime, the film industry is threatening to
leave the state for more “friendly” jurisdictions. 276
This last Section turns its attention to the question lurking behind this entire paper:
the political feasibility of regulating professional sex in the ways suggested above.
Stakeholders from all political persuasions may be highly skeptical that sex work will
ever be effectively regulated. 277 The stand-off between regulators and pornographers in
California suggests the potential challenges of monitoring and enforcement in markets for
professional sex. If all sex work were to be legalized, some laws would apply to it as
they would to any other form of labor, e.g., requirements for exit signs and asbestos
levels. But regulating the substance of sex markets and how they operate is a different
matter. The controversy over condoms in pornography suggests several things about the
pragmatics of legally recognizing other sexual labor. California Rather than making
sweeping arguments about the pragmatics, this Section breaks the feasibility calculus
concerns down into its component parts raised by the California condom controversy—
administrability, i.e., type of regulation, political will, which includes concerns over
externalities and endowments, and, through the lens of substitution effects, whether sex
markets are an effective target for bringing “above ground.” It will address each of these
in turn, briefly contrasting sex work with not only pornography, but another case that has
drawn much attention to regulatory strategy—mining. Importantly, these two are
opposite ends of the regulatory spectrum. Understanding why sheds light on sex markets
and how they might fare under a legalized light.
A.Administrability
1. Type of Regulation
The controversy over the condom mandates suggests the initial question of regulatory
strategy. The pornography industry is emblematic of self-regulation; indeed, it holds
itself up as a poster child for that approach. Yet the condom controversy and its
underlying prompt, the abrupt closing of the industry-funded clinic, demonstrates the
limits, and indeed the serious deficiencies, of leaving risky sexual labor to the sole
regulatory purview of the industry itself. Apart from HIV, sexually transmitted diseases
are diagnosed in a quarter of all adult-film performers each year and are seven times
higher than in general population. 278 Hence self-regulation can hardly be viewed as
successful. Assimilationists might envision a different self-regulating regime, one in
which sex workers themselves would set the standards, not corporate interests. However,
as a practical matter, it will be some time before sex professionals enjoy the same
discretion to self-regulate that is granted the liberal professions, such as law and
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medicine. 279 Moreover, the call for self-regulation does not take account of the brothels,
dance clubs, as well as other institutional interests that have yet to emerge in sex markets.
We can anticipate that these large-scale actors will dominate the regulatory discourse, as
they do in other markets.
At the opposite regulatory pole from self-regulation is state control and ownership.
Yet state control of sexual commerce is not practical in the United States. Compared to
other developed countries, our government operates a relatively narrow slice of the
economy, mainly public utilities, parks and wetlands, infrastructure of roads and bridges,
services such as schools and transportation, and, until recently, incarceration. In addition,
it is difficult to imagine the public, or sex workers, being comfortable with the state
setting markets for and making profits from sex. Thus neither self-regulation nor state
control seems a realistic possibility for regulating markets for sex.
In between these two regulatory poles are several other options. As described in
Section II, the availability of various bodies of federal law, including OSHA and Title
VII, will turn as an initial matter on whether sex workers are classified as employees and
also the size of the workplace. The federal regimes employ differing criteria, and it is not
clear that all sex professionals will qualify as employees under these tests. 280 Beyond
this initial litmus test, the experience with condom regulation in the pornography industry
suggests other constraints. While the OSHAct’s general duty clause would cover many
health and safety issues, the agency’s own statements conceded that it simply lacked the
resources to monitor and remediate violations. It is unclear that other sex work would be
different.
2. Licensing
A more promising alternative would be to regulate sex work under state law. State
regulatory schemes take different forms, but a primary one is licensing. “Before lawfully
engaging in business, economic actors must, in almost all jurisdictions, satisfy certain
administrative requirements, notably to obtain licences or authorizations [sic].” 281 State
registration requirements vary greatly, from simple notification of intent to do business to
“an intense investigation of the applicant.” At the mere notification end of the spectrum
licensing requires no judgment, but can facilitate information disclosure. 282 At the other
279

Some might contend that sex workers already self regulate, pointing to collectives in India and
elsewhere. However these collectives mainly advocate on sex workers’ behalf against violent customers
and intermediaries and also child abuse. They do not appear to exercise any control over condition of
work, set standards, etc. I thank Jayne Huckerby for this insight.
280
See supra notes [x] and accompanying text.
281

Anthony Ogus & Qing Zhang, Licensing Regimes East and West, 25 INTL. REV. OF LAW & ECON. 124
(2005) (comparing licensing regimes in developing and developed countries).
282

While sellers of higher quality products and services may be motivated to provide relevant
information, this may not be reliable, because private legal instruments to verify and enforce the
validity of the information are costly to activate. However, there are usually cheaper ways of
meeting the problem than subjecting all suppliers to prior quality approval. Information which
might have been voluntarily given can be the subject of mandatory disclosure obligations enforced
by public agencies and, as has always been observed, certification systems effectively provide this
form of regulatory protection.
Id.

63

end of the continuum, the state exercises substantial discretion and scrutiny, which can
vary in intensity. Licensing controls also differ in emphasizing entry versus operational
systems. Entry licenses typically require “universal scrutiny at the ex ante stage
combined with periodical renewal,” while operational licenses impose “selective
monitoring at the ex post stage.” 283 Regulators have to decide whether to concentrate
administrative resources at the ex ante screening stage, ex post monitoring stage, or both.
Finally, failure to comply with licensing requirements can result in administrative and/or
financial penalties, or more extreme sanctions including license revocation and/or
criminal sanctions.
Some regulatory controls are “general licensing regimes” that apply to all “business
entrants.” But licensing systems can be structured to serve different purposes. Standard
functions include controlling competition or quality, as is the case with lawyers or
doctors, raising revenue, regulating natural monopolies, and ensuring the safety of both
workers and consumers through risk control and monitoring. Licensing then can
establish highly specific standards for a variety of behaviors, conduct, and interactions.
In service markets a standard component for ex ante licensing is to require standardized
training and a proficiency test, such as the bar exam or cosmetology test. We could
envision that entry license training for sex workers would include at the most basic level
safe-sex practices, how to ensure their own security, ethics, hygiene, and perhaps
instruction in counseling. 284 Ex post, sex workers would be subject to operational
monitoring. Restaurants, saunas, and liquor stores all are subject to ex post scrutiny to
manage and ameliorate risk. Some ex post regimes emphasize random checks; others
focus on continuing education; still others rely on customer complaints to detect noncompliance. We can imagine that all of these would be at work in sex work: checks on
commercial establishments to ensure compliance with safety and hygiene protocols, ongoing education for workers, and a robust system of customer complaints. Importantly,
as with doctors, therapists, and realtors, licenses can be required of corporate
establishments and sole proprietors alike.
Licensing may also have a secondary, collateral effect on sex work—legitimizing
it. As suggested earlier, some sex professionals urge that their work is akin to that of
professional therapists. Sex work is a profession with a high quotient of human need
fulfillment, and sex workers are the last stage in the delivery of that fulfillment. “As sex
workers have themselves suggested, one goal would be for prostitution to become a kind
of sex therapy, professionalized and no longer stigmatized.” 285 These sentiments
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envision the legalization of sex work not only legitimizing sex work, but actually
unmasking it for the high-status, skill-intensive work it is.
Finally, the licensing approach answers erotic exceptionalists’ insistence that sex
work should be exempt from state regulatory oversight and subject solely to private legal
remedies. Contrary to exceptionalists’ libertarian lens, few economic actors are exempt
from scrutiny and regulation. More than 1,100 professions and twenty-three percent of
American workers require licenses to do their jobs. State-issued licenses govern
professions as diverse as florists, realtors, liquor sales, manicurists, shampoo specialists,
interior designers, therapists, caterers, contractors, and of course, doctors and lawyers.
Anthony Ogus and Qing Zhaung provide a more comprehensive and eclectic list: “ice
cream buyers; hair dressers; funeral directors; pet shops; sellers of second-hand cars;
tattoo artists; astrologers and fortune-tellers; nuclear installations; consumer credit; tree
fellers; sex shops; massage establishments; saunas; motels; milk vendors; zoos;
residential care homes; and pawnbrokers” are all areas in which the state licenses market
transactions. 286 One can give ice cream to one’s guests, style a beau’s hair, and allow
friends to stay overnight, but commodifying and selling these services requires a license
and charging for these services without one subjects the violator to civil and possibly
criminal penalties. This is consistent with the state’s interest in the health and well-being
of not only its workers but also consumers. There is no compelling reason to exempt
sexual commerce. In fact, it would seem quite odd that a state would require a license to
wash hair or arrange flowers, but that those engaged in sexual acts with the potential
exchange of body fluids, not to mention the risk of violence, should be exempt.
3. A Sex Occupational Safety & Health Agency?
OSHA’s struggles to effectively enforce condom usage in California’s pornography
industry raise a related issue, whether it is feasible and desirable to create a dedicated
agency to administer the regulation. Some sex workers themselves endorse such a turn
with several organizations urging the creation of separate and discrete agencies and
commissions to monitor the industry. 287 Unlike their self-regulation counterparts, they
call for OSHA-like regulatory structures that can be attentive to the specificities of sexual
labor and empathetic to the concerns of the workers. There are, of course, precedents for
such targeted agencies. A classic example is the Mine Safety and Health Act, which
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regulates mining, an archetypically risky workplace. Mine workers are at high risk of
injury and accidental death from both single incidents and long-term hazards such as
black-lung disease and other forms of cancer. As noted in Section II, the severe hazards
and injuries in mining prompted the first two workers’ compensation laws. 288 Decades
later, in 1969, seven years after the passage of OSHA, Congress passed the first
comprehensive miner safety act. 289 According to the legislative history, “the existence of
unsafe and unhealthful conditions and practices in the Nation’s coal or other mines is a
serious impediment to the future growth of the coal or other mining industry and cannot
be tolerated.” 290 Federal law carefully details standards for equipment, ventilation,
shelters, and training. It also prescribes benefits for making health claims, such as for
black lung disease. Importantly, this regulation envisions regulation of both mine
operator and mine workers themselves.
Mining presents an interesting case because the work remains intrinsically dangerous
and, to many, unpleasant. Despite, or probably because, of this, it is also high paying,
relative to other blue-collar work and hence attractive to many. The regulatory strategy
for mining has been to ameliorate risk. (Importantly, miners themselves played a key
role in gaining these regulatory structures; historically their advocacy groups have not
counted exceptionalists among them.) But are professional sex workers likely to be
treated like miners? Can we imagine an STD Fund akin to the Black Lung Fund? This
raises the next question, of political capital and will.
B.Political Feasibility
Several factors account for the special regulatory attention miners have received.
Through-out the twentieth century, when coal was the country’s primary source of
energy, their labor was perceived as highly valuable. As described in Section II, the
nation valorized miners, politically and culturally. Their efforts to assert their rights
provoked violent resistance from mining companies and legendary stand-offs, now
immortalized in the history of unionization. 291 Importantly, miners were also what
feminist scholar Joan Williams has called “ideal workers.” 292 As described in Section II,
they inspired workers’ compensation because they were bread-winning men who
288

See supra note [x].
Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969 (Coal Act), Pub. L. 91-173; Federal Mine Health and
Safety Act of 1977 (Mine Act), 30 USC § 801 et seq., amending the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety
Act of 1969, Pub. L. 91-173.
290
30 USC § 801(d).
291
See, e.g., Philip Taft & Philip Ross, American Labor Violence: Its Causes, Character, and Outcome, in
THE HISTORY OF VIOLENCE IN AMERICA: A REPORT TO THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES AND
PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE (Hugh Davis Graham & Ted Robert Gurr eds., 1969), available at
http://www.ditext.com/taft/vio-con.html (reviewing the history of violence in the unionization movement in
the United States, particularly in the mining industry, including Coeur d'Alene, the Colorado Labor Wars,
and the Pennsylvania Anthracite Coalfields). See also PRICE V. FISHBACK, “VIOLENCE DURING STRIKES,”
SOFT COAL, HARD CHOICES: THE ECONOMIC WELFARE OF BITUMINOUS COAL MINERS 1890-1930, 212-220
(1992) (reviewing the use of violence by strikers and management during strikes around the turn of the
century); CURTIS SELTZER, FIRE IN THE HOLE: MINERS AND MANAGERS IN THE AMERICAN COAL INDUSTRY
(1985) (analyzing labor relations in the coal industry and the role of the United Mine Workers union).
292
JOAN C. WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT AND WHAT TO DO
ABOUT IT 5 (2001).
289

66

performed crucial labor for the economy, whose workplace deaths left economically
devastated families. 293 In addition, during the heyday of mining, its substantial
environmental costs were not widely perceived. In other words, the substantial
externalities mining imposes remained largely invisible. All of this translated into
political influence. 294 Of course, MSHA was not a palliative. Miners continue to
struggle against both corruption and lack of enforcement, and several recent disasters
demonstrate how such dedicated agencies can be even more susceptible to industry
capture. 295 In sum, MSHA can be understood as a product of miners’ substantial, if
contested, political influence.
The analogy to mining, an archetypically risky form of labor, and one that has
enjoyed substantial, if not completely effective, regulation, is helpful in thinking about
the political feasibility of regulating sex work. While mining may be an iconic form of
labor, it is less clear that most Americans view sex work as of similar social value. To
the contrary, sex work occurs against the strong gravitational pull of marriage and the
firm entrenchment of sex as a non-market private sphere set of relations. Prostitution has
long been cast as a threat to the companionate model of marriage that arose in the late
eighteenth century. Today’s critiques have hardly changed in tenor or fervor, with
feminists and social conservatives alike condemning prostitution as threatening “family
values.” 296 Thus, in today’s nominally sexually “enlightened” era, no less than in
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Victorian times, many view prostitution as a threat to marriage and that institution’s role
in preserving the social order, or, from a more feminist lens, the possibility of marriage as
a site of gender egalitarianism. 297 In stark contrast, most workers labor firmly in the socalled public sphere and do not have to do so against this powerful gravitational pull.
In addition, sex professionals are viewed in many ways as the opposite of Williams’
ideal worker. People find it difficult to envision prostitutes as workers with families, let
alone as the primary bread-winner, which many of them are. To the contrary, as just
described, prostitutes are viewed as threatening to families. Much political and cultural
work would need to be done for the public to perceive prostitution as work that supports,
rather than threatens, families. In sum, unlike miners and other iconic workers, sex
professionals have notoriously low political capital. 298

C. Endowments
Endowments are another factor in predicting the political will to regulate sex
work. The controversy over condom mandates in the pornography industry, a longstanding legal sex market, manifests the difficulty in administering a regulatory regime
for sex markets. On the other hand, the opposite might be true. Institutional endowments
form differently in legal versus illegal markets. A frequent effect of decriminalization is
to disrupt endowments that have become entrenched in the shadow of illegality. In fact,
decriminalization is often urged precisely to disrupt these interests, as evidenced in
instances as diverse as the legalization of alcohol, gambling, and emerging legal markets
for marijuana. In sex markets, part of pimps’ power over prostitutes comes from the
former’s close and complex relationships with law enforcement institutions.299
Prostitution then might actually be easier to regulate than pornography because the
current institutional endowments will be disrupted, and it will take some time for them to
re-form and re-organize in the legal economy. Thus, it is unclear how current
endowments would transform in legalized markets for sexual labor.
D.Substitution Effects
Of course, there are limits to regulation. Equally important are its unintended effects.
Contrasting regulation of mining and pornography sheds light on real restraints and
limits. Recall that the pornography industry easily threatened to leave collectively
of powerful politicians who are “marrying up and dating down,” a fascinating class-biased articulation of
the injury to their wives. Id.
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Of course others contend that prostitution preserves marriages by giving husbands’ presumed greater
sexual appetites a market outlet. See infra notes [x]. Dan Savage has recently updated this claim,
encouraging sexual accommodations if one’s partner desires more or a different kind of sex than one does.
http://www.colbertnation.com/the-colbert-report-videos/391692/july-12/2011/dan-savage .
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government office. This explains why the industries fortunes have been so badly buffeted by the naked
winds of the free market.” LEVITT & DUBNER, supra note [x], at 31-32.
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relocate the business out of California. 300 Sex work comprises a labor sector that is
highly susceptible to substitution effects. That is, as the costs of operating a legal
business increase, employers, workers, and customers migrate, or substitute, to illegal,
underground economies. In economic language, changing the cost structure of a market
produces an equilibrium response. Classic examples include markets for house-keeping
and yard work. Workers in these sectors self-sort into four markets. They can work for a
legal company, independently and legally, independently “underground,” or underground
for a company. Workers opt for underground labor for a variety of reasons. Of course
some do not have a choice, i.e., they may lack the paperwork for legal labor, face
structural discrimination, or are coerced into illegal markets. Others, though, are enticed
into illegal labor by autonomy, convenience, or “wedge” effects, i.e., a substantial
difference between the amount the employer pays into the system and the amount the
worker receives.
Market sectors that are either capital intensive and/or require a fixed business site
have the lowest substitution effects. For instance, a manufacturing plant cannot easily go
“underground.” Similarly, restaurants must operate out of a specific site. This lack of
mobility means they cannot easily evade inspection. 301 (Of course, with manufacturing,
there is a different substitution effect at work, outsourcing to a different, less regulated
jurisdiction, whether domestic or foreign. However, outsourcing exchanges one legal
regime for another; it does not go completely underground.) Arguably, one of the
reasons that mining can be so heavily regulated is that it is unsusceptible to substitution
effects. It is both capital intensive and site specific. Mining companies must be situated
where the natural resources are located. In addition, they invest heavily and, unlike
manufacturing, cannot outsource the work.
Sex work would seem to be the opposite of mining. Sex work requires neither a high
investment of conventional capital nor does much of it require a fixed business site.
Dance clubs and brothels can be run out of almost any space, and the work itself is highly
mobile, as evidenced by its appearance in streets and cars. Thus, like housekeeping, yard
work, and drug dealing, sex work is highly susceptible to substitution effects. This
generates a concern that if decriminalized and then regulated, sex work would remain in
the underground economy.
My gamble, though, is that because much sex work already is illegal, the effects
would flow the other way. Instead of people fleeing the legal sector for the illegal one,
we are trying to induce people to move out of the underground economy to the legal one.
At least some owners, workers, and customers, I am betting, would prefer the lower risk
and lesser stigmatization of a legal market, as opposed to an illegal one. While it is
undoubtedly true that the more regulations that are imposed, the less illegal work will
“substitute up” to legal markets, it is also the case that some who currently opt out of
professional sex because of the criminal and other risks would almost certainly be drawn
into a decriminalized, legalized, fully regulated market.
Importantly, there is also substitution between different sectors of sex markets, e.g.,
incall, outcall, and street prostitution (or in dancing, club versus outcall). 302 There is an
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interesting divide within the sex work industry. In the case of prostitution, some workers
seem to value community, predictability, and safety and choose to work in brothels.
Others, though, place a premium on autonomy, discretion, and privacy, and prefer incall
or outcall work. As described above, many incall and outcall prostitutes are drawn to the
work precisely because of the relative autonomy compared to other options. A similar
dynamic is at work in dance markets. All of this should be taken into account as
regulators try to establish equilibrium, both between legal and illegal markets and among
sex markets.
D.Summary
In sum, contrary to invocations of professional sex as “just work,” the political
feasibility calculus turns on several factors. Important questions include whether a
regulatory regime would be best administered by federal, state, or local law, or industry
self-regulation, and whether a dedicated agency is possible or desirable. Political will
also needs to considered, which entails a variety of issues, including public perception of
sex work and sex professionals, the gravitational pull of marriage and the relegation of
sex to the private sphere, and the management of externalities and spill-over effects.
Policy must take account of endowments, too, and how these may transform and affect
regulatory efficacy. Finally, substitution effects demonstrate that not all work can be
regulated to the same degree of efficacy. Sex work may be a classic instance in which
there is a highly elastic trade-off between regulation and substitution. Thus, all work can
be regulated, but, because of administrability concerns, political will, and substitution
effects, not all work can regulated to the same degree.
CONCLUSION
Sex work advocates claim that it is “just work” to great rhetorical effect—to
normalize sex for hire, decriminalize it, destigmatize it, de-exceptionalize it, and, in the
case of legalization advocates, entitle its workers to basic labor protections. Much of this
scholarship and activism is insightful and has moved the debate over markets for sex out
of mere moralizing and into a substantial policy and legal debate. Yet the rhetoric of sex
as “just” work elides, obscures, and confuses issues raised by legal markets for sex.
This paper has made two arguments about the debate over explicitly commodified
sex. The first argument is a conceptual one—that the emphasis on the sex work debate
between abolitionists and sex work advocates has hindered serious grappling with the
question of whether sex work could be governed and regulated consistent with liberal
goals of protecting workers within well-functioning, minimally exploitative markets.
This Article has teased out different strands within the pro-sex work camp in order to
showcase some latent contradictions and also test some regulatory hypotheses. Both
Experience suggests that if brothels are closed street prostitution and escort services become more
popular. Thus, as a practical matter, the question is whether we prefer street prostitution and escort
services to brothels. Street prostitution raises the most serious risks of violence, sexually
transmitted disease, and offence to community sensibility and public life. Thus, the Inquiry
recommended that prohibitions on street solicitation be retained, but within a context that allowed
alternative means of negotiating commercial sex relations.
Law, supra note [x].

70

erotic exceptionalists and assimilationists want to legitimize professional sex and reduce
workers’ vulnerability. Yet they could not be more opposed in the regulatory end-states
they envision. Erotic exceptionalists call for a radically non-interventionist approach to
sexual labor, stressing that it should not be treated any differently than non–market sex
with the latter’s attendant protections from state interference. In stark contrast,
assimilationists want to do just that, assimilate or integrate sex work into the existing
regulatory employment regime. They envision a thick set of rules that will actively
intervene in the worker/employer and worker/customer relationships.
The Article’s second argument is a set of governance moves. By casting sex
work as like any other labor, assimilationists anticipate a array of effects, including
normalizing and legitimizing the work, changing endowments through enforceability, and
accessing legal regulation to ameliorate some of the worst aspects of contemporary sex
markets. From a harm reduction perspective, assimilationism is a persuasive and
tempting rubric; sex workers truly are a vulnerable population. But is the sex worksite
really like the factory floor? This paper has contended the answer is no. That for all of
its good intentions, at bottom assimilationism misunderstands work, sex work, and the
regulation of both. And yet, the assimilationist claim is revelatory—about both the
discourse and the regulation of commercial sex.
Assimilationism is deeply essentialist. It invokes a monolithic workplace that is
governed by a uniform and universal set of rules. At the same time, assimilationist
discourse essentializes professional sex itself into a singular form of work.
Assimilationists anticipate that once sex work is legitimated it will be integrated into the
universal regulatory regime they imagine, without need for attention to the particularities
of sexual labor. This Article has demonstrated how assimilationist claims are first,
miscues from regulatory realities and second, bound to be unhelpful if not actively
harmful to the cause of legitimizing and protecting sex workers.
Contrary to the assimilationist discourse, workplaces and work are extraordinarily
diverse and subject to varying and differential regulation. Some workers have decent
protections from workplace hazards, while others, including those who labor in some of
the riskiest workplaces, struggle for protection. Workplace violence remains almost
universally under-regulated; yet even within that bleak regulatory landscape some
workers enjoy more protections than others. Finally, employment discrimination remains
contested terrain. Employers continually recast verboten discriminatory forms in new
ways, sometimes with success. Age, sex, disability, and race are treated differently, with
bfoq exemptions formally permitted for some but not others. And even in those areas
that formally ban bfoq’s, commentators have observed implied ones at work. The Article
has demonstrated that the assimilationist claim misses the point. The question is not
whether sex can be legitimate work, but, rather, what kind of work will it be considered?
Equally importantly, the assimilationist claim fails to grapple with the distinctive
characteristics and challenges commercial sex poses for labor regulation. Sex workplaces
differ not only from non-sexual ones, but also, crucially, from each other. Only by taking
account of the particularities individual of sex workplaces—both institutional form, or
sexual geography, and the preferences that comprise the markets—can meaningful and
effective regulation be crafted. Finally, regulation is neither natural nor inevitable, but
deeply political and instrumentalist. Many factors will influence the political calculus
that will determine whether and how sex work will be regulated.
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Yet the paper does not then fully concede the pro-sex work terrain to erotic
exceptionalists. At bottom, erotic exceptionalists argue that commercial sex work should
be viewed as legitimate labor, but that it should not be subject to any more restrictions or
regulations than is non-market sex. Given the range of commodified activity currently
regulated—florists, tattooists, astrologers, lawyers—there is no defensible way to exempt
professional sex. The activity poses risks to both workers and consumers, and those
risks—of disease, violence, and emotional trauma—warrant regulatory attention no less
than does providing massages or spa services. People are free to engage in noncommodified sexual activity free from state intervention, but sex, like many other
activities, becomes a different case when explicitly commodified. In the end, erotic
exceptionalists undermine their own cause. To call it work and then insist on exempting
it from the labor regulation that characterizes the modern democractic workplace is
assuredly a strategy designed to fail. If its sexual nature exempts it from regulation then
people will certainly call it sex, and not work. And fairly so.
Many will believe that this paper is unrealistic, utopian even, in believing that sex
work could ever be regulated effectively. They will make the persuasive case that
changing such longstanding entrenched norms is impossible. Yet, other feminist
regulatory efforts suggest some cause for optimism. Consider sexual harassment; thirty
years ago skeptics believed it impossible to get people to stop pinching their co-workers’
bottoms or linking sex to terms and conditions of employment. Skeptics similarly
expressed doubt about law’s capacity to bring domestic violence or marital rape within
the regulatory imagination. Yet in each of these instances feminism aligned with law to
effect massive cultural shifts, not ending any of this behavior, but reconstruing it as
outlier behavior and the object of both legal and cultural reprobation.
This Article is a first step—an effort to jumpstart “second-generation” questions
in sex work debates, that is, to move beyond the abolition/advocacy stand off to consider
whether and how sex work could be effectively regulated. 303
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Samuel Brunson characterizes his work and my own on polygamy as second generation questions.
Samuel D. Brunson, Taxing Polygamy: Married Filing Jointly (and Severally?),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1941860. See also Davis, Regulating Polygamy, supra
note [x] (defeating dominant analogy between polygamy and same-sex marriage and using commercial
partnership law to consider whether and how polygamy could be regulated on its own terms.)
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